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Salih Hudayar: AI Surveillance, Rare Earths, and Uyghur Rights

2025-11-25

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): 

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/11/07

How do AI systems and rare earth supply chains tied to East Turkistan enable China’s surveillance architecture—and what strategic response should the United States and its allies adopt?

Salih Hudayar is the Foreign Minister of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile and a leading advocate for the rights of the Uyghur and Turkic peoples. Born in East Turkestan and raised in exile, he has dedicated his career to exposing the Chinese Communist Party’s repression, including mass surveillance, internment camps, forced sterilizations, and resource exploitation. Hudayar studied International Studies and Political Science in the United States before entering public service. He frequently testifies before the U.S. Congress and international bodies, urging recognition of the Uyghur genocide and calling for support of East Turkistan’s independence as a path to both justice and global security.

In this 2-part conversation, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Hudayar discuss U.S.-China trade tensions, rare earth supply chains, and population decline within the context of Uyghur repression. Hudayar details how AI and surveillance technologies—powered by minerals extracted from East Turkestan—are used to control Uyghurs through predictive policing, biometric data, and forced assimilation. He argues that China’s demographic engineering, including sterilizations, coerced marriages, and organ harvesting, aims to suppress Uyghur growth while exploiting resources. Hudayar calls on the United States and its allies to treat East Turkestan strategically, not just as a human rights issue, emphasizing independence as essential to countering China’s influence.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, once again, we are here with Salih Hudayar. We will be discussing outsourcing in the rare earths industry, tariffs, and population decline. The sources today are The Washington Post, Reuters, and AP.

Let us start with rare earths. Trump has been stating that the U.S. will be obtaining rare earths from China, and tariffs on Chinese goods will total 55%, which is a significant amount. From your point of view, you have seen the back and forth about the importance of rare earths for semiconductors, AI hardware, and infrastructure. We may not yet know the full potential of the technology, but we already know it will be significant. What are your thoughts on that, either from a political perspective or from an oilier interest perspective?

Salih Hudayar: Regarding AI, from our perspective, it has not been used in a positive way in Xinjiang (which we call East Turkestan). Chinese authorities have deployed an expansive surveillance regime there, including so-called “predictive policing,” where data about everyday behaviour is analyzed to flag people for questioning or detention. This is documented in reports about the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which aggregates personal data and issues alerts that can lead to arbitrary detention.

The targets are primarily Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities—who are Chinese citizens—not simply “non-Chinese people.” Factors that can trigger scrutiny include religious practices, cultural expressions, travel histories, language use, or even lawful behaviours that authorities label as “suspicious.” Since late 2016, credible estimates have found large-scale arbitrary detentions alongside political indoctrination, movement restrictions, and religious repression.

To make this concrete: I had a relative who received a lengthy prison sentence labelled “extremism” after encouraging local youths not to smoke, framing it as unhealthy and against our religious values. This kind of ordinary advice has been treated as evidence of “extremism” within the broader repression that rights groups have documented.

Religious life is tightly controlled. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is officially atheist and forbids its members from religious affiliation, while the state recognizes a limited set of religions under strict oversight. In practice, policy in Xinjiang has entailed coercive “de-radicalization” targeting religious expression.

On the technology side, companies tied to China’s surveillance build-out—including Hikvision—have been reported to market or develop analytics that can detect Uyghurs or “ethnicity” as a category, and U.S. authorities have sanctioned several Chinese firms for supporting biometric surveillance of minorities. This illustrates how AI and camera networks have been weaponized for authoritarian control—and exported abroad via Chinese vendors.

Meanwhile, in the West, AI is typically used for routine tasks like drafting emails or information retrieval, though abuses are possible anywhere. The difference in Xinjiang is scale, intent, and integration with state coercion—surveillance tools feed into detention and social control, as multiple investigations and human-rights assessments have shown.

