Irina Tsukerman on Faith, Foreign Policy, and Free Speech

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): A Further Inquiry

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/06/04

Dialogue conducted May 9th, 2025, Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman, a human rights and national security attorney, on pressing global issues. They discuss the implications of Pope Leo XIV’s centrist leadership, the resurgence of liberation theology, and the Church’s evolving role in international politics. Tsukerman critiques U.S. immigration practices under the Trump administration, particularly deportations to unstable regions like Libya and Ukraine. The conversation also explores media freedom in Greece, disinformation campaigns, and the line between journalism and foreign political interference. Tsukerman emphasizes the need for moderation, institutional integrity, and strong global leadership to address rising authoritarian trends. Interview conducted May 9, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today, we are here for the inaugural session of the Everywhere Insiders, with Irina Tsukerman, a human rights and national security attorney, political analyst, media strategist, and activist. She is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, a platform dedicated to in-depth policy and security analysis. The antonymized name of this session draws inspiration from her work and platform.

Tsukerman is known for extensively writing on disinformation, information warfare, counterterrorism, and geopolitical dynamics. Her work has appeared in Newsweek, Modern Diplomacy, Legal Insurrection, and other outlets. Her analyses have been translated into more than a dozen languages, and she has been featured across global media platforms, including Fox Business, i24 News, and Al Arabiya. She has also participated in discussions and programs affiliated with institutions such as the United Nations and George Mason University.

Tsukerman holds a Bachelor of Arts in International and Intercultural Studies with a concentration in the Middle East from Fordham University and her Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law. She is admitted to the New York State Bar and a member of the American Bar Association and the New York City Bar Association. She also serves as a fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute’s Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.

Let us move on to current developments. We have a new pope—Pope Leo XIV. Based on my analysis, he appears moderate and centrist on many issues, while remaining a theological and cultural traditionalist. I do not expect significant changes on topics such as marriage or LGBTQIA+ rights. However, I foresee increased dialogue, openness, and a diffusion of authority, rather than a continuation of rigid centralization.

Tsukerman: I agree—100%. It is interesting because many people are trying to analyze his past, especially during his time in Chicago. Some claim he did not engage extensively in interfaith dialogue, particularly with Jewish groups. However, that may not be a reflection of his values but rather of institutional norms. Some academic and religious institutions prioritize interfaith engagement, but those efforts often stem from specific theological traditions. For instance, Jesuits are known for promoting interreligious dialogue, but this pope is not a Jesuit, so we should not necessarily expect that same focus from him.

Others have interpreted his comments on J.D. Vance’s view of Christianity as signalling support for pro-immigration or pro-undocumented immigrant policies. I do not see it that way. Vance’s remarks could be interpreted far more broadly. When the pope, still a cardinal, responded, I believe he was not addressing immigration per se. Instead, he criticized Vance’s invocation of theology in a way that appeared opportunistic, self-serving, and unsupported by core doctrine.

Many people are trying to infer political statesmanship or partisan alignment from theological arguments that the new pope is making—arguments that are not necessarily aligned with party politics in the United States or anywhere else. That said, I agree with the general assessment. The way theology and dogma play out in the real world, outside of Vatican inner circles and specific theological doctrines mainly affecting devout Catholics, will be interesting to observe. However, I do not expect him to be as politically involved or outspoken on specific political conflicts and issues as Pope Francis was. I see him as someone who will make broader theological commentary when warranted, but avoid getting directly entangled in political debates.

Some people also read his experiences in Peru as a sign of excessive leftism, but that is a misinterpretation. People forget that one of the Church’s longstanding roles has been to minister to the poor. The fact that he has done this well is a positive sign, not an ideological statement. Pope Francis was heavily influenced by liberation theology and had a concrete intellectual formation in Argentina. On the other hand, Pope Leo was educated elsewhere and shows no apparent signs of embracing liberation theology, at least based on his public writings.

He is also not particularly focused on publishing; he is much more of a hands-on, pastoral priest, which is quite different from some of his predecessors. That could benefit, particularly regarding administration—he may be better equipped to address longstanding problems such as financial mismanagement. Just consider the recent reports of $500,000 found in a paper bag—something that sounds like it came straight out of The Conclave movie—and the ongoing sex abuse scandals.

