Afghanistan’s Quake Crisis: Access, Winter Needs, and a Hollowed Aid System

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/10

Colin Thomas-Jensen outlines Afghanistan’s overlapping crises: earthquakes on top of a humanitarian emergency, sanctions and access hurdles, power outages, and bans limiting the aid of Afghan women. Nearly 22.9 million people need help; pre-winter gaps include shelter materials, winterized items, and dependable food assistance. UN agencies and Gulf states channel relief through established channels; cash aid is effective where markets function, although compliance barriers persist. He describes a hollowed aid architecture: less funding, weaker logistics, and poor data. With the US capacity cut, diplomacy and local partners are of the utmost importance. He urges pragmatic negotiations with the Taliban to secure access while protecting civilians and rebuilding trust.

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Thomas-Jensen details Afghanistan’s layered crises, where earthquakes compound an already dire humanitarian emergency affecting nearly half the population. He explains how aid delivery is obstructed by Taliban restrictions on women workers, shrinking international resources, and limited infrastructure. Despite these challenges, UN agencies and Gulf state contributions provide essential relief; however, winterization gaps—such as shelter, heating, and food—remain urgent and pressing. Thomas-Jensen underscores the collapse of US aid capacity, the loss of reliable data, and the sidelining of Afghan women responders. Aurora Humanitarian Initiative catalyzes lifesaving work by celebrating and supporting exceptional humanitarians around the world. Aurora was founded on behalf of the survivors of the Armenian Genocide and in gratitude to their saviors. Over the past decade, the organization has built a global network and supported more than 3.5 million people affected by humanitarian crises. By funding humanitarians around the world who continue the cycle of giving, this work contributes to proliferating humanitarianism into the future. As director of impact for the Aurora Humanitarian Initiative (https://aurorahumanitarian.org/en), he argues for empowering local actors and innovative funding to restore resilience and save lives.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Afghanistan has suffered further tragedies, with more loss of life and suffering from earthquakes on top of an already severe humanitarian crisis. In the midst of this, what are the basic facts on the ground now, and what unmet needs remain?

Colin Thomas-Jensen: Afghanistan faces one of the world’s largest humanitarian emergencies. In 2025, the UN estimates that approximately 22.9 million people—nearly half the country’s population—require assistance. Access is difficult in parts of the country, and the overall situation is fragile. Displacement after quakes adds pressure on families sheltering relatives and on the limited relief presence that can reach affected areas.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, many international NGOs and UN agencies have continued operating, but with severe constraints, including restrictions on Afghan women aid workers (first ordered for NGOs in December 2022) and periodic access challenges. These measures materially hinder the response capacity across sectors.

The United Nations and its partners remain central to relief operations. For earthquake responses in 2023–2025—for example, Herat in 2023 and Kunar in August 2025—agencies such as the WFP have delivered food and other essentials, utilizing emergency logistics to reach remote areas quickly.

Gulf states have played a visible supporting role, flying in or shipping relief supplies that are then routed into quake zones via established humanitarian channels. Qatar and the UAE, for example, sent multiple consignments to support Afghanistan’s earthquake response, including airlifts to Herat and shipments staged via Pakistan for overland delivery. These consignments typically integrate with UN and NGO distribution systems for “last-mile” delivery.

As winter approaches, priority gaps include emergency shelter, winterized household items, and reliable food assistance to support affected communities through the cold season. These needs align with countrywide planning figures in the UN’s 2025 response documents.

On cash assistance and community feedback: humanitarian actors have used cash-based responses after quakes—for example, Herat in 2023—to stimulate local markets and allow families to prioritize essentials. After-action reviews highlight both the benefits and implementation constraints in the current operating environment. Feedback mechanisms are typically run through UN and NGO partners, as well as local organizations that handle the last-mile interface with communities.

For regional context, a similar “others step in” pattern has been visible elsewhere. Following Myanmar’s major earthquake in March 2025, China deployed significant rescue teams and provided food assistance, alongside broader international support.

