Everywhere Insiders 16: Iran Sanctions, Europe Leads, NATO Tested

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/05

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman calls the outcome a political win for Israel and Trump, yet coordination with Europe is lacking, and Washington has deprioritized Iran. She critiques the UN’s focus on Gaza over Russia’s war, warns European sanctions are driven by politics, and urges decisive NATO deterrence after Russian airspace violations. Haiti’s gang-run collapse demands coherent intervention. She flags risky U.S. concessions to China.

Interview conducted September 21, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We’re here for insiders. Today, we will use sources from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, UN News, Reuters, and AP News, focusing on global contexts.

The first update from UN News is significant: the UN Security Council failed to pass a draft that would have extended Iran sanctions relief. The text—tabled by Council president South Korea—won only four votes (China, Russia, Pakistan, Algeria), short of the nine required. Nine members voted against, and two abstained (Guyana and South Korea). This failure clears the path for the “snapback” of UN sanctions under Resolution 2231.

Had it passed, the draft would have kept relief in place. Because it failed, the default is a re-imposition of UN measures tied to the 2015 JCPOA unless diplomacy produces an alternative before the deadline.

France, Germany, and the UK (the E3) have already initiated the snapback track, with President Emmanuel Macron saying sanctions are likely to be reimposed by the end of the month.

Irina Tsukerman: After the June 13–24, 2025, Israel war, which included U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, Iran sharply curtailed cooperation with inspectors. The IAEA reduced or withdrew in-field inspections for safety, and subsequent access has remained highly restricted.

Intelligence and open-source analyses indicate parts of Iran’s nuclear program persisted, and some enriched material may have been moved before or during the strikes, though quantities and locations remain uncertain.

With the draft failing in the Council, the snapback of UN sanctions now appears set to proceed absent a last-minute agreement, increasing economic pressure on Tehran. Iranian officials say they will withstand any renewed measures. It will likely not stop Iran’s nuclear program; it will only increase financial pressure.

Essentially, we are looking at a return to the pre-JCPOA structure. This is a political win for Israel and for the Trump administration, although ironically, it was not coordinated with Europe. The initiative came from the Europeans, who reached their own conclusions.

Politically, this is a win. But the United States and Israel are not fully capitalizing on it. This would have been an opportunity to re-engage with Europe on the shared concern over Iran’s nuclear program, yet all parties are operating separately. The Europeans are acting in concert, Israel is monitoring Iran for potential aggression and warning regional actors, and the United States has shifted focus after failing to revive diplomacy.

Jacobsen: So Washington has deprioritized Iran?

Tsukerman: The U.S. has paid little attention to Iran since the strikes, instead focusing on Ukraine–Russia diplomacy, broader Middle East issues, and domestic concerns. Iran has fallen off the radar. Meanwhile, the EU trade agreement is unravelling, and after the U.S. trip to the UK, there is still no comprehensive deal with London. This could have been a rallying point for cooperation, but it has not become one.

Jacobsen: Is this despite the scale of the issue?

Tsukerman: Yes. The reactions from the international community have been muted. There is little excitement from either pro-sanctions or anti-sanctions camps. Discussions are limited because many do not think the outcome will have much impact, or because Iran is not seen as a top priority.

Jacobsen: And in the U.S. specifically?

Tsukerman: There has been an ousting of several pro-Iran spokespeople. One example is former Iranian diplomat Hossein Mousavian, who had been a scholar at Princeton. He lost his post, reportedly under Trump administration pressure. He was one of the strongest proponents of the JCPOA and an opponent of intrusive nuclear inspections. Since leaving Princeton, little is publicly known about his activities.

They are on the back burner. The discourse has shifted toward Iraqi militias and speculation about Iran’s next steps in rebuilding its capabilities.

Recently, a dual national researcher held by an Iraqi group was released with U.S. and Israeli assistance. The release generated headlines at the time but quickly faded. Iran, while important, remains on the back burner for the international community.

Jacobsen: What about at the UN?

Tsukerman: Attention is shifting to the General Assembly. Most focus is on U.S.–China dynamics and Gaza. Iran, meanwhile, has been reintegrating regionally. It took part in the Arab–Muslim summit in Doha to support Qatar’s sovereignty after Israeli operations against Hamas. Iranian officials also met with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince to discuss bilateral engagement and security. Rather than confrontation, Iran is positioning itself as part of the broader Muslim world, leveraging Gaza tensions to soften sanctions pressure.