I have seen at least one accusation claiming that he turned a blind eye to sex abuse cases while in Chicago. However, I have no way of knowing whether that is true, or whether the person making the accusation, who appeared deeply traumatized, was projecting personal pain or expecting something beyond what the then-cardinal had the power to address. I do not know.

What I can say is that this pattern—where popes are perceived as protecting the institution rather than directly confronting abuse—has been seen before. How these matters are handled in practice varies: some predators may be quietly reassigned or removed, while others may be an example in a public way. What is clear is that something decisive must be done. Leadership on this issue must come from the top. That said, it remains a problematic issue, and much remains uncertain.

Ultimately, people must stop projecting their political preferences onto a religious institution. It will not behave in a way that aligns cleanly with contemporary political categories. Many religiously conservative Catholic leaders may be seen as progressive when it comes to economic issues, and many reform-minded leaders who support the role of women within the Church can still hold very conservative views on other topics, such as LGBTQ issues, because they see those positions as consistent with Church authority and tradition.

Jacobsen: I would not necessarily make firm predictions based on a few isolated comments he has made. You raise very complex and nuanced points. One area worth noting is Latin America’s broader and compelling religious and political history, including connections to Portugal and Spain, not just Central and South America.

As you mentioned, with Pope Francis, interest was resurgent in the social teachings of the Gospels, particularly through the lens of liberation theology, emphasizing care for the poor and marginalized. Some of the key thinkers in that movement were tragically assassinated in the context of political repression, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s.

An interesting parallel is that many liberation theology–inspired programs, while rooted in Christian ethics, can be interpreted in secular terms. For example, António Guterres—now Secretary-General of the United Nations and formerly Prime Minister of Portugal—has supported policies such as decriminalizing drug use. These initiatives reflect a compassionate, public-health approach rather than punitive moralism, aligning in many ways with the ethos of liberation theology, even though Guterres’ religious views are less publicly emphasized.

Regarding the current pope, it is notable that he spent roughly a third of his life in Peru. That Latin American background places him within a theological and cultural context that has repeatedly given rise to socially engaged Christian thought. Whether explicitly theological or translated into secular governance models, this tradition continues to influence global leaders in meaningful ways.

We may be seeing an inflection point here. The current pope is only 69 years old—a relatively young age for a pontiff—and could remain in office for a decade or even two with access to excellent healthcare. That is significant, especially if he maintains a centrist and traditional theological approach during global cultural uncertainty. That continuity and steadiness could be a valuable anchor for Catholics and international observers.

Tsukerman: From what I have heard, one reason he was selected, despite being viewed as a long-shot candidate, was precisely this perceived ability to provide stability. Some even interpreted his election as a subtle message rejecting the kind of extremism that gained traction under Donald Trump, including certain expressions of politicized Catholicism that emerged in that period.

His election also conveyed that while certain ideological expressions may be rejected, the United States is not. American leadership remains central within the global Catholic community and broader international relations. His papacy could represent an effort to reaffirm transatlantic ties, emphasizing cooperation over polarization.

Thought the conclave was looking for a unifying, centrist figure. There has been a great deal of speculation, much of it unfounded. For instance, some extremist voices, like Laura Loomer—who is not even Catholic—, have called him a “Marxist pope,” which I found bizarre. Many conservatives argue that the government should not be a social safety net provider and that private institutions and local communities should handle such responsibilities.

So, why would that not be welcomed if the Catholic Church stepped into that traditional charitable role and alleviated the burden on governments? Especially by those who have (rightfully) criticized the Church for corruption, should they not be encouraged if someone is actively addressing the needs of the vulnerable in both a personal and leadership capacity? That is the best possible response to institutional criticisms. Calling him a Marxist for returning to the Church’s foundational mission and vision—for acting as a religious institution should—seems deeply contradictory.

Unless, of course, one is conflating the Church with the U.S. Supreme Court. Even when rooted in tradition, judicial philosophy does not automatically translate into support for executive or legislative policies. If people expect the pope to act like a typical head of state, they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of his role. Church doctrine will never neatly align with the constantly shifting demands of politics or with current ideological trends.