Accessing this part of Afghanistan is particularly challenging, especially following the earthquake. Over the last 15 to 20 years, it has become clear that cash delivery is one of the most effective ways to provide relief quickly, especially in rapid-onset emergencies where markets are functioning normally. The challenge in Afghanistan is sanctions. The provision of monetary assistance is generally subject to oversight by the US Department of the Treasury. If it is not provided in US dollars, that is possible, but most humanitarian transactions and cash deliveries are conducted in dollars.

Jacobsen: What about the compounding factor of recent outages?

Thomas-Jensen: Power outages. This is a country that, even in the best of times, has limited infrastructure for electricity and clean water, particularly in rural areas. When USAID and others had a larger presence on the ground, more information and analysis were available to identify the areas with the greatest needs.

One of the significant challenges currently facing not only Afghanistan but also the world is the collapse of the humanitarian aid architecture and infrastructure. The first problem is fewer dollars with which to respond to crises. Just as significant is the lack of reliable data that humanitarian actors need to target assistance effectively.

When I worked at USAID, we took the use of US taxpayer dollars seriously. We relied on credible data to determine where those dollars would have the most impact and how to direct NGO and UN partners. At this point, it is essentially a local effort with some UN support; however, the ability to gather the kind of information that once guided humanitarian responses has been hampered by the broader weakening of the aid system.

Jacobsen: Outside of the local context, how do you even get reliable information for assessing delivery, as well as post-fact efficacy?

Thomas-Jensen: One significant change in the past decade is the role of social media. Much of the early information during disaster response, especially for large-scale natural disasters in rural, hard-to-reach areas, comes from local people recording videos of the damage and posting them online. Analysts then sift through this material to identify where urgent needs are most significant.

In terms of physically reaching communities, I have done relief operations all over the world. When conditions are this severe, you do whatever you can to get the affected people to safety. In Afghanistan, the mountainous terrain makes it even more challenging.

Afghanistan lacks extensive road access. A significant amount of aid is reaching communities in traditional ways—by pack animals carrying supplies into areas inaccessible to vehicles.

Jacobsen: What about pre-winterization needs such as extra shelter, warmth, and insulation? Are there any flooding complications related to the earthquakes?

Thomas-Jensen: We have not seen significant flooding consequences. The primary concern with shelter is simply getting a roof over people’s heads. Heating, sadly, is a luxury for most Afghans, even in the best of times, often limited to traditional indoor fires or cookstoves. The focus now is on getting shelter materials into the country. The UN is effective in this area—bringing in materials that displaced people and families who have lost their homes can use to build viable shelters that can endure what is often a long and harsh Afghan winter.

As I mentioned earlier, Afghanistan has resilient people who have endured repeated trauma and disaster. While it is disappointing that the international community cannot respond with the same speed and scale as it did a few years ago, I am hopeful that as international agencies withdraw, more space will open up for local actors to take on leadership in the response. That said, commodities for shelter still need to be brought in—that is the immediate priority.

Jacobsen: An analogous case with USAID cuts involves other areas of reduced funding in the United States. Some of those positions have been rehired and partially refinanced. Are there any indications of a reversal of prior cuts for Afghanistan?

Thomas-Jensen: No. Even in the near future, no. The process through which the US government is currently making decisions about humanitarian funding remains opaque. What we do see clearly is that aid is prioritized for countries with either direct strategic interest or those in the Western Hemisphere. Afghanistan is not a priority for the United States.

That said, I would argue the US still has significant strategic interests there, given the presence of ISIS-K and their ability to project violence and terror in the region. But Afghanistan no longer receives priority attention. For comparison: I was on the ground in Haiti three days after the 2010 earthquake. Haiti is much closer to the US than Afghanistan, so the logistical advantage there was immense.

The assets the US once had to respond to crises of this scale have, in large part, been eliminated. For example, USAID used to contract urban search-and-rescue teams for conflict and disaster zones. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, teams from Fairfax County, Virginia and Los Angeles County in less than two days. Those teams pulled survivors from the rubble, including American citizens.

Ironically, the contract for those teams was eliminated on the same day as the Myanmar earthquake. Had the contract remained in place, the US could have deployed them to support affected communities. Instead, USAID personnel flown in from Thailand to help coordinate the Myanmar response were themselves fired while they were still in the quake zone.

