Omima Jabal and Sudan’s ERR: Neutral Aid, Nafir Solidarity, and Youth-Led Resilience

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/25

Omima Jabal, a Sudanese humanitarian leading the Emergency Response Room (ERR), a grassroots initiative providing critical aid during the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)–Rapid Support Forces (RSF) war. ERR, originally focused on disaster relief, expanded post-war to include food distribution, medical aid, and civilian protection while maintaining neutrality. Jabal highlights the major challenges of volunteer security, funding shortages, and media neglect. Inspired by Sudan’s communal tradition, Nafir, ERR is a community-driven initiative. Despite hardships, Jabal remains hopeful, emphasizing diaspora advocacy, civil society restructuring, and youth leadership as key to Sudan’s future.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we’re here with Omima Jabal, a Sudanese humanitarian and community organizer leading the Emergency Response Room (ERR). The ERR, a grassroots initiative that existed before and during the ongoing war, provides essential aid amid the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Jabal has been actively distributing food, medical supplies, and shelter to displaced civilians. She has participated in international discussions, including a panel hosted by the United States Institute of Peace, highlighting local responders’ challenges. Her efforts contribute to sustaining civilian resilience during Sudan’s crisis. What is the mission of the Emergency Response Room? What are its primary objectives?

Omima Jabal: Yes, thank you, Scott. It’s nice to be here. As I always say, any opportunity to talk about Sudan and advocate for my people and my country is one I will take.

To discuss the mission of the Emergency Response Room (ERR), we need to go back to its origins. Some ERRs were established before the war, while others emerged after the conflict began.

Before the war, some ERRs focused on promoting health services during crises such as floods and the COVID-19 pandemic. They also provided food and shelter services in response to natural disasters and humanitarian needs. That was the primary goal of the ERRs before the war.

After the war began, the ERR expanded significantly, covering more areas, and many new ERRs were established.

The ERR’s mission after the war is as follows:

• Neutrality: We are a neutral body. This means we do not collaborate with or support any conflicting parties, whether SAF or RSF. Our focus is solely on humanitarian aid.
• Humanitarian Aid: We provide food, medical services, and protection for civilians in war zones.
• Service Continuity: Our objective is to ensure that essential services continue despite the ongoing conflict.
• Food Security: We work to provide food through communal soup kitchens and the distribution of food baskets.
• Protection of Civilians: This includes relocating civilians from active war zones to safer areas.
• Mental Health Support: We provide psychosocial support through safe spaces, including Women’s and Girls’ Safe Spaces and Child-Friendly Spaces. These spaces offer critical mental health and emotional support for children, women, and girls affected by the war.

That, in simple terms, is the mission and objectives of the ERR.

Jacobsen: How did the ERR emerge from the resistance committees?

Jabal: There is a misunderstanding regarding this concept. We cannot say that the ERR emerged from the resistance committees, as each has a distinct mission. While resistance committees focus on political mobilization and advocacy, the ERR is strictly a humanitarian response initiative that remains neutral in the conflict. However, some individuals involved in grassroots activism may also contribute to humanitarian work through ERR efforts.

However, most of the ERR volunteers were originally resistance committee volunteers. After the revolution, the resistance committees primarily focused on political engagement, raising political awareness among individuals within their communities.

Yes, they did take on some administrative roles within their neighborhoods and localities, such as providing necessities like food and other essential services. However, the ERR is fundamentally different—it is a community-based organization.

As I mentioned, the ERR does not support any party in the conflict. Instead, it works directly with communities, aligning with local needs and providing humanitarian aid. That said, many of our volunteers were previously involved in resistance committees. Still, their role within the ERR is strictly humanitarian.

Jacobsen: What were the immediate challenges for the team?

Jabal: Oh, after the war started, in the early days, our primary focus was on providing meals. That was the most urgent need. We also prioritized basic healthcare services, such as distributing essential medical aid. However, as time passed, new challenges emerged. Some of the biggest challenges we faced included:

1. Safe passage for aid deliveries – This was crucial, as active fighting made many roads inaccessible. Moving through these areas safely was a significant challenge.
2. Volunteer security – In the early days, it was extremely dangerous for volunteers. Many were taken hostage, threatened, or even killed while attempting to provide aid.
3. Scarcity of resources – Supplies were severely limited, making it difficult to meet the overwhelming needs of the displaced population.
4. Lack of funding – In the early days, many international organizations and major donors withdrew their personnel from Sudan, effectively cutting off funding. The Sudanese diaspora became the primary source of financial support during this time.
5. Internet and network blackouts – Communication was severely disrupted due to government-imposed restrictions and damaged infrastructure, making coordination efforts difficult.