Hopefully, there is something more Catholic, the small “c” sense—more timeless and universal about religious doctrine than the upheavals of the political moment. That is, after all, one of the central reasons religious institutions exist: to offer a separate moral and spiritual trajectory apart from the volatility of political life.

If Pope Leo turns out to be the centrist, unifying figure many hope he will be, that would be a profoundly positive development. Right now, there has been far too much infighting. On the far-right, some traditionalist factions are openly promoting extreme and even bigoted candidates—figures whose views stray far from Catholic theological orthodoxy and veer into outright hate. Some of these traditionalists have even called for a return to Catholic monarchies—systems that were historically disastrous, not only for religious minorities, but also for many Catholics themselves.

These monarchs often ruin their nations through unnecessary wars and authoritarian rule. On the far left, meanwhile, you have individuals who appear to misunderstand religious tradition entirely, confusing emotional compassion and political activism for authentic spiritual practice. That confusion has contributed to alienation and the exodus of many from the Church, who return to purely political frameworks.

Of course, political engagement is legitimate. However, apart from secular political agendas, if people do not recognize the intrinsic value of religious tradition within the Church, the Church will continue to lose relevance and coherence. Moderation is essential, not only to preserve tradition, but also to adapt it meaningfully to the challenges of the modern world. Those include difficulties with recruitment, outreach in Western nations, and dialogue with the so-called Global South and vulnerable populations more broadly.

A centrist pope offers flexibility—he can bridge these divides and promote dialogue across varied constituencies, each with different realities, lived experiences, and challenges. Facilitating that dialogue into a more coherent and inclusive conversation would be a powerful and much-needed legacy. So yes, I sincerely hope that if anything lasting comes from this election, it is that legacy of unity, dialogue, and compassionate leadership.

Even if this papacy is not marked by major geopolitical battles or confrontations with ideological enemies, like communism under Pope John Paul II, even if it focuses primarily on building better, more positive relationships, that alone would be a tremendous achievement. The central challenge of our time is the growing lack of understanding, the absence of dialogue, and the erosion of empathy for people with different perspectives and life experiences. It would be deeply significant if fostering that kind of engagement becomes Pope Leo’s legacy,

Jacobsen: Let me pivot briefly to something more urgent—concerns around potential U.S. government plans to deport migrants to Libya. As you know, Libya has a long and well-documented history of human rights abuses against migrants. These include arbitrary detention, torture, extortion, rape, murder—and even reports of bizarre mistreatment, such as forced feeding under inhumane conditions. What is your assessment of the legal and ethical issues here, especially given your background as a human rights attorney?

Tsukerman: Libya is currently a volatile and fractured country. It is divided among competing governments, militia factions, and tribal authorities, with significant sectarian divisions. Foreign powers—particularly Russia and Turkey—exploit the conflict for their strategic interests, further complicating the situation. Corruption is rampant, and the country faces massive economic and infrastructure challenges.

Some regions within Libya are reportedly engaging in the enslavement of migrants. To be clear, not all Libyans support or participate in these practices—not at all—but there are localized areas where such human rights violations are taking place. It is horrifying. On top of that, Libya is being used as a proxy front in broader migration-related conflicts, with disruptive flows intentionally created to destabilize Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Geographically, Libya’s position at the crossroads of these regions makes it especially vulnerable to being weaponized in that way.

So why, under the Trump administration, anyone thought deporting vulnerable individuals—many of whom are not African and have no connection to the region—was a sound or moral policy is beyond comprehension. It appears intentional and designed to make a point by choosing the most unstable and dangerous destinations possible. From what we have seen, these deportees are Asian migrants who have no ties to North Africa. Sending them to a country where they are at even greater risk makes no logical sense.

If the goal were truly safe repatriation, or even just temporary relocation, the most reasonable approach would have been to make arrangements with a stable country in Asia—one closer to their country of origin—where proper infrastructure exists for processing, protection, and possibly reintegration. Instead, what happened was a list of unpredictable, high-risk destinations that are entirely inappropriate and disconnected from the migrants’ actual backgrounds.

In both legal and humanitarian terms, it is indefensible. This is not just poor policy; it signals gross negligence or deliberate cruelty. The plan was to send Asian migrants to Libya—despite the apparent dangers—and then another group, of unclear background, was slated for deportation to Saudi Arabia, which was reportedly not pleased about it. Even more astonishingly, yet another group was set to be deported to Ukraine—of all places.