Jacobsen: What about calculating the scale of suffering? There is the immediate suffering of deaths and injuries, but also the damage to infrastructure—homes, schools, businesses.

Thomas-Jensen: In Afghanistan, Haiti, and Myanmar, most buildings in rural areas are constructed with basic materials. Even where designs account for some seismic resistance, an earthquake of this magnitude causes catastrophic damage. Entire villages in Afghanistan were levelled. That is the reported pattern, and it is likely repeated in areas that are still inaccessible and undocumented.

By contrast, in more developed countries, many buildings are designed to withstand major earthquakes. That is not the case in Afghanistan, which magnifies the destruction.

Compounding this are gender-based restrictions. After the Taliban returned to power, the UN and NGOs were barred from employing female aid workers. This reversed two decades of partnership, where many Afghan women had become vital relief workers and first responders. They brought critical knowledge of local needs, particularly those of women and children—the groups most vulnerable in times of crisis.

Excluding women has effectively halved the talent pool. When 50 percent of experienced staff are sidelined during a national emergency, scaling up an adequate response becomes nearly impossible. The UN has highlighted this as a significant barrier at precisely the moment when an all-hands response is needed.

Jacobsen: What about Afghan-led groups for funding and support?

Thomas-Jensen: Afghan partners on the ground remain essential. In any country, large UN agencies or major NGOs, such as the International Rescue Committee or Save the Children, often undertake a significant portion of the work themselves. However, to reach rural and isolated communities, they typically partner with and sub-grant to local organizations. The “trickle-down” funding has largely been cut off due to reductions in aid. We are left with whatever relief agencies are still present, trying to rebuild those relationships and the infrastructure.

The impact of USAID’s dismantling has been dramatic. It is not only about the US responding directly, but about America’s ability to encourage other partners to respond. US assistance traditionally leveraged more aid, especially in moments like this. With cuts, an entire network of relationships and a 20-year supply chain was disrupted. Shutting it down is simple—it can be done with a letter. Reconstructing it is far more difficult. The result is now much improvisation in disaster response, where previously there was at least a functioning system able to move assistance to people promptly.

Jacobsen: Even setting aside your former role at USAID, from a professional standpoint, are there directly correlated deaths associated with the cuts to USAID under the current administration?

Thomas-Jensen: Absolutely—every day. The Lancet, a credible UK-based medical journal, has projected 14 million excess deaths by 2030 as a result of these cuts. Much of this will be felt in public health rather than disaster response. Cutting people off from antiretroviral drugs, halting tuberculosis programs, ending malaria net distribution, and undoing decades of progress in disease control—those decisions cost lives.

I can give a concrete example. My organization, Aurora, supports a hospital in Sudan. A few weeks after the cuts, the head of that hospital contacted me asking how to obtain ARVs (antiretroviral drugs) and TB medications because his supply was gone. He said, “I have patients who, if they do not get this round of treatment, the entire process becomes worthless.” That illustrates how abrupt disruptions destroy continuity of care, particularly for TB treatment.

The excess deaths will also be felt in the broader humanitarian space. Humanitarian work is not just about delivering supplies—it is also about the practice of humanitarian diplomacy. If you approach a government with resources and say, “We want to help,” it’s much easier to initiate cooperation. Without resources, governments are often reluctant to seek assistance, whether due to pride or political considerations.

Negotiating for access is fundamental. No relief operation achieves anything if you cannot reach the people who need help. In every country, the government is the principal gatekeeper for whether agencies can operate effectively. Numbers will continue to be debated—credible and less credible—but it is safe to say millions of excess deaths will occur because of these cuts.

This is a story that must continue to be told, because the effects of the cuts will have a long tail. People will remember showing up at clinics for their regular supply of antiretrovirals, seeing the medicines still on the shelves, but being told they could not be distributed because the organization had received a stop-work order. That really happened.

Jacobsen: Diplomacy with a democratic society is probably easier than with a theocratic one. How is diplomacy conducted with governments whose interpretation of Islam is politically theocratic?

