Everywhere Insiders 14: UN Crises and Humanitarian Challenges

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/09/12

 Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

In this interview with Scott Douglas Jacobsen, Tsukerman discussed UN underfunding and credibility crises in the DRC, Afghanistan, and South Sudan, stressing corruption, governance, and donor fatigue as obstacles.

Interview conducted September 5. 

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: All right, so today’s focus for Everywhere Insiders is UN News. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is in crisis. Funding shortfalls this year have forced cuts across the UN system, and OHCHR says services for survivors of sexual violence in eastern DRC have been curtailed or halted as the liquidity crunch bites.

A new UN Human Rights Office report finds that all sides in North and South Kivu—most prominently the Rwanda-backed M23—committed grave abuses since late 2024, some likely amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The findings include systematic sexual violence (including gang rape and sexual slavery), summary executions, torture, and enforced disappearances.

On the battlefield, the report and wire coverage note M23’s significant advances. Reuters reports M23 seized Goma in January and then made gains across North and South Kivu. The same report says the UN found M23 received training and operational support from Rwanda’s military, which Rwanda denies.

Ravina Shamdasani, the OHCHR spokesperson, briefed the Geneva press that the Fact-Finding Mission’s report (covering Jan–Jul 2025) documents “gross human rights violations” by M23 as well as by the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and affiliated groups such as the Wazalendo. OHCHR also flagged that funding shortages have stalled a planned Commission of Inquiry.

Women and girls are disproportionately targeted in the sexual violence documented, and the scale of attacks has surged amid the fighting, according to AP’s readout of the UN report.

Irina Tsukerman: Part of the background here is money and trust. UN entities have been cutting or postponing work due to budget gaps—UNHCR announced deep reductions for 2026 after a challenging 2025, and OHCHR has warned of delays and cancellations resulting from underfunding, which compounds the service gaps for victims.

It is also true that the UN’s reputation has been dented over the years by sexual exploitation and abuse cases involving peacekeepers, which does not help donor confidence or field operations—especially in places like the DRC.

All of this makes it harder for the UN to advocate for—and deliver—adequate support to survivors in Congo, even though the crisis is unquestionably genuine and urgent. The tragedy is that it still competes for attention and resources with other headline conflicts.

In Gaza, and even more so in Sudan’s civil war, the scale dwarfs what is happening in Congo. However, Congo remains a major human rights and humanitarian crisis. It deserves attention. It deserves resources. It deserves to be prioritized. Unfortunately, it suffers from the fact that not only the UN but also other international institutions are now experiencing a crisis of credibility.

The better way is to develop resources targeting individual situations—Congo, for instance—and perhaps de-internationalize them. Make it the focus of a specific group of countries or international actors that can dedicate their full attention to that issue and lobby the international community for support on that front, without entangling it in massive international bureaucracies that are fighting on multiple fronts, distracted, or seen as excessively biased and mistrusted. That would be the best way to help people in need—by creating mechanisms of assistance that are not dependent on organizations, countries, or actors that are not trusted with either funding or coverage of the situation.

The problem is compounded by the fact that several international crises are consuming all the oxygen in the room, due to their global scale and long-term impact on neighbouring countries and international stability. That leaves less room for people to dedicate full attention to localized conflicts, such as those happening in the Congo.

The other issue is that Congo itself is often perceived as almost a hopeless case. The government there is backed by Russia, which amplifies the abuses. Some Russian operatives involved in law enforcement operations are themselves seen as contributing to the crisis. On the other hand, that backing makes it less likely for anyone to want to intervene, because when an already undemocratic or corrupt government is also supported by a major international human rights violator, the scope for outside action becomes very limited. The only viable path is to pressure both the Congolese government and its backers, while also trying to address the non-state actors as part of a transnational problem. However, it is not easy—let us face it, it is not easy—without addressing the broader context.

In some of these countries, internal issues will inevitably be left for the government to manage, making it challenging to attract meaningful international support. The fact that Congo has been as mismanaged as it has only compounds the problem, reflecting the weakness of the political infrastructure. All of this makes any form of long-term resolution, or even short-term assistance, exceptionally cumbersome. People there are not only dealing with rebels and localized violence, but also with a government that may facilitate assistance—or may use it as an extortion tool against international organizations and donor countries, as has been the case in many other conflict zones.

You want to help civilians, but if the government is corrupt and multiple bad actors are operating in the same sphere, how do you manage to get assistance to the people who need it, rather than having it stolen and redistributed among local cronies? That creates a very narrow path for assistance, particularly for victims of sexual violence. I also think that focusing on transnational blocs—meaning victims of sexual violence in multiple conflicts joining forces—could be a way to attract greater international attention. That might be more effective than treating each subset of victims in isolation.

Child soldiers have become an international issue, where several countries have joined forces. The same has been true of landmines—countries victimized by landmines have come together to find standard solutions. Victims of sexual violence should not be confined to their own internal conflicts but should build bridges with others worldwide. The problem is that people tend to “choose their favourite victims” based on their own biases, preferences, or misconceptions about global conflicts.

There may be individuals in other countries who could be helpful to victims in the DRC, but nothing will succeed unless political differences are put aside. The focus must remain on the fact that sexual violence is wrong, regardless of who is involved, and it should be treated as a humanitarian issue wherever in the world it occurs. That is the only real way to make a lasting difference.

Tsukerman: Moving to another crisis—Afghanistan. The recent earthquake’s death toll has risen to around 2,200, which is far higher than initial estimates. About 5,000 homes have suffered partial or total damage. Roughly half a million people are affected, including approximately 263,000 children as of September 4.