These were not Ukrainian migrants. They were Latino migrants whom the Trump administration had considered sending to a war zone. Most Ukrainians do not speak Spanish, and most Latin American migrants do not speak Ukrainian, Russian, or English. The cultural, linguistic, and geopolitical mismatch was extreme, especially considering that Ukraine is in an active state of war.

It is unclear why the administration chose such unsuitable destinations instead of negotiating with relatively stable countries that could use financial support and were better equipped to receive migrants. However, it appears to have been a deliberate power play—a form of deterrence. The message seemed to be: if you cross into the United States illegally, not only will you be deported, but you will be punished by being sent to a completely foreign and potentially hostile environment. It was meant to instill fear.

Moreover, there is a second layer—it also seemed like a power move aimed at the receiving countries. Libya, for example, does not have a unified government. It has two competing governments and is in no position to negotiate. Dumping migrants into such a fractured state is not part of a serious diplomatic or humanitarian strategy. It is a show of brute force—saying, “We will offload whomever we wish, and what are you going to do about it?”

These migrants—many from warm, tropical regions—would be placed in foreign climates, with no knowledge of the language, no social support, and no legal protections. They could be abducted by militias, detained, abused, or killed by actors like the Russians or Turks operating on the ground. It is a gross violation of U.S. international obligations, and it reflects profoundly on the moral image of the United States.

I have never heard of any other country taking such steps. Many countries enforce strict border controls, but they do not load families onto military planes and send them across the globe to completely unsuitable and dangerous locations. That is not immigration enforcement—it is pointless cruelty designed to project fear and demonstrate impunity.

The message was clear: “We can do whatever we want, to whomever we want.” Even if this segment is short, it is essential. It speaks volumes about the weaponization of immigration policy, not as law enforcement, but as theatre of punishment.

Jacobsen: In Fangak County, South Sudan, there was what appears to be a deliberate and potentially war-crime-level act: an aerial bombing that killed at least seven people and injured more than 20. The target was a facility run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)—Doctors Without Borders—including a hospital and pharmacy. This attack was condemned by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan. Any thoughts on this?

Tsukerman: Unfortunately, this kind of abuse and violence against medical personnel in conflict zones is becoming increasingly common. I do not see how such attacks can be reliably prevented without sufficient security or accountability mechanisms. Operating in active conflict areas is becoming ever more dangerous.

More broadly, I observe an alarming trend of renewed global fragmentation and sectarianism. After a period in which violence declined and sectarian confrontations became more political and less militant, we are now witnessing a reversal. Incidents like this bombing reflect a larger global pattern. As new flashpoints emerge, without any clear resolution, accountability, or coordinated pathway to reconstruction or reconciliation, other vulnerable regions become susceptible to similar outbreaks of violence.

The lack of consequences emboldens violent groups. Rather than pursuing diplomatic, legal, or political avenues to resolve disputes, they resort to armed conflict. What is especially troubling is the absence of strong leadership from the international community, the United Nations, the United States, or other potential stabilizing powers. There is no coherent strategy to protect humanitarian workers or medical personnel from these extrajudicial attacks.

We need more than deterrence. We need visible support. Strong messages must be sent to would-be perpetrators and those risking their lives to provide aid. As it stands, we are failing to protect the most essential actors in humanitarian crises.

Jacobsen: So, let us talk about Greece and the deterioration of media freedom there, particularly since the New Democracy government came to power in July 2019. A recent human rights report accuses the government of creating a hostile environment for independent media and journalists from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Highlights include harassment, intimidation, surveillance, and abusive lawsuits, all of which are known to lead to self-censorship and undermine the free press. As a media figure yourself, what are your thoughts?

Tsukerman: As an American media professional, I believe in fostering as much media freedom and open dialogue as possible. The best way to challenge bad ideas is with better ones, not censorship. Combatting harmful platforms requires factual, clear, and accessible communication rather than suppression.

When journalists are intimidated into silence—whether by lawsuits, surveillance, or threats—it erodes not just press freedom but democracy itself. We are seeing this pattern not only in Greece but across the world. Governments are learning to weaponize legal tools, digital surveillance, and even social media manipulation to stifle dissent under the guise of order or national interest.

