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East of the Eastern Front 2: Energy Strikes, Nuclear Risks, and Geopolitical Strategies

2025-12-14

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/17

Mark Temnycky is a Ukrainian-American analyst and freelance journalist specializing in American, European, and Eurasian affairs. He serves as a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center (since December 2021), and he is a geopolitics contributor at Forbes. Previously, he spent nearly seven years as a U.S. defense contractor supporting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment. His work appears across leading outlets and think tanks, with a curated portfolio of articles and media available online.

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Temnycky outlines Russia’s intensified strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, Ukraine’s drone campaigns against Russian energy assets, and rising global oil prices. He highlights U.S. intelligence support for Ukraine’s precision targeting, the nuclear risks from Russian assaults, and the Kremlin’s strategic failures despite high costs in casualties and materiel.

Interview conducted October 6, 2025, in the afternoon Pacific Time.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Based on Reuters, did Russia’s Oct. 5 barrage kill at least five people and prompt Poland to scramble jets? 

Mark Temnycky: 

Jacobsen: On Oct. 3, did Russia launch its largest attack on Ukraine’s gas production, damaging Naftogaz sites? 

Temnycky: On October 3, Russia launched an assault on Ukraine. The attack involved 35 missiles and 60 drones. The strike resulted in critical damage to several energy sites, leading to significant power outages in Ukraine. This affected thousands of Naftogz customers. The events that occurred on October 3 are a pattern in which Russia has previously targeted energy infrastructure in Ukraine.

Jacobsen: Did the U.S. around Oct. 1 provide Ukraine with intelligence on long-range energy targets? 

Temnycky: Around October 1, the United States began providing Ukraine with intelligence to support long-range missile strikes on Russia’s critical energy infrastructure. This U.S. intelligence sharing will significantly enhance Ukraine’s ability to target Russian refineries, pipelines, and power plants, which help Russia sustain its war effort. As Ukraine continues to target these critical areas, this will put additional pressure on Russia to try to force it to end its ongoing invasion.

Jacobsen: Between September 28 and 29, did Russia carry out one of the most sustained drone/missile attacks of the war on Kyiv? 

Temnycky: The drones and missile strike which occurred in late September 2025 was one of the most sustained attacks since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. The assault lasted over 12 hours, and involved nearly 600 drones and more than 40 missiles. The Russian attack targeted civilian residential areas as well as parts of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. At least four people were killed in the attack, and at least 70 Ukrainian civilians were injured.

Jacobsen: On October 1, did Zelenskyy warn that Russia is creating the risk of nuclear incidents? 

Temnycky: Following the Russian assault on Ukraine in late September 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia was deliberately creating the risk of a nuclear incident by targeting Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure. In this case, Russia conducted a drone strike that cut power to the decommissioned Chernobyl nuclear power plant for several hours. This affected critical safety systems in Ukraine. Aside from this incident, the Russians have also shelled the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant throughout the ongoing invasion, where the International Atomic Energy Agency has condemned Russia’s attacks on the ZNPP on several occasions. Ukrainian special forces have also reported that the Russians have mined areas around the ZNPP, making the situation even more dangerous.

Jacobsen: On September 26, did Zelenskyy and Syrskyi say Russia’s 2025 offensives failed to meet strategic goals? 

Temnycky: Prior to the summer of 2025, several international media outlets warned that Russia was preparing for a major assault throughout Ukraine. What transpired, however, was anything but a major offensive. Over several months in 2025, the Russians would sustain hundreds of thousands of casualties. Several pieces of Russian military hardware and equipment were damaged and destroyed, and the Russians failed to capture significant territory in northern and eastern Ukraine. Despite gaining little territory in 2025, and sustaining substantial losses, Russia has continued its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Jacobsen: Did oil prices rise on September 26 as Ukraine’s drone strikes curbed Russian fuel exports? 

Temnycky: Following Ukraine’s drone strike on Russia’s energy infrastructure, oil prices notably rose. The Russian Federation responded by extending bans on gasoline and partially on diesel exports to keep more fuel domestic amid refinery outages. Ukrainian strikes have also reduced Russia’s refining capacity by targeting key oil infrastructure, tightening global fuel markets and pressuring Moscow’s war effort. These events have also led to a price increase in international fuel supplies.

Jacobsen: What military-political strategy can be inferred from assessing these patterns on the Ukrainian side and the Kremlin side?

Temnycky: Ukraine’s strategy focuses on asymmetric warfare and continuous disruption by using drones and precision strikes. Meanwhile, Russia’s approach relies on sustained attritional attacks, drone swarms, and missile strikes on Ukrainian residential areas and critical infrastructure. The Russian Federation is doing this as it tries to break Ukrainian morale. In other words, Ukraine is using drones and missiles to target Russia’s energy infrastructure, which is used to power Russian airplanes, tanks, and other military equipment. Meanwhile, Russia is launching drones and missiles on Ukrainian residential areas, such as hospitals, schools, cultural centers, apartment complexes, and shopping malls. This suggests that both countries are operating differently during the war.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Mark.

Temnycky: Happy to help, Scott.

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