Everywhere Insiders 20: Xi–Trump Talks, Critical Minerals, Russia Sanctions, Reagan vs. Trump

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/27

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman survey global flashpoints: a proposed Xi–Trump meeting in South Korea on trade, critical minerals, and ceasefires; China’s rare-earth curbs versus U.S. diversification. Tsukerman stresses leverage via Belt and Road, questions “debt-trap” narratives, and also dismisses Qi Group allegations. They clarify Reagan’s free-trade record and argue MAGA is neo-Buchananite. An obituary notes Queen Sirikit’s cultural legacy and resilience. On Ukraine, they parse sanctions, enforcement gaps, shadow fleets, and urgent air-defence co-production. Nigeria’s military reshuffle is deemed cosmetic without structural reform. Argentina’s austerity pits budgets against dignity, needing cross-sector partnerships to rebuild a viable middle class.

Interview conducted October 24, 2025, in the afternoon Pacific Time.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: All right. Today, we are here again with Irina Sukerman, a New York attorney. We’re going to be talking to our insiders today. Do you want to do Reuters and AP this time?

Irina Tsukerman: Yes, let’s do that.

Jacobsen: This is the biggest news we’re going to see: the two largest economies—the People’s Republic of China and the United States. Leaders Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are expected to meet in South Korea for talks centred on trade, critical minerals, and ceasefires—a very tall order. Trade and critical minerals are the sharpest pressure points right now. China has tightened rare-earth export controls ahead of the meeting, and the U.S. has moved to diversify supply through new critical-minerals deals with partners like Australia. Ceasefires are also part of the agenda—soft-power signalling where both sides want to look like peacemakers. I think that’s probably accurate: one side tends to be blunt, the other subtle—but neither is especially trusted.

Tsukerman: It’s not only about trust; it’s about leverage. Beijing often gains influence through lending and infrastructure deals under the Belt and Road Initiative. The popular “debt-trap diplomacy” narrative—usually illustrated by Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port—is debated: the 2017 arrangement was a 99-year lease and did not transfer state ownership or forgive debt. Scholars argue evidence of a deliberate “trap” is mixed, though concerns about leverage are real. Claims about a criminal “Qi Group” acting as an intermediary for the PRC to defraud Asian economies are not substantiated in reliable sources; absent verification, we should set that aside. 

Jacobsen: In other news, the Pope publicly lamented U.S.–Canada difficulties after President Trump ended trade talks, calling the situation “great difficulties” between two historically close allies. Why did Trump actually end the negotiations with Canada? The immediate trigger cited in coverage was political friction around messaging and tariffs; in any event, the bigger context is a hardline posture on trade and a reset of supply chains. 

Tsukerman: On Ronald Reagan: the ad-history point often gets mangled. Reagan’s 1980 campaign used the slogan “Let’s Make America Great Again.” Trump later popularized “Make America Great Again”; the phrasing is closely related but not identical. Reagan’s speeches and policies broadly favoured free trade while criticizing unfair practices such as dumping or IP theft; he was not a champion of broad protectionist tariffs. That part stands. 

The fact that Trump and the Reagan Foundation are now misrepresenting what that ad contained—and discouraging people from listening to Reagan’s original address in full—is both dishonest and politically revealing. To see that the ad is not actually deceptive in any way indicates that, first, they don’t want people to know what was in the original speech, because many people don’t understand basic history. Second, we have to remember what happened when Reagan made that statement. Trump took out an ad attacking Reagan’s position back in the day.

Trump was pro-tariff, and he basically tried to undercut Reagan specifically because of that position. More importantly, we have to remember that Pat Buchanan actually resigned and was on record attacking Reagan’s anti-tariff stance. If you look at some of the MAGA figures around Trump today, their positions on many issues—not just tariffs—are nearly identical to Buchanan’s. Trump is trying to disguise the fact that his movement is, in essence, neo-Buchananite. They’re presenting themselves as something new and original, but in reality, it’s a recycling of old, discarded ideas that were unpopular because they were anti-growth and didn’t work.

That’s why Buchanan never represented a majority and was never a serious presidential contender. His following was much smaller than Reagan’s original movement. It was Reagan who was the genuine populist—he was popular. Buchanan never was.

Trump has to mislead people about Reagan’s positions and his own to make his narrative work. He doesn’t want people to know the real history or to agree with Reagan, which is why he distracts them from revisiting the original. He’s also deeply insecure, because if people understood what Reagan actually said, they’d see why Trump’s protectionist position failed then and why it’s failing economically now. They’d also recognize that Trump likely cut off negotiations with Canada because he realized that, if they continued, the Canadian ad could completely undermine his entire position—and Canada would emerge stronger from those negotiations. People would literally side with Canada. That, I think, is the reason for this whole incident. Unfortunately, few are looking past the headlines.

