Anton Zelinskyi on the Judicial Reform and Russo-Ukrainian War

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/12

Anton Zelinskyi is a Ukrainian legal-reform advocate and Advocacy Manager at the DEJURE Foundation, focusing on judicial transparency, integrity vetting, and EU-aligned standards. As a member of the Public Integrity Council, he helps evaluate candidates for judicial positions and judges undergoing qualification assessment conducted by the HQCJ. His work centers on advancing merit-based selection, ensuring disciplinary accountability, and preventing political capture. Zelinskyi argues reform momentum depends on conditionality from the EU and U.S., especially after international experts’ participation in HQCJ selection ended in 2025. He also highlights wartime windows that enable modernization for survival, reconstruction, and democratic consolidation through the rule of law. 

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Zelinskyi emphasizes the fragility of Ukraine’s judicial reforms. As a member of the Public Integrity Council, he stresses that EU conditionality and international expert involvement remain vital for merit-based selection, integrity vetting, and accountability. Zelinskyi highlights the Supreme Court as the greatest vulnerability, capable of undermining HCJ and HQCJ progress. He warns that without external pressure, reform momentum stalls, enabling capture by entrenched interests. Digitalization, disciplinary enforcement, and civil society oversight provide resilience, but sustained international participation in key commissions is essential for Ukraine’s rule-of-law commitments and EU accession trajectory.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Which specific EU accession benchmarks shape judicial reform incentives in Ukraine? 

Anton Zelinskyi: In June 2022 the EU set seven steps for Ukraine; the first two have shaped judicial reform: (1) adopt a merit- and integrity-based procedure for selecting Constitutional Court judges; (2) complete integrity vetting of the HCJ and re-establish the HQCJ. By 2025, several CCU appointments have been made through transparent, merit-based procedures, and both the HQCJ and HCJ have been independently formed and are demonstrating tangible progress (thanks in large part to the involvement of international experts, including their casting vote). Yet one major gap remains: the Supreme Court has not been meaningfully reformed and can effectively overturn decisions of the HCJ or HQCJ. A clean-up and new selection to the Supreme Court via a commission with international experts is pivotal to consolidating the entire reform.

Jacobsen: If external pressure eased, which reform tracks would stall first, e.g., integrity vetting, or disciplinary enforcement?

Zelinskyi: We have the opportunity to see it in real life. In January 2025 the U.S. administration changed its policy regarding judicial and other reforms in Ukraine. The Supreme Court started to produce detrimental decisions with ease, overruling HCJ and HQCJ decisions. It appears that the selection of Supreme Court judges to the Grand Chamber is driven by notoriety from corruption scandals in the media — the more noise, the better. By law, HCJ and HQCJ must consider and align their work with Supreme Court decisions, so these rulings quickly cascade across vetting and competitions.

The majority of MPs have never been interested in reforms that would diminish the influence of parliament or government over the judiciary. A vivid example of how things can go wrong was the adoption of the law cancelling the independence of NABU and SAPO. If international partners lose interest in Ukraine’s judicial reform, it will stall step by step in a chaotic manner.

Jacobsen: What are the practical consequences of ending international experts’ involvement in HQCJ selection? 

Zelinskyi: Under the current law, unreformed legal communities nominate members to the Selection Commission that screens candidates for the HQCJ. That process is already underway, and we can clearly see nominees from unreformed institutions who are on the opposite brink of integrity. If international experts are not brought into this Selection Commission (with real decision power), the HQCJ’s new composition will be defined by a captured, crooked commission. Practically, that means an HQCJ that proceeds to staff the judiciary with hundreds of compromised or politically loyal judges who will remain in the system for decades.
Jacobsen: How should the new Selection Commission for HQCJ be designed to prevent capture?

Zelinskyi: Don’t break what works. The Selection Commission with international experts has shown excellent results. We should keep the same mechanism and extend its mandate for a longer period — until Ukrainian nominating institutions no longer raise questions about their delegates.

Jacobsen: What joint HQCJ–PIC low-integrity indicators reliably predict future misconduct? 

Zelinskyi: We cannot truly predict future misconduct. There was even a case when a judge passed qualification assessment successfully and only a month later was caught taking a bribe. No mechanism can uncover every hidden risk. What the HQCJ and PIC try to do instead is identify low-integrity indicators that strongly suggest a judge should not be allowed to continue dispensing justice. These include things like unexplained wealth and assets, tax inconsistencies, family ties and conflicts of interest, repeated violations of procedural deadlines, questionable decisions that benefited powerful actors, or a pattern of ignoring anti-corruption rules. Such red flags don’t guarantee misconduct tomorrow, but they are clear warnings that a person’s past conduct is incompatible with the standards of an independent judiciary. Our task is to remove from the system those whose record already “screams” that they cannot be trusted to make fair and impartial decisions.

Jacobsen: What lessons did reformers draw from the 2024 Supreme Court ruling allowing 180 judges to skip full qualification assessment? 

Zelinskyi: As experts in judicial reform, we had a clear idea of what went wrong with the selection to the Supreme Court in 2017–2019. But until this ruling, there was no general recognition that the Supreme Court itself posed such a high risk to judicial reform. Ironically, after the President of the Supreme Court Kniaziev was caught with a record-breaking $2.7 million bribe for himself and other judges, the new leadership quietly but steadily began producing detrimental decisions that broke with the Court’s established practice. The more the composition of the Grand Chamber changed, the more drastic blows to the reform followed.

The pinnacle of this trend was the notorious decision allowing 180 judges to skip the qualification assessment. Importantly, these were not ordinary judges, but those who had previously been banned by the PIC. At that moment came the epiphany: all the progress achieved in eight years could be undone in a single stroke by an unreformed Supreme Court.