These were the five main challenges we faced in the early stages of our response.

Jacobsen: How does the ERR coordinate with local organizations and communities?

Jabal: We cannot say that the ERRs “coordinate” with local organizations in a formal sense because they emerged directly from the communities themselves. The ERR is a community-based initiative involving all components and different groups within the local population. The needs are identified by the community itself self and then the fund is directed towards these needs, the ERRs are accountable to the community and very transparent, “monthly reports of spending shared through social media of meetings with the community”.

The idea behind the ERRs is rooted in a Sudanese tradition known as Nafir.

Nafir is a long-standing agricultural tradition in rural Sudan, where community members help each other during harvest. For example, suppose a farmer needs to harvest a large piece of land. In that case, the entire community will gather daily to complete the work collectively.

This same spirit of collective action drives the ERR. It is not a top-down organization but a grassroots movement built on solidarity, mutual aid, and local knowledge.

The ERR is deeply embedded in the community, involving all different groups and age demographics. For example, young people take on logistics and administrative tasks since they have the energy and mobility to move around. Women and older people prepare meals, care for children, and provide psychosocial support for those affected by the war.

So, rather than saying that the ERR coordinates with the community, it is more accurate to say that the ERR is part of the community itself. That’s it.

Jacobsen: Are food, water, and medical supplies being distributed amid the conflict?

Jabal: Yes, but it has been a significant challenge.

The ability to distribute aid depends heavily on the geographical location. The situation in Sudan is different based on the area e.g: Khartoum and Darfur. While the conflict involves the same warring parties (SAF and RSF), the realities on the ground vary greatly.

Distributing aid has been particularly difficult because the war zone has expanded over time. For example, when the conflict first broke out in Khartoum, the city of Wad Madani (Al-Jazira State) became a key supplier of food and daily necessities. However, as the war spread to Al-Jazira, these supply lines were disrupted, making accessing food and essential goods increasingly difficult.

Another major obstacle is the presence of checkpoints controlled by SAF and RSF. Moving supplies across different territories requires passing through multiple military-controlled zones, where fees or bribes may be demanded before goods are allowed.

Additionally, there have been no sustained ceasefires to facilitate humanitarian efforts. While negotiations have taken place, they have not resulted in any lasting truces to ensure the safe aid distribution.

Another financial challenge is that only one mobile banking application, Bankak, is currently functional in Sudan’s capital. This mobile money service frequently malfunctions due to poor service. In some cases, the government has deactivated the accounts of individuals receiving financial aid, further complicating access to funding for humanitarian efforts.

Despite these difficulties, people have found creative solutions. One notable initiative involved urban agriculture—a group planted vegetables near the Blue Nile to help support communal soup kitchens.

So, yes, it is incredibly challenging, but people are finding ways to adapt and survive.

During the fighting, infrastructure, including water stations, water pumps, and power stations, is often targeted. As a result, we have seen significant damage to these essential services.

As the ERR, we have successfully repaired and maintained some of these systems, but many remain non-functional today.

Regarding medical support, in early late 2023, several international organizations, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), began operating in the capital and other affected areas, providing medical services.

However, importing medicine, medical supplies, and other essential healthcare materials remains a major challenge.

Jacobsen: How do you ensure the safety of responders who provide aid?

Jabal: Ensuring the safety of aid providers in a war zone is extremely difficult. There are no fixed parameters or guarantees for protection. It depends on two key factors:

1. Basic safety training – We provide basic self-protection training to volunteers. However, there is no way to predict what will happen in an active war zone.
2. Community involvement – Volunteers working in active war zones are safest when the entire community is engaged. When a community takes responsibility for protecting volunteers, the risk is lower because security does not rely on a single individual but on collective support.

We do not have formalized safety protocols, which remains a major challenge. Early on, we attempted to gain recognition for aid providers to protect them from being targeted by SAF and RSF. However, this effort was largely unsuccessful.

When a volunteer is kidnapped or threatened, our response typically involves advocacy through social media. We raise awareness in the hopes that an international organization or a foreign body will speak out and apply pressure for their release. Internally, we have limited power to intervene.

