Omima Jabal on Human Rights and Sudan

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/02/17

Omima Jabal, a Sudanese humanitarian, volunteer in the Emergency Response Room (ERR), a grassroots initiative providing critical aid during the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Initially focused on disaster relief, ERR expanded its work in response to the war, providing food distribution, medical aid, and civilian protection while maintaining neutrality. Jabal explains that USAID funding cuts have severely impacted local civil society organizations, forcing projects to freeze and depriving communities of essential food, medical care, and protection. This shortage intensifies resource scarcity, conflict, and human rights abuses. Despite challenges, grassroots and women-led groups continue coordinating aid and advocating for flexible international funding. Jabal calls for urgent policy changes to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches vulnerable Sudanese communities and supports local initiatives amid instability.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: The Trump administration came into power following the U.S. election. One of its early policy changes was cutting funding to USAID. What impact has this had on the Sudanese people?

Omima Jabal: The effects have been significant and widespread, causing considerable harm. The decision has particularly impacted Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs), many of which have relocated to neighboring countries. These organizations relied heavily on USAID funding.

As soon as the funding cuts were implemented, most CSOs froze their projects, halting ongoing initiatives. These projects had two key aspects: one focused on direct collaboration with grassroots groups, including the ERR and other community-led initiatives.

With USAID funding frozen, all projects dependent on this financial support came to a standstill. People on the ground are now deeply concerned about the resulting shortages, limiting access to essential daily needs.

Another significant impact is on individuals employed by Sudanese national organizations. Many of these employees are the primary providers for their families, whether in Sudan or abroad. Without funding, they can no longer support themselves, let alone their dependents.

Overall, this decision has significantly reduced Sudan’s already limited humanitarian aid. Previously, Sudan had been promised additional funding from USAID and other sources. However, with these cuts, those commitments have been withdrawn.

Given the rapidly deteriorating situation, this lack of funding places people at severe risk, affecting their ability to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, and medical care.

This is a major concern. As Sudanese people and as CSOs, we urge the U.S. government to reconsider this decision, as it has affected the lives of millions. This funding is critical for humanitarian efforts.

Jacobsen: How does the reduction in USAID funding contribute to an increase in human rights abuses for the Sudanese people?

Jabal: It ultimately comes down to funding. As mentioned, many Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs) and grassroots groups depend on USAID funding. Cutting this funding creates a financial shortfall.

A lack of funds means a lack of resources, leading to multiple crises. The scarcity of resources can cause conflicts among people struggling to survive with few available resources.

Sudan is already facing a severe resource shortage. Without external support, competition over these scarce resources can escalate into violence.

Additionally, when essential aid—such as food and medical assistance—is cut off, it directly impacts people’s survival, leading to widespread human rights violations. The fundamental rights of the Sudanese people to receive humanitarian aid and support are being severely undermined by these funding cuts.

Jacobsen: What specific human rights standards should be in place to protect humanitarian workers and volunteers operating in active conflict zones?

Jabal: This is a difficult question we’ve been asked many times. There is no single way to guarantee the protection of aid workers on the ground, but some measures can be taken.

First, the international community must officially recognize these individuals as humanitarian workers, even if they are not affiliated with a registered organization.

Second, it is crucial to ensure that funding channels remain open and uninterrupted. This would allow aid workers to continue delivering assistance at different levels despite their challenges. However, there is no universal solution if we talk about concrete procedures to protect aid workers.

It ties back to the broader issue of protection, which I have discussed previously. If aid workers face immediate danger, they need to be relocated—either within Sudan or outside the country—depending on their willingness and the level of safety available to them.

Jacobsen: When gathering data in grassroots initiatives, what are the challenges regarding transparency, accountability, and data security? Given the context, these systems are not necessarily operating in secure conditions.

Jabal: Yes. That is one of the key challenges—ensuring information availability while maintaining security.

Volunteers working on the ground face significant risks, including threats of kidnapping. Women, in particular, are at heightened risk of sexual violence.

Another major issue is data availability. The necessary information exists, but due to the lack of internet access and limited resources, much remains inaccessible or is only available in physical form—written on paper rather than stored digitally.

Even when data is collected, accessibility is limited, and only a small fraction of the information reaches those who need it. Additionally, being an aid worker in Sudan is inherently dangerous. The risks of collecting and handling data make this work even more challenging.

Jacobsen: What about support from the Sudanese diaspora outside of Sudan, whether financial or through expertise? How do you build networks with those individuals?

Jabal: The Sudanese diaspora plays a crucial role in this crisis. At the beginning of the war, there was no support from international organizations or external funding—everything depended on the Sudanese diaspora, which became the primary channel for funding.

