Everywhere Insiders 26: Syria, Iran, Hong Kong, Pakistan

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/12/18

 Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Irina Tsukerman joins Scott Douglas Jacobsen to dissect intertwined crises: a US raid that killed Syrian undercover agent Khaled al-Masoud, cautious US–Syria coordination, and shifting energy ties among Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, and China. She analyzes Iran’s missile tests and sanction-driven economic decline, Hong Kong’s hollowed-out democracy under Beijing, Pakistan’s power struggle between Imran Khan and the military, and the UN Security Council’s first post-war visit to Syria. Across cases, Tsukerman stresses brittle alliances, proxy conflicts, and regimes prioritizing power over citizens’ rights and genuine reform.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So this is for the insiders. We are officially at our half-year anniversary of this series, so congratulations. That is great. Succession. Succession is once a week. There we go.

Interesting: a US raid accidentally—essentially, we do not usually use these terms, but I think “accidentally” is the right one—killed a Syrian undercover agent who had been working against the Islamic State group, instead of an Islamic State official. It is following up on reportage from October on interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, and now neither the US nor the Syrian government is commenting on Khaled al-Masoud’s death. 

The implication is that neither side wants the incident to derail efforts to improve ties. No one wants to explicitly claim responsibility or assign blame because of the geopolitical relationship they do not want to jeopardize right now. Is that normal in geopolitical analysis?

Irina Tsukerman: What specifically?

Jacobsen: The part where there is an accidental killing of an undercover agent rather than a terrorist, and to avoid derailing alliances, the states involved know the facts—whether from Syria or the United States—but do not explicitly assign blame.

Tsukerman: Yes, that happens. The closer the allies, the more likely they are to keep it as quiet as possible. When things run smoothly and coordination is very close, such incidents are more likely to be avoided. But in the case of Syria and the US, they are not exactly allies. They do not have a real alliance, the way the US and the UK, or the US and Canada, do. They do not have integrated intelligence networks. There is a lot of distrust, even if they coordinate certain operations. So it is not surprising that they would not share the names or information about undercover agents with each other. Coordinating some operations does not mean they want to give up independence or that they do not have significant differences in how to conduct those operations.

When you do not know each other’s undercover identities and do not have explicit integration of resources and assets, a tragic accident like that can occur. Then it becomes incredibly awkward, but you also do not want to cause tension or friction, and you certainly do not want to publicize it much, given that it is truly an accident and not deliberate targeting, recklessness, or negligence by one of the partners. Essentially, countries that are further apart—without a long history of coordination, operational integration, or joint operations—are more likely to suffer from these kinds of miscommunications.

Jacobsen: So Vladimir Putin is meeting Modi in India. He is circumnavigating to meet Xi. You would meet Xi first, then Modi. Is there anything going on there regarding Chinese-Russian or Indian-Russian relations, with a focus on prioritizing India right now?

Tsukerman: We are stuck in a bizarre situation. Putin’s meeting with Modi obviously touched on energy. But India has actually been shifting away from Russian energy and more toward the United States lately. Of course, the US remains expensive for India’s needs. The biggest supplier for the time being will be the Gulf states, which creates a bizarre situation for China.

China views India as a strategic rival. At the same time, it is growing its relationship with Russia. Russia is selling LNG to China at a steep discount. But Russia still needs other markets, and India has been a long-time customer. There is not only strategic rivalry between China and India but also outright enmity, alongside the situation with the United States. On one hand, Russia wants India to keep buying its oil and gas to the extent possible. On the other hand, China is not pleased because India is its strategic rival, even though Russia and India have had a long relationship. China actually benefits from India turning more toward other gas sources, as this creates greater Russian dependence on China.

However, all of that is balanced out by the economic reality that India can only go so far given the price ranges, tariffs, and related issues with the United States. So it is a bizarre triangle at the moment.

Jacobsen: Also, Iran has launched a raid with missiles in the Sea of Oman, near the Strait of Hormuz. This involved the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What were they striking? Their ballistic missiles were part of a significant attack. 

Tsukerman: It is more like a skirmishing follow-up. Iran has been testing its missiles. It is not just a response to anything specific; it is also preparation for potential escalation in the near future with Israel and other countries. We are seeing many shifts in that area. On one hand, the US and Israel are pressuring Lebanon to disarm its border, which is not going very well. On the other hand, Sudan just proposed giving Russia a naval base in the Red Sea, which would help Iran to some extent and also extend Russia’s reach into the area.

Also, the Houthis have sworn off attacking Israel-linked ships for the time being but are refocusing their energies on confrontation with the Saudis. There is a Saudi-UAE rivalry inside Yemen. All of this is essentially distracting from Iran trying to rebuild itself.

Both militarily and through its proxies and alliances in the region, Iran is rebuilding. You also have al-Shabaab escalating, strengthening its ranks, and coalescing with the Houthis and other armed groups in the area. We are seeing signs that there is likely to be a return to hostilities in the Red Sea in the near future, and Iran is very much preparing for that. This exercise is not merely a deterrent.