We may see Middle Eastern states soft-pedalling sanctions enforcement, even offering backing to Iran on specific issues.

Jacobsen: Now, to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary-General António Guterres issued a stark warning to world leaders on the eve of the 80th high-level week. He stressed the multiplication of conflicts, widening political divides, and growing impunity, where states act as though they can do whatever they wish. He pointed to debt crises in developing countries, inequality, and lack of concessional funding. He highlighted three priorities: peace and security in the Middle East, with a focus on Gaza and the two-state solution; urgent humanitarian aid; and climate action, with a demand for new national climate plans that dramatically cut emissions to avoid an irreversible disaster. His remarks seemed pointed.

Tsukerman: The first part implicitly compared Russia and Israel. A UN panel recently accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, while no UN body has labelled Russia’s actions in Ukraine genocide, despite well-documented massacres of civilians under active investigation as war crimes. In Israel’s case, evidence of systematic targeting is far weaker; incendiary comments from some officials exist, but not from those directing military operations. The panel itself has faced criticism for including members sympathetic to Hamas.

The United States recently vetoed a Russian-proposed resolution at the UN calling for an immediate ceasefire. Washington supports dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure, provided operations are relatively short and remain within legal and ethical norms, given conditions in Gaza. Yet Russia’s war in Ukraine affects far more people worldwide.

Russia’s war has disrupted global grain supplies, fueled asymmetric operations, and included recent intelligence findings—such as Moscow being behind explosive parcels sent to European embassies and pig heads dumped outside Paris mosques in a staged intimidation campaign. Despite this, much of the world’s diplomatic focus is fixed on Gaza.

Jacobsen: Why such a disproportionate focus?

Tsukerman: Several reasons. Pan-Arab states and broader Muslim audiences emphasize Gaza heavily, often through Russian and Chinese amplification. Some European governments have also rushed to declare support for a Palestinian state without addressing borders or bilateral agreements. Others have embargoed arms to Israel or even imposed trade sanctions. These moves rely almost entirely on casualty figures and reports from Gaza, which are controlled by Hamas and cannot be independently verified during active conflict.

Policy is being shaped without investigation. Civilian casualties are real, but the numbers remain uncertain. Despite that, sanctions are being pursued unusually fast. Usually, sanctions follow lengthy investigations and deliberations. Here, decisions seem driven more by political frustration, domestic constituencies, and Arab or Muslim partners’ pressure. It is less a direct response to confirmed war crimes and more about appeasement and managing public opinion.

The concern is that European foreign policy is being shaped by domestic pressures or external manipulation. This undermines sanctions as a legitimate tool for changing state behaviour. In the long term, that misuse will backfire, regardless of how Israel’s actions are evaluated. Sanctions are meant to address clearly established violations, not serve as a way to air grievances.

Jacobsen: Let’s pivot. Haiti, Amnesty International reported on the Lombard massacre of September 11–12 in Haiti, where gangs killed at least 40 people and set dozens of homes on fire. César Marín, Amnesty’s Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns in the Americas, called it a painful reminder of the collapse of state protection. He urged immediate action to ensure security and justice. What has the international community done?

Tsukerman: So far, efforts have been weak. The U.S. imposed sanctions on individuals, Kenya has offered security support, and El Salvador was approached for its experience with gang elimination. But without a more decisive international intervention, Haiti’s gangs will continue terrorizing communities. Domestically, the Trump administration has tried to revoke Temporary Protected Status for Haitian refugees, sparking ongoing legal battles. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians, along with Venezuelans and others, face uncertainty in the U.S.

Jacobsen: And the situation on the ground?

Tsukerman: Dire. Gangs are heavily armed and organized, effectively overrunning the country. Haiti has seen repeated changes in leadership, none of which have been effective in restoring order. Local law enforcement and the military lack capacity. Without a serious, systematic external enforcement mechanism, the violence will continue.

Jacobsen: Why isn’t it prioritized more globally?

Tsukerman: Haiti’s crisis is devastating locally but largely self-contained. Unlike cartels in Mexico or Colombia, Haiti’s gangs have not disrupted global markets or directly impacted distant states. While it fuels migration pressure on the U.S. and nearby countries, it has not elicited sustained international attention.