Even now, after USAID funds have been frozen, the Sudanese diaspora continues to work collectively to support people on the ground financially.

There is no single mechanism for managing Sudanese diaspora engagement. It largely depends on geographical areas. Diaspora groups are often organized based on location, forming networks within neighbourhoods or communities. This structure varies from one grassroots group to another. Their contributions are primarily personal donations, which grassroots groups manage directly.

Another major contribution from the diaspora is advocacy. They actively campaign for Sudanese communities, raising awareness and influencing international discussions. Overall, the Sudanese diaspora is a fundamental pillar in localizing aid and ensuring that support reaches those who need it. As Sudanese, we are working hard to strengthen these efforts and tailor aid distribution to the needs of local communities.

Jacobsen: Destruction is an obvious tragedy. However, the silver lining is the potential for reconstruction—an opportunity to build within a rights-based framework for civil society while ensuring sustainable and inclusive development.

What opportunities do you see despite the tragedy? Because in my interactions with you, you seem optimistic and solutions-oriented.

Jabal: Regarding this, grassroots groups today represent the future of Sudan. The high level of youth engagement in these groups and initiatives creates real hope for the development of Sudanese civil society. We have internal challenges within civil society, but grassroots organizations actively work to overcome these obstacles.

In some ways, they have already fostered an environment in which Sudanese national organizations and grassroots groups—whether ERRs, community initiatives, or other networks—are beginning to coordinate more effectively.

This coordination mechanism is key. The opportunity is to develop a structured and collaborative approach between Sudanese civil society and the international community. This will allow aid, solutions, and funding to be tailored to the real needs of the Sudanese people, with their input at different levels and across various regions.

Another major opportunity is using this coordination to strengthen the capacities and skills of grassroots groups. We are also preparing them for Sudan’s future by supporting them in implementing locally driven solutions.

Jacobsen: Given their unique vulnerabilities in these contexts, how should support for women and children and their rights be addressed?

Jabal: Protecting women and children is essential. The Emergency Response Room (ERR) has taken several steps to address these issues.

While we recognize the need to promote women’s rights, most grassroots groups are led by women and manage their needs in a highly organized and sophisticated way.

Women’s offices, women-led initiatives, and groups operate across different parts of Sudan. These groups focus on meeting the needs of women and children, particularly during the crisis. They do not just work for women; they also provide essential services for children, including psychosocial support and early healthcare systems.

They are also developing their skills and advocating for more gender-sensitive aid policies across various sectors.

Most grassroots groups consist of women who have been actively contributing since day one of the war. It is truly remarkable to see what women can accomplish. In general aid efforts, such as community kitchens, women are key contributors—they prepare meals, distribute food, and ensure people are fed.

In the healthcare sector, many women and girls serve as nurses and doctors, providing critical medical assistance across different areas and conditions. We also have designated safe spaces, Women’s and Girls’ Safe Spaces and Child-Friendly Spaces, which provide crucial protection and support.

The most important thing is to ensure that aid is gender-sensitive. This has been an ongoing discussion among various grassroots groups, but women have proven their capability time and time again. Many projects are now directly addressing the needs of women and children.

Women’s groups within grassroots movements will be essential in shaping Sudan’s future. Their contributions will influence the localization of aid, broader community development, and post-war recovery efforts.

Jacobsen: Returning to the earlier point about USAID funding being cut—what changes in international funding policies are necessary for community-based humanitarian responses to be more robust and effective, particularly in safeguarding the human rights of the Sudanese people?

Jabal: According to the Sudanese context, specific policies need urgent change, and we have been discussing them for a long time. This is critical.

One key issue is the flexibility of funding. The international community needs to reassess its approach to Sudan because its context is highly complex and varies significantly by region. For example, the situation in Darfur is not the same as in Khartoum, Kassala in the east, or the southern parts of Sudan.

Applying a rigid funding structure with predetermined criteria or fixed funding channels creates problems. More flexibility in how funds are allocated is needed. Another issue is the policies governing who is eligible to receive funding. As I mentioned, national organizations do not cover all of Sudan.

Certain areas are supported only by grassroots initiatives, community groups, or local organizations. Funding policies must recognize and accommodate these realities. Additionally, the definition of accountability needs to be reconsidered. Grassroots groups are accountable to their communities. Still, their accountability mechanisms do not always align with the international community’s.

This does not mean they lack accountability—it means the international community must adapt its expectations to suit the local structures better. Another necessary change is the creation of alternative funding mechanisms. Funding should not be limited to a single channel; multiple funding streams should exist. This would allow for greater adaptability and effectiveness in distributing aid.

By diversifying funding channels, international bodies can better assess the impact and efficiency of aid distribution. The international community currently engages in discussions primarily with government bodies and ministries.