We have urged the international community to officially recognize volunteers as humanitarian aid providers to increase their protection. However, the reality is grim—all our volunteers understand that they may never return when they deliver aid. It is a daily reality they have come to accept.

We have not established a clear protection protocol for our volunteers. When someone is kidnapped, we do our best to advocate for their release. If a volunteer receives a death threat, our best course of action is to relocate them to save states more.

However, this is another challenge—most of the protection funding we receive is designated for relocating people within Sudan (from one state to another). There are no dedicated funds for evacuating volunteers outside of Sudan, making it incredibly difficult to provide long-term protection for those most at risk.

Jabal: Those fortunate enough to secure protection funds often face new challenges. While relocating them may remove the immediate threat of death from conflict parties, they are frequently placed in a new environment without any financial or resource support to sustain themselves. So, their long-term safety and survival remain uncertain even after escaping immediate danger. Yes, it is a major challenge.

Jacobsen: How has the community responded? This question is linked to the previous discussion about ERR’s integration with the community. Instead of simply asking how the community responds, a more precise way to frame the question is: Since the ERR is deeply integrated into the community, how does this influence the community’s operational strategies?

Jabal: ERR’sIn the beginning, our primary focus was providing essential services—food, healthcare, and protection—but our impact has extended beyond those core services.

One of the biggest impacts has been on community cohesion.

For example, in shelters and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, you will find people from different ethnic backgrounds and geographical regions living together. Over time, they have started to work together, care for shared spaces, and even engage in discussions about broader issues affecting their lives.

Additionally, displaced people have started interacting and integrating with host communities in non-active conflict areas. This has created new levels of social cohesion and even contributed to community peacebuilding.

Despite all the suffering caused by this war, one unexpected opportunity has emerged—it has allowed Sudanese people from different regions and backgrounds to interact, collaborate, and understand each other uncommonly.

Today, we no longer identify the  ERRs purely as a service provider. We also identify community needs and reallocate funds accordingly. So we are partners in the whole process.

We have placed a strong emphasis on localizing aid. This means that communities are now actively engaged in:

1. Identifying their own needs – ERR holds regular meetings within communities to update them on available resources and listen to their needs.
2. Discussing funding allocations – Communities decide how aid and financial resources should be distributed.
3. Developing self-sufficiency – Instead of relying solely on external aid, people are learning how to organize, manage, and sustain resources locally.

In this way, the ERR is not just a relief organization—it is helping communities take control of their futures and strengthen their resilience in the face of ongoing conflict.

The community response has significantly influenced community operational strategies. Now, people are working within their areas, identifying their real needs, determining how to fulfill them, and deciding who to coordinate with.

Beyond the ERRs, community initiatives and independent groups operate in different regions. To be clear, ERRs are not present in every part of Sudan. Local initiatives step in to fill the gap in areas without an ERR.

As a result, there is now a growing level of coordination between different entities across Sudan—including community-led initiatives, national organizations, and ERRs.

This has affected local communities and reshaped Sudanese civil society as a whole. The ERRs, through community engagement, are helping redefine the role of civil society in responding to humanitarian crises.

We are working toward a more effective, organized, and self-sustaining approach—ensuring that communities can identify their needs, conduct local research, and create solutions from within rather than relying solely on external aid.

So, yes, this is how the ERR’s work has influenced broader community strategies.

Jacobsen: Who are the main international organizations or humanitarian agencies that consistently collaborate with the ERR or the community?

Jabal: We have partnerships with several international organizations, but before answering that question, let me explain how our coordination efforts have evolved.

About four to five months after the war began, we started working on a coordination body to bring together:

1. National NGOs (nongovernmental organizations)
2. International NGOs and aid organizations
3. ERRs and grassroots community groups

The ERRs are considered an extension of the community itself.  Since we are not a registered organization, many international donors cannot directly fund us due to policy restrictions.

To overcome this challenge, we partner with national organizations, which serve as intermediaries between international donors and ERRs. However, all three entities—the ERRs, national NGOs, and international organizations—are part of the same coordination body to ensure transparency and efficiency.

One of our main priorities is advocating for the international community to rethink its funding policies to better align with the realities on the ground in Sudan.

For example, many international aid organizations come in with predefined agendas—such as focusing on food security—without fully understanding the specific needs of a given region.

However, the situation changes rapidly in Sudan, making applying rigid, pre-planned funding models impossible.