They meant to send an obvious message. Iran is flexing its muscle just as the US is distracted with various peace processes, none of which are going particularly well. It is no coincidence that the new national security strategy just came out, and none of these issues are really at its center.

It blames Europe for everything that is going on, including having unrealistic expectations of Russia. It shows no focus on Iran-related matters at all, as if Iran is entirely out of the picture, and it reorients the entire direction of US national security toward the Western Hemisphere. That leaves the Strait of Hormuz and other areas of former Iranian influence wide open to a return to Iran’s power-building.

Jacobsen: Hong Kong itself has had an election, which is always presented as a healthy sign. There was also the deadliest fire in Hong Kong in decades. Within a wide range of sectors, in the last five years or so, nearly 40% of incumbents—including household names and notable politicians—have stepped aside this election, while more mainland Chinese business-linked candidates are joining the race. So it looks like a multi-pronged attack on, or influence over, Hong Kong democracy. 

Tsukerman: Hong Kong democracy has become a husk of its former self since China’s takeover. Beijing is essentially taking over everything. The pro-democracy camp has been virtually shut out of elections in recent years. So this is not a brand-new development. There has been a lot of criticism of the fire, but that will not necessarily translate into a pro-democracy or anti-government result. First, because people know the consequences of backing parties that are not even properly represented. Second, because it does not change anything, people may be angry, and justifiably so, but ultimately, China controls this sphere.

By having Hong Kong handed over to it, China can dismiss any claims of external influence and has made it very clear that it plans to reintegrate Hong Kong into its own government structure. At first, it tried to send the message that everything would remain as it was. But it has become undeniable that China never had any intention of doing so. Under Xi, in recent years, it has expedited its takeover of several autonomous systems and is trying to create a system of conformity everywhere. Hong Kong is just one example. This is the future that awaits Taiwan as well, should China ever take it over.

One interesting note to that: UK students apparently are being taught in K–12 schools that Taiwan is actually Chinese sovereign territory, that it literally belongs to Beijing. On paper, that reflects the official UK position—the One China policy—but in practice, that has not been the case for many decades.

Interestingly, the UK is moving closer to China in its educational and ideological views of what it considers China’s sphere of influence. The UK never had Taiwan as part of its own sphere of influence, per se. Taiwan viewed the UK, the US, and other Western countries as potential security partners. Now we are seeing an ideological shift in the other direction. The UK, and possibly other countries, are giving up claims to treat Taiwan as at least a quasi-independent and autonomous entity in favour of adopting China’s position.

With Hong Kong, that happened a long time ago. I have not seen Western countries push for much on Hong Kong. Yes, there have been sanctions related to China’s overreach and its quashing of protests in the past, but there has not been a push to get China out of Hong Kong or stop it from interfering with Hong Kong’s elections or democratic processes. Everyone has essentially accepted the status quo.

Jacobsen: Also in the news: Seoul’s army has labelled the imprisoned ex-leader Yoon Ram Kong “ill” because he criticized the army chief. For those who may not be aware, cyber-terrorism laws are in place, and if you criticize the state, its institutions, or personnel, you can get into serious trouble in Pakistan. The same is happening there, even for former leaders. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: The situation in Pakistan is exciting because, quite frankly, the populist Imran Khan–aligned faction is no more democratic than the ruling military-aligned elites. It is essentially presenting a different flip side of the same mindset. The Imran Khan faction has been far closer to China, Russia, and to some extent Iran than most other factions within the Pakistani elite. He has had tensions with Saudi Arabia, which the current leadership does not.

Pakistan’s reality is already so dependent on China and, historically, so torn between Iran and the Gulf states, that these shifts back and forth do not fundamentally change the situation on the ground. They only reflect how the population perceives things, but they do not alter the economic factors that have created certain interdependencies. Those interdependencies are complicated to dismantle, no matter who is in power.

Pakistan has had a very long history of cyber interference, regardless of leadership, and a long history of imprisoning prime ministers for corruption. Literally no prime minister has ever finished a full term without either ending up in prison, being forced out of power, or being accused of corruption.

A lot of it is very much real, but of course, it is also used as a political cudgel. Imran Khan’s popularity for “standing up to elites” has not been about being more democratic or more liberal. In many ways, he is far more traditionalist. Even though some of his factions have played the card of potentially normalizing relations with Israel, that has also been the case with other factions inside the government. They have all explored different opportunities for diversifying sources of weapons, cyber technology, surveillance technology, and so forth.

The only thing that makes Imran Khan unique in the general political sphere is that he is seen not as a military figure, but as a popular cricket player who came from the public rather than the military establishment. That is the only significant difference. In everything else, he has kept to the worst traditions of Pakistani political mismanagement. 

The great ideological gravitation toward China and Russia also made him more popular with the Trump administration than some previous leaders, and Trump even lobbied for his release. But that does not change the reality of what Pakistan has been doing on the ground, its security paradigm, or the security problems it has been facing. The cyber crackdowns we are seeing are not new.