Jacobsen: Changing gears, I didn’t know this: Thailand’s Queen Mother, Sirikit, an influential style icon, has died at age 93. I don’t know the average life expectancy there—it’s certainly lower than Japan’s—but 93 is remarkable. She was a distinguished, long-time figure in fashion and culture, instrumental in revitalizing the Thai silk industry. She brought, quote, “glamour and elegance” to the post-war revival of the country’s monarchy. She suffered a stroke in 2012 and has been hospitalized since 2019. So, she battled severe health issues for about a decade. A sad loss of a distinguished woman of her time. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Obviously, she had a vibrant and accomplished life. I particularly admire women of her generation, because even if she came from a wealthy royal family and enjoyed its privileges, it was still difficult decades ago in Asia for a woman to achieve that much. Frankly, it’s not easy for anyone—let alone a woman in a traditional society—to carve out a public legacy like hers.

Actually accomplishing anything, even with all the advantages in the world, still requires talent, grit, perseverance, imagination, and creativity. You have to do things the right way and inspire people. If your product is terrible, no matter how much PR you put into it, people aren’t going to buy it—unless you’re inspiring in some way. In that case, they might still buy it because of you, but even then, you have to be admirable in the first place. I definitely give her credit for that. Politically, of course, she had less influence than others who held absolute power. 

Thailand has a long, uneasy history of elites competing for control, and sometimes clashing with neighbouring countries. There have been repressive tactics and episodes of upheaval, particularly during the transition to the new king. Things seem to have stabilized somewhat, though difficulties persist, as we’re seeing in nearby Cambodia. Still, I hope that young people in Thailand will draw inspiration from visionaries who sought to improve their country economically and culturally, rather than those who pursued power for its own sake. That’s what should inspire the next generation.

Jacobsen: This next story hits close to home. Kyiv and its allies have argued that frozen Russian assets—which have been discussed widely in the news—should be used quickly to aid Ukraine. That’s especially urgent now, with winter setting in and civilian infrastructure under attack, particularly energy systems for heating and cooking. President Zelensky, almost matter-of-factly, has said that Ukraine will need to develop domestic production of air defence systems. About 60 percent of Ukraine’s weapons are now produced domestically, but air defence systems and missiles still rely heavily on Western allies.

Zelensky has also called for a “coalition of the willing” to provide long-range strike weapons. There’s an asymmetry in the conflict: Ukraine is targeting primarily military sites and, occasionally, energy infrastructure such as oil depots, while Russian forces under the Kremlin and President Putin are targeting not only military sites but also civilian infrastructure and cultural and religious landmarks. That’s a stark contrast like the strikes.

Tsukerman: Regarding energy, energy is the key economic factor here. It’s good that the U.S. finally sanctioned two of Russia’s largest oil companies. Frankly, I have no idea what took so long or why President Biden delayed it. If he had done it earlier, we could already be in a different position. I doubt Trump would have lifted those sanctions had they been in place; he might have dragged his feet, but he probably would have let them stand. It was a strategic mistake not to act sooner.

Russia is clearly suffering significant economic damage. There are reports of gas shortages and even hunger in peripheral regions like Siberia. The more pressure the U.S. and its allies put on Russia’s energy sector, the quicker Russia will run short of funds for its war effort. Even if they divert everything toward the military, it will still be challenging to sustain. That kind of economic stress will create profound internal discontent.

Europe is also finally doing the right thing with the nineteenth package of sanctions. Admittedly, Germany has been something of a spoiler by asking the U.S. to exempt German-run, Russian-owned companies from certain sanctions, which undermines the goal of a unified stance. It’s frustrating. I wish they would stop doing that. It’s also concerning that some of these energy sanctions won’t take full effect until 2027 or 2028, giving Russia another 2 to 3 years to keep funding the war effort.

Doing what needs to be done for European sales will be harder now with U.S. sanctions, but it will still happen. It’s also unclear what the Gulf states will do: OPEC+ has not frozen Russia out—in fact, Saudi–Russian cooperation continues, including plans for joint business forums and talks on energy projects.

The effectiveness of announced U.S. sanctions will depend on enforcement and on whether the U.S. pressures its allies. It made little sense to put high tariffs on India while not sanctioning some Russian producers; sanctioning buyers but not producers risks circumvention and gives importing countries incentives to increase purchases because Russian oil is being sold at a deep discount. Recent U.S. actions, however, have targeted Russia’s largest oil firms. 

We will definitely see sanction-busting and shadow fleets—some of that is already visible. Some Chinese companies have announced curbs on Russian oil transactions, which would be a notable blow to Moscow if sustained, since China has been a major buyer of Russian crude in recent months. 

If the U.S. wants sanctions to work, it must press broadly, not only target a few countries for unrelated political reasons. Otherwise, Russia will keep finding ways to evade the new framework.

On the second issue—Zelensky’s comments about domestic air-defence production—the reality is that some Western-supplied systems (for example, Patriots) aren’t expected from Poland or other partners until later; waiting until spring may be too late because Russia could press offensives in winter. Recent reporting indicates that Ukraine and the U.S. are preparing contracts for additional Patriots, but delivery timelines remain crucial. 