However, in Sudan, control is divided between the SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) and the RSF (Rapid Support Forces). Since SAF represents the government, international aid allocation discussions often exclude areas not under SAF control.

This means that some regions are left out entirely, and the only viable way to deliver aid in those areas is through grassroots initiatives that operate independently of government control.

Recognizing and supporting these local initiatives would improve aid distribution and effectively reach vulnerable populations. Another crucial factor is coordination among international organizations.

Although aid efforts are organized into clusters, these do not always function effectively. Each crisis requires tailored coordination strategies.

Instead of relying solely on standard cluster mechanisms, international organizations must work together dynamically, reassessing their approach for each crisis to ensure proper coordination of funds and resources.

So, in summary, the key changes needed are:

• Greater flexibility in funding allocation,
• Expanding eligibility criteria to include grassroots groups,
• Aligning accountability measures with local structures,
• Establishing alternative funding mechanisms,
• Recognizing the importance of grassroots initiatives in conflict zones and
• Improving coordination among international aid organizations.

Jacobsen: Large clusters of international organizations operate in crisis zones. These organizations can be massive and well-funded, but their size sometimes makes them inefficient for rapid response.

They tend to be comprehensive and bold in their approaches, but are there any initiatives focusing on smaller, more agile groups—such as small cohorts of organizations working together instead of large networks? Would such a model be more responsive to the localized needs of the Sudanese people who are most affected?

Jabal: That’s right. Some smaller mechanisms do exist.

For example, UNICEF has worked in Sudan since the crisis began, focusing on aid, education, and substitution programs.

The World Food Programme (WFP) is also active. However, as I mentioned, one of the biggest challenges is that these large international organizations do not cover all parts of Sudan or engage the community at planning levels.

For instance, in the beginning, UNICEF operated only in the government-controlled zones controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Other areas were inaccessible, and UNICEF had no mechanism to work with them.

Later, UNICEF began collaborating with grassroots groups, which was an effective approach. Working through national organizations alongside grassroots groups demonstrated real impact. However, UNICEF has not yet engaged directly with grassroots groups to develop a tailored intervention strategy using smaller, more localized clusters.

The same is true for WFP. Due to the mandates and policies they follow, they face similar limitations. I previously emphasized that international organizations must improve coordination mechanisms within crisis zones.

They must become more creative and adaptive to the changing realities of Sudan, working in ways that respond flexibly to different regional needs.

Jacobsen: On a personal note, for those who want to know more about you as an individual—where do you find your strength? You are working under extreme circumstances. Some may find comfort in data and analysis; human rights discussions can be theoretical. 

Jabal: Where do I find my strength? Strength comes from understanding the situation and its complexities, even within a single area. The situation in Sudan is not uniform—within one state, you will find vastly different conditions.

For example, we have worked in states where control is divided between two conflicting parties—some areas are controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while others are under the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

One key strength of grassroots groups is their accessibility. They have access to areas that even the government or international organizations cannot reach. Another source of strength is their deep understanding of the local context.

We understand why certain interventions fail, and others succeed and how to adapt to each situation. This knowledge is invaluable.

Community accountability is another strength. Grassroots organizations are directly accountable to their communities, which builds trust. This level of accountability is not easily achieved, but it is crucial. 

Lastly, grassroots groups have a strong reputation among the people they serve. This trust and credibility within their communities make their work more effective. So, yes, these are some key strengths that sustain us.

One of the major challenges we face is the spread of hate speech. The war on the ground is one thing, but the war on social media is another serious issue. Platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp are being used to spread misinformation and incite violence.

There have been cases where people were killed because of a video circulating online. This is a serious concern. One of our worries is the role of Meta, the company that owns Facebook and WhatsApp.

They have a fact-checking program, but it has many complications. One challenge is language. Hate speech often spreads in Sudanese Arabic dialects or specific tribal and regional languages, which are not always recognized by fact-checkers.

Another issue is transparency—we do not know how many fact-checkers Meta employs to monitor Sudan-related content or how effectively they prevent the spread of harmful speech. A recent U.S. government decision to halt Meta’s fact-checking policies has made things even more difficult.

This has further reduced the ability to control the spread of misinformation and hate speech. The international community has not taken significant action on this issue. No concrete steps have been taken to address the harmful content spreading on social media, and this remains a serious and growing problem we face daily. I want to highlight that as one of the key challenges we are dealing with.

Jacobsen: Thank you. I appreciate your time again.

Jabal: Thank you so much, Scott.

Jacobsen: You’re welcome.

Jabal: It was nice talking to you. Have a good day.

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices. In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.