They are less about significant changes in the country’s politics and more about a power struggle among different factions. This has created a lot of anger and resentment among the populace because, as I said, Khan’s faction is seen as the non-military faction, closer to the public. But in terms of foreign policy or domestic policy, it has not changed anything about Pakistan at all. It is an image and messaging difference, not a practical difference in governing, political philosophy, or relationships with other countries. It is a stylistic difference more than a real one.

We are seeing that, interestingly enough, it is not the prime minister but the army chief who is now consolidating and expanding power in Pakistan, while Imran Khan is essentially being disappeared, in a way that is stoking public anger. This expansion of power is possibly correlated with rising public outrage over the perceived injustice of Khan’s treatment, the politicization of his fate, and the government and military’s cyber interference.

There is a very real internal friction in Pakistan, but it is not about democracy or better governance. It is simply about factions wanting to be treated equally and people wanting to feel represented by their choice rather than by the military. As for whether that would amount to better elections or better outcomes if Imran Khan were released, that is not necessarily the case. We saw no substantive difference when he was in power. If anything, he intensified some existing problems.

Jacobsen: One last aspect before we take a break and come back later. This is interesting. Two parts in one: following sanctions—new bridge sanctions, economic and otherwise—on Iran, their currency has been dipping to a recent record low, and they are trying to hedge their wealth in various ways. In addition, in the same region, the UN Security Council sent its delegation to Syria for the first time since 1945. That is extraordinary for the latter and consequential for the former. Thoughts on either of those? 

Tsukerman: On the one hand, the UN Security Council’s visit to Syria is necessary. You cannot really evaluate the changes occurring in Syria—or whether they are truly occurring—without a physical visit. The fact that there is a change even to be discussed is self-evident. Obviously, Assad is no longer there, so the UN must see to what extent the institutions are changing, whether the new government is a distinction without a difference, or whether it is genuinely different.

On the other hand, this visit alone will not allow the UN to appreciate the changes fully. It will depend on how thorough they are and how honest the government is. Will the delegation follow government policy and local handlers, or will they be free to explore, meet with diverse communities, travel throughout Syria, and speak to a range of voices to understand the complex reality? I am sure the government will try to cover up and hide certain matters—not just the lack of economic progress, but also various security issues and the fact that some Assad loyalists are being reintegrated into the government apparatus. That includes not only security officials who never left, but also political leaders being returned to a new hybrid regime.

The value of the visit will depend on how honest the UN delegation is with itself, how willing it is to challenge the Al-Shar’a people, push for real answers, and explore beyond the narrow frameworks the government will present. It will also depend on whether this sets up return visits and a real fact-finding mission—or whether this is merely a symbolic opportunity to grant the new government legitimacy and show that “things have changed” without any real follow-through.

Quite frankly, the UN has not been the best at these things for a long time. There is a lot of pressure from the Gulf States, from Turkey, and even from the United States to move on quickly, to give a stamp of approval so everyone can proceed to reconstruction, economic opportunities, corridors, regional integration, and all the benefits expected from Syria’s reintegration with the international community. I am not sure a rush is justified given the security and human-rights incidents, the reports on the ground that extremists are operating checkpoints, and the contradictory reports on Al-Shar’a’s handling of the situation. It is unclear whether his opportunism will translate to anything more than tactical alliances with the West—alliances that will be abandoned as soon as he gets what he wants: removal of all sanctions and the funding needed for Syria to function more like a state and less like a patchwork of conflicting municipalities and regions. By the way, it has been like that since the Ottoman Empire; it has never truly been a solid, unified state.

There is an attempt to force centralization by Al-Shar’a, by Tambaric, and certainly by Turkey, with backing from some Gulf countries. But that does not necessarily have the support of local communities. Now, as far as the Iran sanctions fight, that should come as no surprise. Rather than taking the opportunity to reevaluate its strategy, given the climate change and ecological disasters it is facing—

Given that Iran’s nuclear program has suffered severe setbacks after UN strikes, after its military has been left in ruins, and after confrontations with Israel; given that its proxies across the region have been decimated and severely weakened — rather than taking this opportunity to focus on rebuilding its economy and proving its usefulness to its own citizens and to the region, Iran is actually rebuilding its military and nuclear program. It is sending aggressive external messaging and trying to restore its previous image as the regional scarecrow, rather than doing anything beneficial for the people living within its own borders.

That should come as no surprise, because the leadership of Iran has not changed as a result of these events, nor have they learned any meaningful lessons other than possibly improving their intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus. That will not make them more popular. They are deliberately repeating the same mistakes and problems. Their ideological focus has not changed.

I think it was a tremendous mistake for the Trump administration to stop Israel from putting an end to the current leadership and at least forcing the country to begin some reevaluation of its institutions and leadership. So long as the current people in power remain in power, we should not expect any dramatic changes. We should expect them to continue doubling down even as the economy crashes and people continue to suffer. As long as the policies do not change, we will not see anything new.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina. 

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