The solution lies in strengthening journalistic resilience, protecting whistleblowers, supporting independent media, and encouraging information literacy among the public. A vibrant press is a cornerstone of any democratic society. Once you weaken it, everything else begins to fall apart. Frankly, when I encounter hostile or disinformation-driven media sources, my first instinct is not to censor them, but to render them irrelevant by creating better, fact-based alternatives. The goal should be to avoid giving them additional grievances, platforms, or marketing value. That said, not every place is like the United States.

In Greece, the situation is more precarious. There are active political operations and foreign-directed disinformation campaigns that are significantly more destabilizing than what we have seen, so far, in the U.S., and that is saying something, given the high levels of pro-Russian influence and even penetration into high levels of the U.S. government in recent years.

However, even under those extreme circumstances in the U.S., the average citizen does not feel the same immediate, on-the-ground impact as people in Greece. In Greece, hostile foreign actors operate directly within the country, in ways that are not happening in the U.S., at least not with the same physical presence or intensity.

One primary reason for this difference is the relative strength of American law enforcement and institutional infrastructure. We have historically had better mechanisms for tracking illicit funding, investigating foreign influence, and taking action to mitigate these threats. That infrastructure—though now under strain—has served us well.

Greece, by contrast, has experienced extended periods of economic instability and lacks the same level of resources or institutional resilience. Its financial capacity is not comparable to that of the United States. So it becomes significantly harder to respond effectively when you combine economic grievances, underfunded public institutions, and limited experience dealing with complex foreign interference.

It is a far more challenging environment from a logistical and practical standpoint. It also makes the erosion of media freedom and public trust all the more dangerous. Regarding media confrontations, I am not entirely convinced that shutting down a foreign-funded outfit that exists solely to spread propaganda constitutes an infringement on press freedom. If an outlet is funded by a foreign government and its core mission is to defame local authorities, spread conspiracy theories, or incite violence. It no longer functions as a legitimate media organization but as a political operation. Moreover, political operations are not entitled to the same media protections.

That is very different from an outlet with a political spin that publishes controversial opinions or presents legitimate criticisms of the government, particularly when those critiques come from domestic opposition. However, when that opposition operates with the backing or coordination of foreign entities, the discussion shifts entirely.

Now, I am not saying governments cannot go too far. There is always a risk of authoritarian overreach, where governments become paranoid and begin targeting legitimate opposition under the guise of fighting foreign interference. However, based on my experience with risk and intelligence-related issues, I suspect there is more foreign meddling, corruption, and covert funding behind the scenes than most people realize.

It is easy to cite statistics—how many media outlets are being surveilled or shut down—and immediately conclude there is repression. However, we need to look at each case in its full context. Are these domestic and independent media platforms? Or are they fronts for foreign political operations?

Is there concrete evidence tying them to hostile foreign actors? Is the surveillance or restriction justified, or is it arbitrary and abusive? These are nuanced questions; we must approach them with granularity, not sweeping generalizations.

Many extremist and foreign-affiliated groups count on the fact that most international audiences will not do a deep dive into these cases. They know most people will not investigate things like media transparency reports or explore whether an outlet is an actual journalistic enterprise, a foreign PR firm, or worse, a troll factory.

We have seen this in the U.S.—for example, the FBI later revealed a so-called media company in Tennessee to be a Russian disinformation front, set up to undermine public trust. At first glance, someone outside the U.S. might ask, “Why is the FBI shutting down a private media business?” However, once you look into the case, it becomes clear that foreign funding and coordination were involved, which justified legal action.

Similarly, what we see happening in Greece may follow that pattern. It is essential to examine the specifics—who is involved, where the funding comes from, and what their activities entail—and then assess how the United States and the European Union might be able to help. The goal should be to protect Greece’s sovereignty, ensure media freedom, and preserve platforms for legitimate criticism while addressing foreign interference.

Jacobsen: Irina, thank you for this first session of the inaugural Everywhere Insiders series. I appreciate your time and insights.

Tsukerman: Thank you so much. This was great.

Jacobsen: I am curious to see how this evolves. It sounds like the beginning of a very engaging conversational news show.

Tsukerman: Absolutely.

Jacobsen: Thank you again.

Tsukerman: Take care.

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