Mark Temnycky on AUKUS: Strategic Reassessment & Deterrence
Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen
Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project
Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/09/13
Mark Temnycky is a Ukrainian-American analyst and freelance journalist specializing in American, European, and Eurasia affairs. He serves as a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center (since December 2021), and he is a geopolitics contributor at Forbes. Previously, he spent nearly seven years as a U.S. defense contractor supporting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment. His work appears across leading outlets and think tanks, with a curated portfolio of articles and media available online: https://wakelet.com/@MTemnycky.
With Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Temnycky discussed the AUKUS pact’s evolving role in U.S. defense strategy. Drawing from his RAND Corporation capstone experience, he highlighted the 2025 Pentagon reassessment, aimed at aligning AUKUS with shifting Indo-Pacific priorities. Central issues include submarine production constraints, technology sharing under Pillar II, and enhancing trilateral cooperation with the UK and Australia. The review underscores integrated deterrence, force posture recalibration, and innovation through AI, quantum, and hypersonics. While industrial and workforce limitations remain obstacles, AUKUS significantly strengthens regional deterrence, particularly against China, and revitalizes allied defense capabilities and industrial bases.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What is your background with the RAND Corporation on the AUKUS relationship?
Mark Temnycky: I completed a Capstone Research Project with the RAND Corporation while pursuing my dual degree master’s program at the Maxwell School, earning a Master of Public Administration and a Master of Arts in International Relations. During the capstone, my classmates and I wrote six research papers analyzing public-to-public and public-to-private partnerships. We looked at how governments in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia partnered with other government agencies (such as the AUKUS relationship), as well as how these governments formed relationships with various public and private institutions in their own countries. One report focused on the AUKUS relationship, contextualizing it within broader intelligence-sharing frameworks, such as Five Eyes. We presented our findings to RAND analysts in June 2017, successfully completing the project, which sharpened my understanding of trilateral defense cooperation and partnerships.
Jacobsen: What strategic objectives is the Pentagon pursuing with the 2025 AUKUS reassessment?
Temnycky: Like all other programs under the new administration, the Pentagon’s 2025 AUKUS reassessment is a strategic review intended to ensure the pact remains aligned with shifting U.S. defense priorities, particularly in the context of intensifying great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Key challenges include expanding submarine production capacity to meet both U.S. and Australian demands amid industrial constraints, optimizing burden-sharing and co-development with the UK and Australia, and advancing emerging capabilities such as autonomy and long-range strike. The review aims to confirm that AUKUS not only bolsters deterrence and regional stability but also revitalizes the U.S. defense industrial base and fosters a sustainable partnership among these critical allies.
Jacobsen: How could the AUKUS review reshape U.S. force posture?
Temnycky: The 2025 AUKUS review presents an opportunity to reinforce U.S. strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific by enhancing forward-deployed naval and subsurface forces and deepening burden-sharing with allies like Australia and the United Kingdom. Anticipated shifts include prioritizing integrated deterrence strategies, emphasizing operational flexibility, joint interoperability, and technology integration. This recalibration supports a more sustainable, capable U.S. presence designed to impose significant costs on potential adversaries, maintain regional stability, and potentially allow reallocation of forces from less critical theaters.
Jacobsen: What about its basing in the Indo-Pacific?
Temnycky: The U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly focused on dispersal and a networked presence, rather than fixed, large-scale bases. This includes rotational deployments and forward-operating locations in partner countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, supported by frequent multinational exercises, including Resolute Force Pacific and Talisman Sabre, to enhance interoperability. The strategy emphasizes island garrisons and control of strategic maritime routes to complicate adversary planning and enable rapid response, striking a balance between readiness and political sensitivities surrounding permanent basing.
Jacobsen: What are the deterrence implications of the AUKUS submarine program?
Temnycky: One thought is that equipping Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines will significantly strengthen undersea deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. These platforms would offer enhanced stealth, endurance, and reach, enabling persistent covert operations that threaten adversaries’ naval assets and critical sea lines of communication. The program amplifies integrated coalition deterrence, signaling a firm commitment to regional security and raising the costs of aggression. Although concerns over nonproliferation exist, the strategic benefits of maintaining maritime security and deterrence are considerable.
Jacobsen: Is this intended as a deterrent for China?
Temnycky: The AUKUS submarine initiative is primarily intended as a credible deterrent against China’s expanding maritime power. It aims to enhance allied capability to sustain covert presence and surveillance across key maritime corridors vital to China’s military and economic activities. The program injects operational uncertainty into Chinese strategic calculations, restricting freedom of movement and complicating naval operations. China’s diplomatic opposition underscores its serious regard for AUKUS as a strategic challenge. The initiative’s core purpose remains reinforcing an integrated deterrence posture that discourages Chinese aggression and supports regional power balance.
Jacobsen: How will AUKUS Pillar II tech sharing affect allied innovation and export controls?
Temnycky: Pillar II of AUKUS promotes deeper allied collaboration on cutting-edge military technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonics, autonomous systems, and others. They seek to outpace adversaries’ advances by pooling expertise and resources. Furthermore, this initiative faces challenges due to restrictive export control regimes, which have traditionally restricted sensitive technology transfers. But targeted exemptions and regulatory reforms have begun easing these hurdles for AUKUS partners. Fully leveraging Pillar II’s potential depends on modernizing export controls and building trust within and beyond the trilateral framework, ultimately accelerating innovation, interoperability, and industrial integration.
Jacobsen: What industrial-base and workforce constraints might delay AUKUS submarine timelines?
Temnycky: AUKUS submarine delivery timelines confront notable industrial and workforce challenges. Shipyards such as those in Stirling and Henderson face infrastructure and capacity limitations. The UK’s submarine industrial base bears historic strains from prior program delays and cost overruns, which raise concerns about sustaining nuclear-powered attack submarines, commonly referred to as SSNs. This will also impact SSN-AUKUS development schedules. The U.S. must balance the demands for Virginia-class construction domestically with its commitments to AUKUS. Sustaining long-term program stability will require continuous investment in workforce development, supply chains, and risk mitigation across all partners.
Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Mark.
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