Thomas-Jensen: You appeal to shared humanity. These are Afghan citizens, and they are suffering. You work with the government to negotiate access—where you can operate, what compromises you accept—while maximizing your ability to deliver aid. Afghanistan is no different. Restrictions on women working in relief are particularly debilitating, but the Taliban still has an interest in responding to crises. They want to project that they can govern and meet people’s needs. The truth is, they cannot do that without outside help.

That is where the leverage lies: resources. Humanitarian principles guide this work. We are not there to support U.S. political or military agendas—we are there to provide essential services, including food, water, shelter, and medical care. The message to the Taliban is: you have a political interest in responding, and we can help you do that.

Jacobsen: What objections do you hear to that?

Thomas-Jensen: These days, the most common objection is domestic: many argue that US taxpayer dollars should not be used for crises overseas when the US faces severe crises at home. America indeed faces significant challenges of its own, but this perspective often overlooks the interconnectedness of global stability and security—and how quickly crises abroad can impact people at home.

Many argue that crises abroad are not in the strategic interest of the United States—or even if they are, that it is not America’s role to be the world’s emergency responder. I agree. It is not our job. It is a choice, one that brings advantages: stability, influence, and goodwill.

What is profound now is the loss of trust. For decades, there was bipartisan consensus that it was in our interest to maintain a strong humanitarian presence overseas—to act quickly when crises struck and to project our character as a generous nation. I still believe we are fundamentally that. But when humanitarian response becomes politicized—when one administration supports it and another dismantles it—you erode confidence. Other countries no longer trust the US to be a reliable partner, and rebuilding that trust will be a slow and challenging process.

On the one hand, this puts us at a disadvantage. On the other hand, and I will end somewhat optimistically, it creates opportunities for local responders, local organizations, and individual humanitarians—the kinds of people we support—to step up and thrive. The challenge now is reorienting a system built on writing extensive checks to major organizations into one where smaller, direct investments in local actors can have a meaningful impact.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts?

Thomas-Jensen: Only that I am glad to answer these questions. People need to understand, as objectively as possible, the impact of aid cuts and the crises people are enduring. I have been on the front lines of many disasters, and from personal experience, the work we did meant a lot to the people receiving assistance. They never forgot that the US—and the world—showed up.

We are now in a different place. But I hope that by empowering and supporting local people, we can still have a meaningful impact.

If you have any follow-up, let me know. We can get you more specifics on our colleagues working in Afghanistan; a couple of them have done relevant work there. I just watched a TED Talk – One of our local humanitarians from Afghanistan gave a TED talk about keeping her school open.

She [Sakena Yacoobi is] an educator, and in the midst of a crisis she was suddenly thrust into being a humanitarian—who else would organize a response if not her? It’s interesting to see how this dynamic is changing.

Jacobsen: I’ve been part of the international humanist community and have some colleagues in Nigeria and Ghana.A big complaint they have is that groups wanting to join Humanists International as “humanist” organizations are, by their own activities and definitions, actually humanitarian organizations. That channel can attract scams, but there are also legitimate groups simply scrambling for any source of funding.

Thomas-Jensen: Funding is extremely tight. Large-scale philanthropy often assumes some portion will be lost to waste or fraud and budgets accordingly. The irony is that even massive, well-run entities—think a $40-billion company—carry a few weak projects.

Jacobsen: If the Department of Government Efficiency truly wanted to pursue waste as aggressively as it claims, it could look hard at the Pentagon, where there are programs worth billions that critics consider wasteful of taxpayer money. Chris Hedges—a former New York Times correspondent and an ordained Presbyterian minister—has commented on the bloat: budgets expand, and even some generals acknowledge they don’t know what to do with the excess.

Thomas-Jensen: The U.S. military, when it wants to be, is the most powerful, efficient, and effective military on the Earth. The Pentagon, when it wants to be, can also be the slowest, least effective, least efficient bureaucracy on the planet. The two things can be true. 

Jacobsen: Thank you, Colin. I appreciate your time and expertise.

Thomas-Jensen: Thank you. It was good to meet you.

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