East of the Eastern Front 1: NATO ROE, Counter-Drones, and Baltic Defense
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/06
Mark Temnycky is a Ukrainian-American analyst and freelance journalist specializing in American, European, and Eurasia affairs. He serves as a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center (since December 2021), and he is a geopolitics contributor at Forbes. Previously, he spent nearly seven years as a U.S. defense contractor supporting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment. His work appears across leading outlets and think tanks, with a curated portfolio of articles and media available online.
In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Temnycky outlines NATO’s posture after Estonia’s 12 minute MiG 31 airspace breach. He explains Article 4 consultations, conditions for tougher rules of engagement, and a developing counter drone playbook uniting detection, electronic warfare, AI, and rapid response, reinforced by Ukraine to Poland training. He details integration of Turkey’s AWACS with UK Eastern Sentry patrols, continuous Baltic Air Policing, and legal and financial risks of an EU reparations loan backed by immobilized Russian assets. Temnycky notes U.S. deliveries via the allies-funded PURL channel, stresses credible military red lines, and distills Zapad 2025 lessons for the Suwałki corridor.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: After Estonia’s 12-minute MiG-31 airspace breach and the North Atlantic Council statement, what would trigger tough rules of engagement?
Mark Temnycky: Estonia’s invocation of NATO Article 4 signals allied consultations on collective security measures, including potential escalation of defensive postures. If further aggression or repeated violations continue, NATO could authorize more robust defensive actions under existing collective defense commitments.
Jacobsen: With NATO reinforcing the eastern flank, Lithuania authorized shoot-downs. Ukraine training Polish forces on drone defense. Is there a common NATO counter-drone playbook?
Temnycky: NATO is developing and testing an integrated counter-drone playbook, with a focus on detection, electronic warfare, and rapid response. Exercises like Ramstein Legacy and JPOW 2025 emphasize cooperation between member states, blending air defense with counter-unmanned aircraft systems. Ukraine’s hands-on experience training Polish forces enhances NATO’s evolving tactics, particularly against low-cost, swarm, and covert drones. The alliance is integrating AI, intelligence sharing, and multi-domain defense into its approach, combining air defense, electronic warfare, and interoperability among allies.
Jacobsen: How does Turkey’s AWACS deployment to Lithuania integrate with UK Eastern Sentry air defense patrols?
Temnycky: Turkey’s AWACS in Lithuania helps NATO detect Russian drones and low-flying aircraft that ground radars might miss. It works alongside UK fighter jets patrolling Poland by sharing real-time data, improving overall air defense. This combined effort strengthens NATO’s ability to respond quickly to threats along the eastern border.
Jacobsen: What about Baltic air policing day-to-day?
Temnycky: Baltic air policing is a continuous NATO mission protecting the airspace of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which lack their own fighter jets. NATO members rotate deployments to conduct regular patrols and quick intercepts of Russian aircraft probing the region. Operating 24/7, this surveillance deters airspace violations and demonstrates NATO’s collective defense commitment on the eastern flank.
Jacobsen: What are the legal and financial risks of the EU’s proposed “[reparations loan]” backed by immobilized Russian assets? (explainer; Germany update)
Temnycky: The EU’s proposed reparations loan aims to provide up to €130 billion to Ukraine by issuing bonds backed by frozen Russian assets, enabling Ukraine to finance its defense and reconstruction while postponing repayment until reparations are agreed upon.
This would provide significant assistance for Ukraine’s defense and ease financial pressure on EU members, who have collectively provided nearly €200 billion in aid since the invasion began.
Legal risks arise from using assets that are still officially Russian property, necessitating careful navigation of sovereign immunity and property rights to avoid disputes that could undermine future asset freezes. Financially, the loan spreads risk among EU states and investors, and could set a precedent for other countries seizing assets of adversaries.
While balancing urgency and legal norms, uncertainties persist regarding political outcomes and investor confidence; however, the approach reflects a pragmatic effort to hold Russia accountable and support Ukraine’s recovery.
Jacobsen: With the U.S. resuming deliveries via the allies-funded PURL channel (policy update), what realistic timelines and sustainment costs can be expected?
Temnycky: The U.S. has approved initial shipments of weapons to Ukraine through the PURL channel, pooling NATO allies’ funds to purchase U.S. arms. Deliveries, including Patriot missiles and HIMARS rocket launchers, are underway, with more packages expected. PURL enhances coordination and financial support, ensuring Ukraine receives critical defense and counterattack equipment.
Jacobsen: Following Zelensky’s UNGA warning of the “most destructive arms race” and NATO’s pledge to use “all means” after incursions, what will reduce escalation?
Temnycky: Clear deterrence is needed to reduce escalation. NATO must maintain strong defense capabilities and establish credible red lines while reinforcing Ukraine’s defense without provoking Russia. A balanced approach that combines military readiness and diplomacy, including pursuing diplomatic channels, is essential to maintain stability and prevent conflict from escalating.
Jacobsen: What lessons from Zapad-2025 should shape Allied air and missile defense across the Suwałki corridor? (context)
Temnycky: Zapad-2025 highlighted integrated air and missile defense, precision fires, and electronic warfare to disrupt NATO defenses. Lessons include prioritizing hardened command centers, strong missile defense layers, and resilient communications to withstand pre-emptive strikes. NATO should also enhance its rapid detection and coordinated responses to hybrid threats, such as drones and electronic attacks, ensuring the corridor remains defensible and connected to the alliance.
Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Mark, see you next week.
Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In-Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices. In-Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In-Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.
In-Sight Publishing 