At the same time, we want countries that have ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties to the people of East Turkestan to support us. We want the United States to pressure those countries to stop helping China crack down on our diaspora communities. Ultimately, what we want is for the United States to cut economic ties with China and instead support East Turkestan’s independence. Our homeland contains many critical minerals, and we would gladly provide them to the United States at steep discounts—cheaper than they could obtain elsewhere—because China is stealing our resources every day. They are extracting hundreds, if not thousands, of tons of our resources daily, using them to fuel their economy, strengthen their military, and oppress us. That poses not only an existential threat to us, but also a strategic threat to the international community, including the United States, which China openly positions as its primary rival. Replacing the U.S. is China’s endgame.

From that perspective, we have been advising both Congress and other American officials that America needs to start viewing East Turkestan through a strategic lens, not just a human rights lens. At the end of the day, genocide does not stop itself. You cannot name a genocide in history that suddenly ended on its own. Stopping the genocide is impossible while China continues colonizing and occupying East Turkestan. Supporting our independence is the only way forward—both from a humanitarian perspective, ending the genocide, and from a strategic perspective, countering China’s expansion.

This is why we have been arguing so strongly. Returning to U.S. trade policy, part of the deal has been access to critical minerals. In exchange, the U.S.—even though it had previously banned exports of high-tech video chips to China—is now allowing China access to some of those chips. Moreover, what is China doing with them? They are building massive AI data centers in the deserts of East Turkestan, essentially constructing an entire miniature city dedicated to AI infrastructure. Bloomberg and other outlets have reported on this.

From that perspective, these new AI facilities will not only be used against the people of East Turkestan, but could also be leveraged against the international community. Whether you look at it from the humanitarian front, the economic front, or the security front, it is in the U.S. national interest to support East Turkestan in regaining its independence.

Jacobsen: To the expansion of the Chinese state, let me check my notes here. I pulled up information on the surveillance of Uyghurs. The system is called IJOP, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform. It compiles massive amounts of data. What is included are phone surveillance, checkpoints, cameras, Wi-Fi monitoring, and even information fed by neighbours. Is that incentivized in some way—the snitching?

Hudayar: Yes, of course. It is incentivized. People can be given financial rewards, better job opportunities, and a more favourable lifestyle. In other words, collaborators can enjoy more freedom than others.

Jacobsen: Police also collect DNA, fingerprints, iris scans, and voice samples. Neighbourhoods are carved into units so local officials can maintain tighter surveillance.

Even on the phone side, in East Turkestan, the government forces people to download mandatory government apps. These apps have access to all the data on the phone. For example, if you receive a call from someone the government deems suspicious, or if you get a call from overseas, the app automatically alerts the nearest police station. Police then summon you for questioning.

If you have photos, videos, texts—anything remotely religious, cultural, or political—the same thing happens: the app alerts the police, and you are picked up. People cannot refuse these apps; without downloading them, you cannot even get a SIM card, since phone numbers require registration with your national ID. So nearly everyone has one of these apps, which constantly monitors all activity.

Many believe that even if you turn off your phone, authorities can still listen to your voice and track your movements. That means there is no privacy, not even in your own home. People live in constant fear: “What if I say something wrong? What if someone sends me the wrong message?” The fear of being flagged is pervasive.

Jacobsen: People can be flagged as suspicious and sent to camps. What we discussed years ago—mass internment, forced labour, political indoctrination—continues, and the leaks we have seen describe camp rules as harsh as “shoot to kill” for those who try to escape. The UN has said these may constitute crimes against humanity. “May” seems like an understatement, but it tracks with the UN’s cautious style and the slow pace at which it often acts. Do you see the Uyghur population as a test case for how these tools might be deployed against an entire population?

Hudayar: Yes, China has been using East Turkestan as a testing ground for virtually everything—from nuclear weapons to conventional weapons, and now the latest surveillance and AI technologies. The so-called “vocational training centers,” which are in fact internment camps, were first established in these areas. Then they began separating our children from their families, forcing them into boarding schools where they are required to learn Chinese and undergo indoctrination. Now Beijing has extended similar policies into Tibet, because what worked in East Turkestan is being rolled out elsewhere. The international community, beyond issuing statements of condemnation and concern, has done little to stop it. Seeing that no one acted decisively, China is repeating the same strategies in Tibet.

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