That is why this coordination framework is so important—it enables:

• International organizations to adapt their policies and funding structures
• National organizations to facilitate local aid distribution
• ERRs to communicate urgent community needs in real-time

By integrating these three components, we ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the people who need it most rather than being dictated by preexisting international funding constraints. As I mentioned, the ERRs are shaping Sudan’s future. The leaders emerging from these grassroots efforts may play a key role in someday rebuilding Sudan.

Another significant aspect of our work is the redefinition of Sudanese civil society. Historically, Sudan has faced structural challenges in civil society organization, and we are now reidentifying and restructuring it to be more effective and community-driven.

In terms of international partnerships, we are currently working with four key international organizations such as (NRC, saverworld,  USAID,,etc) , working directly with the ERRs or through national organizations.

One of our former key partners, SaverWorld, also assisted in formalizing the Coordination Council, which helps align ERRs, national organizations, and international donors.

However, following the recent decision by the U.S. government, many of our major donors are no longer active. We do not know what will happen next, and everyone is uncertain.

This is particularly challenging because the situation on the ground is worsening, especially in Khartoum and Al-Fashir. These areas remain active war zones with extreme resource shortages, making aid delivery even more difficult.

Jacobsen: One question concerns Sudan’s media coverage, particularly in North America. From my perspective in Canada, media attention—across the political and social spectrum—has been largely focused on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Why do you think there is such a significant gap in media coverage of Sudan’s crisis?

Jabal: That is a great question, and we know this issue. One major reason is the lack of centralized, reliable data.

Even after nearly two years of war, Sudan still does not have a comprehensive data collection system that tracks the full extent of the crisis. The available data is often fragmented—some statistics are collected for specific regions. Still, we do not have a single nationwide study that covers all of Sudan, including:

• Khartoum
• Darfur
• Non-active war zones

Without this data infrastructure, journalists, policymakers, and international organizations will have difficulty assessing the true scale of the crisis.

Another major issue is weak advocacy channels.

The ERRs, national Sudanese organizations, and community-based initiatives lack capacity-building support. Many of us originally trained in different fields but had to step into humanitarian work when the war broke out. Because of this, our ability to advocate on an international level is still developing. Even though the impact is still very high. 

Without strong advocacy networks, Sudan’s crisis does not receive the same global attention as conflicts with well-established lobbying efforts.

For me, the two most important factors behind the lack of media coverage are:

1. Data scarcity – The absence of a comprehensive, accessible record of Sudan’s war makes it harder to generate sustained global attention.
2. Capacity gaps—Without dedicated training and support, Sudanese civil society and humanitarian workers struggle to bring Sudan’s crisis into the global media spotlight.

This is why we continue to work on strengthening community-based networks, improving data collection, and expanding our advocacy efforts—to ensure that Sudan’s war is not forgotten.

Data collection is difficult because the war is ongoing, and many active conflict zones remain. Even when we do manage to collect some data, it is often incomplete or inconsistent.

Despite these challenges, the ERRs have developed their data system, which includes:

• Administration
• Accountability
• Responsibility
• Transparency

This strong and effective system has contributed to the ERRs’ credibility and acceptance within different communities.

However, the data remains fragmented. Each geographical area maintains its records, and no centralized database consolidates all the information across Sudan.

For example, Khartoum’s ERR operates at a state level, meaning all seven localities coordinate together and share some data. However, even in Khartoum, we still do not have a fully accurate picture of the situation.

Jacobsen: Of the coverage that has been done—whether through formal international reports or media organizations that send journalists into the field or conduct remote interviews—what aspects of Sudan’s crisis do you think have been covered properly? Where do you see gaps in the coverage?

Jabal: The areas that have been covered well are food security efforts, including:

• Communal kitchens
• Food basket distribution

These efforts have continued throughout the war, making them relatively visible. Sudan still has many communal kitchens, and food distribution remains a major focus of humanitarian aid. 

However, one of the most underreported issues is the protection of volunteers and women’s needs.

The safety of humanitarian workers is rarely discussed, and there are no dedicated funds for ensuring their security.

As I mentioned earlier, when a volunteer receives a death threat, we struggle to relocate them quickly because we lack the financial resources to do so. The process often takes a long time, which places them at even greater risk.

So, while food security and health services receive some media attention, protecting aid workers is one of the crisis’s most overlooked aspects.

Jacobsen: How do you feel about Sudan’s future, particularly liberation, development, and rebuilding? What role do you see for the Sudanese diaspora in this process?

Jabal: I am optimistic, no matter how long this war lasts. It will end.