UN-Habitat’s Stephanie Luce, speaking from Kabul, noted that continuing aftershocks are triggering landslides and complicating access to the area. Many women have not been able to leave their homes because of restrictive cultural norms, and the lack of sufficient female doctors means they cannot receive proper medical care. This is a natural disaster compounded by human factors.

Tsukerman: Afghanistan, of course, is no stranger to disasters of this scale. It is prone to earthquakes, like Iran and other countries in the region. In recent years, it has also faced devastating floods and harsh winters. All of this is mainly due to its geography, but the lack of infrastructure and the political situation compound the suffering.

Afghanistan’s geography makes it prone to disasters like earthquakes, floods, and harsh winters—but geography alone does not explain the current humanitarian catastrophe. It is compounded by the fact that Afghanistan has long been severely underdeveloped. Rural areas have remained underdeveloped even under the previous government. Now, the situation is worsened by Taliban corruption, international isolation, and the effective prevention of humanitarian organizations from reaching many parts of the country.

Moreover, of course, the women’s rights issue makes everything worse. Women are essentially confined to their homes under draconian laws that are harshly enforced. Men who attempt to help them may also be punished. This is an entirely preventable dimension of the crisis. You cannot prevent challenging geography, and you cannot solve economic issues overnight. However, the Taliban’s choice to prioritize religious dogma and profoundly restrictive interpretations of modesty laws over the well-being of citizens speaks for itself. It is a wholly criminal and incompetent regime that should never have been allowed to gain power, much less retain it.

Unfortunately, there is no real mechanism right now beyond trying to prevent the Taliban from stealing as much international aid as possible. The Taliban has repeatedly diverted humanitarian assistance to cronies and loyalists. Ideologically subservient followers are rewarded, while everyone else—men, women, and minorities—are treated as second-class citizens at best.

The way international humanitarian aid is currently structured perpetuates this status quo. Aid groups generally work through whoever controls the territory politically. Organizations such as the International Red Cross or their equivalents in Muslim-majority countries rely on local authorities to provide access to victims of disasters or conflicts. 

This means they rarely act independently, and access turns into a political game. Yes, the Taliban bears much of the blame, but the international community has also failed to address this dimension. Instead of developing creative, out-of-the-box solutions to bypass restrictions—whether stemming from corruption or misogynist laws—international actors have largely gone along with the Taliban’s rules.

In practice, many are trying to cultivate goodwill and build diplomatic bridges, hoping the Taliban will cooperate. However, that is not how it works. The Taliban feels empowered as the sole gatekeeper of aid distribution. They will exploit that power. They will not compromise the way a democratic or less militantly fundamentalist authority might. They prioritize their dogma over health, the economy, and humanitarian needs.

So the UN, international NGOs, and governments seeking to provide basic assistance to Afghan civilians should not expect the Taliban to be a legitimate partner in the delivery of aid.

There is no practical solution unless the international community is willing to continue the status quo, where hundreds of thousands of people are virtually isolated and disenfranchised. They have to find a way to work around the Taliban—either by confronting and pressuring them or by supporting alternative governance mechanisms that could gain a political foothold in at least parts of the country. Short of that, they need creative workarounds that do not rely on the Taliban to “do the right thing.” That is simply not going to happen.

Jacobsen: The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, has condemned an attack by a local armed group in Western Equatoria State that targeted UN “blue helmets.” The militants seized a small cache of weapons and ammunition during the incident, which occurred while peacekeepers were on patrol between Tambura and Pusay.

UN spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric stated, “We emphasize that any attack on peacekeepers may constitute a war crime… These peacekeepers are deployed to protect civilians at a time when access and security remain fragile across Western Equatoria.” Meanwhile, severe flooding in that region has affected hundreds of thousands of people.

The civil war continues, and 270,000 people have been affected by flooding across 12 counties in four states. However, again, a natural disaster that cannot be prevented is compounded by poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, health crises, and international dynamics.

Tsukerman: Beyond the floods, there is now a cholera outbreak. That is partly due to poor humanitarian conditions: lack of adequate healthcare, prevention mechanisms, vaccines, and medicine. Internal political strife adds more pressure points. Tensions with Sudan also continue, with disputes over oil, energy infrastructure, and territory fueling instability. Sectarian divisions further complicate the situation, making the border regions especially fragile.

Moreover, of course, there are governance issues, including corruption. Russia has been trying to make inroads in South Sudan, and none of that helps when addressing a natural disaster crisis. We are seeing all these dimensions come into play. The fact that peacekeepers are now at risk underscores that the human security element is no less important than the physical impact of the flooding itself.

Quite simply, the security of South Sudan—the human security—has not been adequately handled. That means that general security in a post-disaster zone is compounded by marauding, sectarian strife, and attacks on aid convoys, whether by disenfranchised groups, corrupt factions, organized crime, or other elements.

All of this is more than peacekeepers can handle alone. They do not have offensive mechanisms for dealing with crime, violence, or resolving disputes. There needs to be more than aid distributors and peacekeepers trying to stabilize the situation.

There must be a more concerted effort to engage with the local government and establish a more transparent framework for addressing the multiple, overlapping crises—and for preventing them from compounding one another.

Once again, the humanitarian dimension is being ignored by the international community, partly due to shifting priorities and partly because many Western countries are facing their own economic crises and political instability. The United States has also significantly reduced its humanitarian aid to African countries. Identifying new donors and new sources of funding is paramount.

However, just as important is creating practical solutions for addressing security, corruption, and governance challenges. Otherwise, the money will disappear into a black hole, further feeding cynicism among Western governments that previously supported humanitarian operations in countries like South Sudan.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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