Haiti’s gangs remain locally focused. They have not yet exported violence abroad. If they consolidate power enough to do so, we may see a stronger international response. For now, because the threat is contained, there is little will to commit financial or human resources to stop the mass violence. It is horrific and highlights the ineffectiveness of international security mechanisms.

Past international interventions and NGO efforts have often been corrupt, mismanaged, or poorly structured. Resources were looted or wasted. Haiti is a microcosm of what happens when crises are treated as isolated rather than as part of a broader global security structure. The international order is failing to produce organized, effective responses to fragmented societies. Haiti is now a failed state.

It has no alignment with international terrorist groups or state sponsors so that no outside actor can be easily blamed. These gangs are not proxies like Hezbollah or cartels tied to state intelligence. They are local, leaderless manifestations of violent disorder. Contrast that with El Salvador, which eventually reduced gang violence after decades of extreme crime, economic collapse, and social devastation. I do not believe Haiti has leadership willing or able to implement comparable measures, even if it wanted to.

Jacobsen: Let’s turn to Russia and Ukraine. On Friday, Russia sent three military jets into NATO member Estonia’s airspace for 12 minutes. Estonia called the incursion “unprecedentedly brazen.” Recently, Russia also launched 19 drones that penetrated deep into Poland, past Warsaw. What do you make of this escalation?

Tsukerman: It was not incidental. A few days earlier, Russian drones “wandered” into Poland, and NATO issued warnings. Then came this deliberate incursion just ahead of the Zapad (“West”) exercises in Belarus, which explicitly simulated an attack on Europe. This was a clear signal, a psychological pressure campaign to divide NATO, and a test of the alliance’s resolve.

Jacobsen: How did NATO respond?

Tsukerman: NATO mobilized quickly to intercept and shoot down drones, but all measures remained defensive. There was no counteroffensive or announced deterrent. Russia will interpret that restraint as an invitation to continue probing. Indeed, following the Estonia incident, more drones were detected violating Polish and Romanian airspace. Romania escorted one out but refused to engage militarily, signalling fear of escalation. Public polling in Romania reflects widespread anxiety over a Russian attack.

Jacobsen: And Estonia?

Tsukerman: The three Russian jets were escorted out by Italian F-35s, but again, not shot down—despite the deliberate nature of the violation. Until NATO decides to meet such incursions with decisive force, they will continue. Consider Turkey in 2015: when a Russian jet violated its airspace, Turkey shot it down within seconds. That single action ended further violations.

After Turkey shot down the Russian jet in 2015, there were no further violations of its airspace. There was no nuclear escalation, no war. That shows deterrence works. NATO is more than capable of projecting overwhelming force against a militarily overstretched Russia, but it continues to play by Moscow’s rules. Instead of endless warnings and finger-wagging, NATO must send a clear message in the only language Russia understands: decisive military strength.

Jacobsen: Reports indicate Trump is preparing to meet with South Korean leadership in the coming weeks, followed by a visit to China. In the meantime, his concessions to Beijing are striking. He extended TikTok’s deadline yet again, announcing a deal that allows it to operate through a U.S.-based shell company while maintaining the same Chinese algorithms, security risks, and propaganda pipelines.

Tsukerman: He has cut military funding to Taiwan in hopes of securing a trade deal with China. Scheduling multiple top-level meetings with Xi Jinping is already a significant win for Xi—undeserved, given that Xi has pursued an ultra-nationalist strategy, isolating China and deepening confrontation with the global community. There are signs of internal factional pressure against him, but even so, Trump’s moves lend him legitimacy and propaganda value.

Xi has taken China’s confrontational approach further than his predecessors, making management of the U.S.–China relationship far more difficult. Trump, by preplanning a China visit regardless of how things go in South Korea, signals desperation for a deal. That weakens the U.S. position and emboldens China to harden its negotiating stance.

Alarmingly, no serious China experts are advising him. We saw the consequences of that with the Russia policy. It will be worse with China, whose diplomacy is built on millennia of tradition, protocol, and cultural strategy. Beijing’s negotiators are experienced and difficult to read. Walking into that without expertise is a dangerous move.

The cultural and procedural aspects of Chinese diplomacy mean Trump’s delegation is likely to miss key signals and red flags. Without expertise, they will not achieve their goals.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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