Ukraine needs air defences now; ideally, allies would help with components, designs, and co-production rather than just promising complete systems that won’t arrive for years. Europe is short on many of these systems, and some ordered equipment won’t be available for at least 2 to 3 years. Domestic variants would be better tailored to battlefield needs and wouldn’t be subject to import delays or export bans. At the same time, developing domestic systems is hard—production capacity is limited, and factories are vulnerable to strikes—so meaningful co-production or rapid components support from allies is essential.

There’s been talk of Tomahawks and other deep-strike systems. The administration has signalled openness to providing long-range missiles under certain circumstances. However, political leaders, including President Trump, have at times publicly expressed reservations, while also suggesting they might approve transfers if the war continues or if conditions are met. That ambiguity shapes Kyiv’s calculus and Western debates about escalation risk.

Training, logistics, and command-and-control are nontrivial concerns—Tomahawks and comparable systems require skilled crews and integration into targeting frameworks—but if the political decision is made and proper training and safeguards are established, they could change strategic dynamics.

I really think he’s still holding out for some possibility of a breakthrough with Putin, despite having called off—or semi–called off—the Budapest summit. There’s also a lot of pressure from the hawks in the Pentagon and other circles not to agree to the Tomahawk sale. Some, like Colby, oppose it for ideological reasons rather than strategic ones. He’s more hardline than Hegseth, who seems more concerned with internal reforms at the Department of Defence.

The reality is that Ukraine cannot count on Tomahawks arriving anytime soon, and the Flamingo systems are insufficient. There are other long-range weapons available, but it’s not only Trump blocking them—some European countries have also prevented their transfer. The mystery is who exactly, and why. Trump made an interesting comment when the Wall Street Journal reported that he had lifted the ban on the use of long-range weapons; he then called it “fake news,” insisting that the U.S. had nothing to do with those systems. That statement makes it clear that no American weapons are involved in this particular process, and that another party is calling the shots.

If the U.S. hasn’t sold Tomahawks, then the weapons in question must be something else. It’s not the HIMARS—Ukraine has used those extensively. So these other long-range systems must be blocked by other countries, though it’s still unclear which ones or why they’re hesitating.

Jacobsen: This next story is from Lagos. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu has appointed new service chiefs in what’s being called a sweeping overhaul of the military leadership. It’s described as an attempt to confront the country’s multiple security crises—Islamist insurgencies in the northeast, armed banditry in the northwest, and separatist unrest in the southeast.

Tsukerman: The problems in Nigeria’s security apparatus are deeply entrenched. Many of these officials have already held senior posts while these crises have persisted. None of the issues are new—they’ve only worsened over time, while governance remains weak.

Some of the separatist movements involve Christian communities that allege systemic discrimination by the federal government. Many live in regions rich in oil and gas and feel those resources have been expropriated and redistributed to government cronies and to Muslim-majority areas without fair benefit to local populations. That’s a legitimate grievance. Meanwhile, the state has failed to effectively counter Boko Haram and related extremist groups due to corruption, poor coordination, and a lack of resources.

The U.S. has provided security funding in the past, and the Gulf states have also offered support, but neither effort has produced lasting improvements. Large parts of the country remain disaffected and vulnerable to infiltration. Beyond sectarian, tribal, and religious tensions, Nigeria also faces porous borders and limited capacity to secure them—especially given instability in neighbouring states that are even less pro-Western.

That is why this reshuffle will not amount to a serious solution. It is like trying to use a bandage to cover a gaping wound. Nigeria needs a far more comprehensive reassessment of priorities and a concrete, long-term plan to combat these entrenched problems. The entire structure of governance and security needs reform at a foundational level. We will not see that anytime soon.

Jacobsen: The last story comes from Argentina—protesters against pension cuts. Pensioners who worked all their lives are finding themselves unable to maintain a basic standard of living.

Tsukerman: Argentina’s financial issues are deep-rooted and challenging to solve. The government has focused on reducing the fiscal deficit, which has meant cutting back on entitlement programs. Admittedly, some of those programs were inefficient and drained the economy without improving lives, but austerity has made things more complicated for ordinary citizens.

About 30 percent of the population is reportedly not fully engaged in the labour force—not due to illness or disability, but because decades of far-left economic policies have created a culture of dependency on social assistance. That has shrunk the pool of available funds for genuine pensions, making it difficult to sustain support for older citizens who need it most.

Balancing the budget and reining in inflation are necessary goals, but the social dimension is equally urgent. Without significant investment and competent management, these structural issues will persist. Argentina needs a partnership among the government, private investors, NGOs, and community and religious organizations to supplement state efforts. The government should be the floor, not the ceiling, of social support.

When the government tries to be the sole provider, corruption and inefficiency thrive. Argentina has already seen this—decades of clientelism, theft, and the erosion of the middle class. Without a strong middle class, there is no sustainable tax base, and without that, reform collapses into a cycle of dependency and inflation.

Returning to a stable, productive middle ground will be tough. The $40 billion swap line the U.S. is providing may not be enough, but it could help attract investors, NGOs, and development organizations interested in building a more self-sufficient and opportunity-driven economy—especially for younger Argentinians.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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