Jacobsen: Where are integrity checks most vulnerable? 

Zelinskyi: Funny enough, we did a lot to make integrity checks work, and today most judges and judicial candidates are being fairly assessed. But the biggest vulnerability lies with the Supreme Court, which is effectively breaking many of these achievements. On paper, it cannot directly overrule HCJ or HQCJ decisions, yet in practice it acts as the highest judicial body and does whatever it wants

Jacobsen: How can the Ethics Council’s model for HCJ vetting be strengthened? 

Zelinskyi: The Ethics Council’s model for vetting members of the HCJ actually works quite well. Of course, there are imperfections, but they are not critical at this stage. The key point is that the HCJ itself is functioning effectively, which shows that the Ethics Council model is also delivering. Instead of trying to re-engineer the mechanism, the priority should be to preserve what already works, maintain international expert involvement with a decisive role.

Jacobsen: Which disciplinary mechanisms have proven genuinely deterrent?

Zelinskyi: The most genuinely deterrent mechanism is when judges clearly understand that it is impossible to “make a deal” with officials to guarantee the outcome of a selection, vetting, or disciplinary procedure. In such circumstances, they begin to follow the rules and respect the red lines set by the HCJ and HQCJ. In practice, the consistent application of these rules by both bodies has already changed the day-to-day behavior of judges and judicial candidates, showing that predictability and inevitability of consequences are the strongest deterrents.

Both the HCJ and HQCJ have shown that they are not afraid to issue negative decisions, even against the most notorious judges — perhaps the clearest example being Pavlo Vovk. When judges see that someone as influential as Vovk could not “make a deal” to avoid consequences, they understand that their own chances are close to zero. This sends a powerful message: the disciplinary and vetting mechanisms actually work, and no reputation or connections can shield a judge from accountability.

Jacobsen: How should wartime exigencies be balanced with due-process rights?

Zelinskyi: I don’t see cases where judges were unlawfully removed from office or imprisoned without due process. On the contrary, even Kniazev (caught with a record-breaking bribe) still attends hearings in the High Anti-Corruption Court and enjoys the privilege of conducting his own business outside of them. When it comes to ordinary people, wartime undoubtedly brings challenges for everyone, but I’m not an expert in this broader field. The only thing I can say with certainty is that the balance must be maintained between the needs of war and the protection of basic human rights.

Jacobsen: Where has court digitalization measurably improved transparency?

Zelinskyi: As a general rule, the more processes are digitalized and the less discretion left to individual officials, the more transparent the system becomes, and the less room there is for corruption. Ukraine is no exception. Digitalization of the courts has already had a measurable impact: the automatic case distribution system, online publication of court decisions, and the electronic judiciary system (ЄСІТС) all make it far harder to manipulate outcomes behind closed doors.

I would say that Ukraine’s level of court digitalization is already comparable to many developed countries, with online access to cases and documents being a strong transparency driver. Of course, the system still requires polishing, both in terms of technical reliability and user-friendliness, but the core principle has been proven: digital tools reduce hidden discretion and increase predictability, which in turn enhances public trust.

Jacobsen: What role should civil society play in year-three-plus oversight fatigue? 

Zelinskyi: Fatigue cannot serve as an excuse for lowering standards, even after more than three years of war. The reality is a million times harder on the frontline than in Kyiv, and that perspective matters. Civil society must keep working at full capacity to win the internal fight against corruption and unfair practices.

This means sustaining public oversight of judicial and political institutions, documenting abuses, and pushing for accountability even when international attention shifts. Civil society also has the role of keeping reform momentum alive: reminding both the authorities and the public that integrity is part of resilience, and that victory is not only about holding the frontline but also about ensuring fair governance at home.

Jacobsen: How do anti-corruption agency governance debates interact with judicial reform credibility? 

Zelinskyi: Independent anti-corruption agencies are essential allies of civil society, because we share the same enemy — corruption in all its forms. Their work directly reinforces judicial reform credibility: many judges have been dismissed or blocked based on case files and evidence provided by NABU and SAPO. Even if criminal trials take years, the documentation collected by these bodies enables the HQCJ and HCJ to remove corrupt judges or candidates much sooner through qualification or disciplinary procedures.

This creates a single mechanism where civil society, the vetting bodies, and anti-corruption agencies act as interlinked gears. If the independence of NABU or SAPO is weakened, the whole system suffers. In short, debates over anti-corruption agency governance are not isolated, they strike at the very heart of whether Ukraine’s judicial reform is seen as real or cosmetic.

Jacobsen: Which reforms are foundational for negotiating the rule-of-law chapters (23/24)? 

Zelinskyi: We believe that the following key things must be assured:

• Cleansing and selection of integrity judges to the Supreme Court as the highest judicial institution, with meaningful involvement of international experts.
• Preservation of international experts in selection commissions, especially in the Selection Commission for the HQCJ, until Ukraine’s EU accession.
• Appointment of the selected candidates to the Constitutional Court to ensure its full and legitimate functioning.
• Guaranteed independence of anti-corruption agencies such as NABU and SAPO.

Jacobsen: What concrete milestones should Ukraine hit by mid-2026?

Zelinskyi: By mid-2026, Ukraine should achieve the following concrete milestones:

• Adopt the law on cleansing and selection of judges to the Supreme Court with meaningful involvement of international experts.
• Appoint at least three additional judges to the Constitutional Court to ensure its full and legitimate functioning.
• Adopt laws extending the participation of international experts with a casting vote in the Selection Commission for the HQCJ and similar bodies, securing this mechanism for at least three more years.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Anton.

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