Gytaute Gyneityte on Lithuania’s Defense, Democracy, and Resilience

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/08/03

Gytaute Gyneityte is a Lithuanian architect and military conscript who advocates for civic preparedness and national resilience. She speaks passionately about Lithuania’s history, cultural preservation, and defence readiness. Gyneityte emphasizes unity, human rights, and resistance to authoritarianism, drawing on both professional and personal insights into architecture, security, and collective memory. Gyneityte reflects on Lithuania’s resilience, military preparedness, and cultural survival amid threats from Russia. Emphasizing civic unity, historical memory, and democratic values, she expresses hope for Europe’s commitment to human rights and national sovereignty in the face of authoritarian aggression and hybrid warfare.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: You are an architect. Is Lithuania’s architecture also very angular?

Gytaute Gyneityte: I’d say so. Maybe not as much in contemporary architecture anymore, but yes, it is more about the quality of the materials—they use very high-end materials.

Jacobsen: You can see it everywhere: the roads, the cobblestones—everything is done beautifully. One example is in Ukraine, in Kharkiv. The stonework and masonry were done exceptionally well. That is old construction, of course. So, talking about military preparedness—what is your name and title, and how long were you in the military at that point?

Gyneityte: I’m Gytaute Gyneityte. In February 2015, I was conscripted and spent nine months in military service, training alongside other conscripts.

Jacobsen: What did you learn?

Gyneityte: I was assigned to the engineering battalion. Lithuania reinstated mandatory conscription in early 2015, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. As an architect, I opted for the engineering battalion because there might be an overlap with my civilian skills. However, in reality, it was more focused on constructing field fortifications and obstacles.

We trained in handling explosives—detecting, neutralizing, and using them to breach structures. That included learning how to open doors with a charge. Of course, we also received basic military training, which included firearms handling, grenade throwing, physical fitness, and combat drills. That is the core of what the engineering battalion focuses on.

Jacobsen: Now, regarding the threat posed by the Russian Federation—by that I mean the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin, and perhaps vice versa to some extent—how do Lithuanians perceive that threat? How is it characterized, both politically and militarily, especially in the context of a possible escalation of the current conflict?

Gyneityte: We have always viewed Russia as a threat. There was never a time when the possibility of Russian aggression was ruled out. Hybrid warfare—encompassing cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and attempts to influence our political system—has been a consistent feature since we regained independence in 1990.

Russia has never been a friendly neighbour. However, since 2014, things have felt more acute and more dangerous. We have been warning the rest of Europe about Russia’s aggressive intentions since the annexation of Crimea. Back then, many European leaders told us we were paranoid. Unfortunately, we were right, and recent events have confirmed that. We have never forgotten the threat Russia poses.

You might have heard of the hybrid tactics involving Belarus. In 2021, the Lukashenko regime began directing thousands of migrants—mainly from the Middle East—toward Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia as a form of state-orchestrated pressure. It was widely interpreted as a retaliatory measure for EU sanctions.

What we did in response was a controversial move. We placed the migrants in detention centers and began constructing barbed-wire fencing along the Belarusian border. While the humanitarian aspect of that response has been criticized, we successfully controlled the situation.

Now, Lithuania has significantly strengthened its border security. We have fortified the borders with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region of Russia, and we continue to invest in military preparedness in cooperation with NATO.

We have, what do you call it—we have suspended parts of the Ottawa Convention, or at least adjusted our interpretation of it, in terms of the use of anti-personnel mines. Now, we are permitted to deploy certain types of landmines for defensive purposes, in coordination with other Baltic countries, as well as Finland and Poland, I believe.

What else? We have established what might be called a Commander’s Reserve or civilian auxiliary units—basically, civilians who receive some basic military training so they can assist the army or the police forces in the event of an emergency.

Generally, public support for the military has increased substantially. Military service and defence are seen much more positively now. Salaries for professional armed forces have also been raised. Conscription is still active. We have a standard nine-month conscription period, and that has not been cancelled. So yes, these are some of the main defence-related efforts underway.