As I mentioned before, despite the tragedies and suffering, the war has also created opportunities for Sudanese people to connect and engage in ways that were previously impossible.

Under the old regime, Sudanese society was intentionally divided—with people placed into separate geographical zones to limit interaction and solidarity.

However, the war has forced us to break down those barriers. We are now talking to each other more, learning about each other, and building stronger relationships across different regions.

I also have hope in the Sudanese diaspora.

Although there are challenges, particularly the lack of unity within the diaspora, they have already contributed significantly to supporting communities inside Sudan.

The diaspora’s role will be critical in Sudan’s rebuilding and future development. They will continue to play an essential part in shaping the country’s next chapter. I am optimistic about the situation because Sudan’s civil society is being reshaped and continues to evolve.

We will see Sudan’s future leaders emerge from within this restructured civil society. Many of those involved in the ERRs today are youth, and we know that young people comprise the largest segment of Sudan’s population.

Right now, we have a great opportunity to redefine our response and focus on our communities to build the future we all envision for Sudan. So, yes, there is hope and opportunity. The Sudanese diaspora also plays a crucial role.

They were instrumental in providing financial support from the beginning of the war. However, the diaspora needs a unified mechanism beyond funding to coordinate its actions more effectively.

Their role extends beyond financial aid—diaspora members can also:

1. Apply diplomatic pressure within their countries, urging their governments to support Sudan.
2. Advocate for Sudan internationally, ensuring the world does not ignore the crisis.

If we, the Sudanese people, do not speak up about what is happening in our country, we cannot expect others to notice or act.

Jacobsen: Who impresses you the most in work similar to yours? Most people do not work in difficult conditions yet remain upbeat and committed. I assume you are working extensive hours each day. Who, within your context, impresses you the most? Comparisons between people’s lives and experiences are not always direct—like comparing apples and oranges. But in terms of your work and journey, who do you admire? Who inspired you when you were just getting started in this field?

Jabal: Oh, for myself? That is a very personal question. From my perspective, my journey began with the Sudanese revolution of 2018. Since I was a child, I have loved volunteering in my community. I have always believed that to create real change, you must start within your geographical area—your community.

After the revolution, I came from one of the poorest areas in Khartoum. We started a community development project that lasted over three years. Our main motivation was the memory of our friends who were killed during the protests and sit-ins.

We witnessed our friends being shot and killed right in front of us. Their sacrifice became our driving force. We wanted to honor them by improving our community, which is how we started.

I have always identified myself as a change agent for my community. Beyond that, my love for Sudan keeps me motivated. Despite hardships, I remain committed to seeing my country rise again. Being Sudanese is one of the greatest joys of my life.

Even though none of us choose where we are born, which identity we inherit, or which country we call home, I love being Sudanese. I take pride in my identity, and I cherish the opportunity to be Sudanese in this world.

When the war started, we thought our response was simple. We were trying to save our people. For me, it started in my neighborhood. I was there when the war broke out, and I looked at the people around me—the same people I grew up with, my neighbors, my family.

We decided to support and protect one another and to provide essential services for those in need. That was how it all began. At first, it was about helping the people closest to us—our families and neighbors. But now, I see it as something even bigger.

It is a way to pave the path for future generations. Being young Sudanese people was incredibly hard for our generation—it was challenging in every way.

Now, it is our responsibility to ensure that the next generation comes forward facing fewer obstacles than we did. They should have greater opportunities for development and more chances to shape Sudan’s future on their terms.

We must solve deep-rooted, systemic problems. We have started addressing and conversing about them, but the work is far from finished. We hope to see meaningful solutions soon. Many of us feel we have no choice—this is our responsibility.

I must contribute as long as I am educated, capable, and can help. It is that simple. What keeps us going is looking back at our colleagues and friends who are still in active war zones, risking their lives every single day to provide services.

That motivates us. Yes, this is 24/7 work, but we do it with happiness because we are helping. We are young people who love Sudan. I won’t lie—most Sudanese youth love Sudan deeply. They say it outright.

All of this comes from a place of love. It is that simple.

Jacobsen: It was wonderful meeting you, Omima. Thank you for the work you’re doing—I appreciate it. I’ll be in touch tomorrow.

Jabal: Oh, thank you, Scott. It was nice talking to you. As I’ve said before, whenever you want to talk about my people or country, I will always be happy to do so. The world needs to hear these stories. Thank you so much—I appreciate it.

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