Jacobsen: Now, cyber warfare seems to be Russia’s primary tool of disruption in Lithuania. Is that correct?

Gyneityte: Not only in Lithuania. I think they are doing that across Europe—and beyond. They have been involved in various acts of sabotage throughout the continent.

We had an incident where a plane exploded, and the cause is still under investigation. Events like that always raise suspicions, and unfortunately, the default assumption tends to be that Russian involvement is involved. Russia also regularly interferes in elections across Europe.

Jacobsen: Now, when it comes to Lithuania’s military preparedness, what can the country realistically do in the event of an invasion?

Gyneityte: Realistically, it has long been acknowledged that Lithuania could only hold out for a few days on its own, just enough time for NATO forces to arrive.

The critical vulnerability is the Suwałki Gap—a narrow stretch of land, approximately 60 kilometres wide, that forms the only land connection between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO, specifically between Lithuania and Poland. To the north is the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and to the south is Belarus. Everyone knows this is the weak link—Lithuania knows it, NATO knows it, and indeed, Russia and Belarus are aware of it.

Every September—or every two years in September—Russia and Belarus hold extensive joint military exercises known as Zapad (“West”). These drills are essentially rehearsals for potential conflict scenarios in this region. Their maneuvers often simulate actions like securing the Suwałki Gap, which would connect Kaliningrad to Belarus and effectively cut off the Baltic states from NATO reinforcements. 

Naturally, we are not particularly enthusiastic about these exercises, and Zapad is scheduled to take place this year. If something were to happen, it could be timed to coincide with those drills. In other words, it would not necessarily be just a drill.

Jacobsen: What about the leadership of Lithuania? Are they issuing public statements to raise awareness—within NATO or through other alliances—that could facilitate military or critical intelligence support?

Gyneityte: We have been very vocal for the past ten years. The Baltic states and Scandinavia, together with Poland, are the ones who truly understand the threat, especially since we are closer geographically and have a better understanding of the Russian culture and language.

So, for years, we have known what they have been saying and planning. For example, Russia recently published a so-called “history” of Lithuania, claiming that Lithuania is not a real country, that our language is fabricated, just like they have done with other former Soviet republics. This was officially signed by Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister. Yes, that is indeed very concerning. Our politicians always respond to these provocations. In Lithuania, if you go around saying pro-Russian things, you are not going to win a majority of votes. However, our current ruling coalition is somewhat corrupt, which is a concerning development. A protest is planned for Tuesday because our Prime Minister is allegedly involved in corruption.

Jacobsen: What are the allegations?

Gyneityte: A detailed investigative report was conducted by journalists. It revealed that he was living in a costly apartment that did not belong to him, despite having a modest official salary. He also allegedly has business ties that suggest financial misconduct. It is a long story—at least an hour-long investigative piece—but it is packed with information. Moreover, this is not the first time he has been implicated. He has previously been found guilty of corruption.

It was a mess how he got elected, to be honest. So yes, people are worried. However, even with all that, nobody can openly say they want to be friends with Russia or Belarus now. Our laws—and our constitution—do not allow that. Moreover, the public would be furious if anyone were to try.

Jacobsen: How do people in the military talk about these kinds of threats?

Gyneityte: When we refer to “the enemy,” everyone knows who we mean. There is no ambiguity. It is not some vague, abstract threat. It is very clear. It is not hypothetical. We all know who we are preparing to defend against.

Jacobsen: How much of Lithuania’s GDP is allocated to the military?

Gyneityte: As of now, Lithuania is spending over 2% of its GDP on defence, which meets NATO’s target commitment. We plan to increase it even further in the coming years—toward 3%—due to the current security situation. There is a broad consensus that this is necessary.

Jacobsen: How big is the military?

Gyneityte: Currently, Lithuania has approximately 20,000 professional military personnel. The number is approximately 26,000 when including both full-time and reserve forces.

In terms of conscription, we have had approximately 3,000 conscripts each year since February 2015, when conscription was reinstated. That would amount to around 30,000 trained conscripts to date.

We also have the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, which is a paramilitary organization. You will want to check the official numbers for that. In addition, there are volunteer forces—our volunteer national defence units. Again, exact figures can be verified, but they represent a meaningful segment of our broader defensive capacity.

Moreover, there is now also the Commanders’ Office—a relatively new initiative that allows civilians to undergo a short training program to prepare them to support military or police operations in emergencies, even in a limited capacity. For comparison, I believe Lithuania’s professional armed forces are now larger than those of Australia.

Jacobsen: That may be true. Australia is interesting, however. In the G20, Canada ranks nineteenth and Australia twentieth in terms of defence personnel size. However, Australia has perhaps the most generous benefits package for military personnel in the G20. Canada might be second-best in that regard. That is why both countries have large incentive programs—they struggle to recruit enough people to meet their targets. Within the Lithuanian context, when people talk about “the enemy,” do you think the political leadership might be corruptible enough to undermine Lithuania during a military incursion? Say, in the event of another so-called “special military operation” by the Kremlin-led Russian Federation, would some leaders offer no resistance? Or would civilians override executive orders and defend themselves regardless, because the political will lies more with the people than the leadership?

Gyneityte: Option number two. If we had the same kind of government for the past thirty years, maybe things would be different—perhaps we would be more brainwashed, or living in some grey zone politically. However, it is now a matter of black and white. In Lithuania’s history, the Singing Revolution took place on January 13, 1991. Sausio 13-oji. That was a critical moment. 

So, to give an example: on January 13, 1991, Soviet tanks entered Lithuania. Civilians—many of them unarmed—came out to defend the parliament building, the television tower, and the national broadcaster.

In that case, they formed human shields—standing in large crowds around these buildings so the tanks could not proceed without running them over. There were thousands of people. You have no idea how many came out. They stood out there all night in minus-20-degree weather, singing songs, drinking coffee and tea, doing whatever they could to stay warm—and to stand their ground peacefully.

It was such a scary time. Moreover, I was not even born yet, but I cry every year. I put a candle on the windowsill, and we do this every year in remembrance of them. To give you an example: people from all over Lithuania came—no guns, no formal preparation—just to stand there and defend strategic buildings with their bodies. Moreover, I truly believe the same would happen today.

No doubt in my mind—crowds would appear again. This cab driver once told me that he was at the TV tower that night. Moreover, the radio host said, “It is a cold night. If anyone living near the TV tower can welcome people in for some tea, to warm up, please do. Moreover, put a candle on your windowsill.” Moreover, the cab driver said, “I looked around, and there was not a single window without a candle.”

That is who we are. This is our main existential threat—Russia. Moreover, we know just how expensive our freedom has been—our independence. We have been losing and regaining it for centuries. The fact that we have kept our language—even when it was banned—our alphabet, our traditions, including our Christmas celebrations, all of it was outlawed. Russia tried to erase us—our history, our culture, everything. However, we kept it. We still speak Lithuanian. We still have our country. That is a miracle. Moreover, I believe it shows we will maintain this miracle, no matter what happens.

Jacobsen: Are there different gendered experiences of this history? I mean, the Singing Revolution, the threat of Russia, the military—do men and women carry different memories, perspectives, or sentiments about these events? So, how might men think and feel about this history versus how women might?

Gyneityte: No, I do not believe there is a significant difference. After World War II, during the partisan resistance, the Russians killed a lot of Lithuanian men. Women had to step up in their place. During Soviet times, everyone, regardless of gender, was considered a worker.

That is why I think we have made relatively good progress on gender equality. Not perfect, not great—but not terrible either. I do not think men or women fought more or less for freedom. It was the same enemy, and it was the same difficult life, no matter your gender.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts?

Gyneityte: I do not know—maybe a message of hope. I believe that we can be united and work together. That we can choose human values—and not succumb to dictatorships, fake news, propaganda, or fear. I still have much hope that Europe remains a place that fights for human rights.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Gytaute.

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