‘MONEY IS NOT MUNITIONS’: SHELBY MAGID ON WHAT UKRAINE NEEDS TO WIN

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): СокальINFO

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/10/19

Shelby Magid is the Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where she oversees policy and programming on Ukraine and the broader region, leading initiatives at the intersection of security, justice, and human rights. She organizes high-level discussions and research on Russia’s war, recently moderating panels on the Russian Orthodox Church’s role in the conflict and on the abduction and repatriation of Ukrainian children. Magid frequently publishes analysis—including a Kyiv/Warsaw dispatch arguing that security is the essential foundation for any lasting peace—and briefs policymakers and media on sanctions, disinformation, and transatlantic coordination. She holds degrees from Central European University and Brandeis University.

In this conversation, Magid argues that sustaining U.S. bipartisan support for Ukraine through 2026 will depend largely on Donald Trump’s messaging and the perception that Ukraine can still prevail. Her priorities include tightening sanctions enforcement, accelerating Ukraine’s drone and munitions production, and strengthening U.S. air defenses. She also calls for credible, technology-driven ceasefire monitoring and emphasizes that the return of abducted Ukrainian children will require meaningful cooperation from the Kremlin.

(Atlantic Council)

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What are the fundamental swing factors for sustaining bipartisan support for Ukraine?

Shelby Magid: The bipartisan support for Ukraine has been consistently strong. The news cycle can change. Sometimes former President Trump’s comments can make it look like support is shifting, but within Congress and among the American population, as seen through polling, support has remained relatively stable. People empathize with and support Ukraine and disapprove of Russia and President Vladimir Putin.

There are ongoing debates about whether another package, such as a supplemental appropriation for weapons and funding, is necessary, with some people opposing it. Overall, however, support remains strong. The key factor right now is Donald Trump and his messaging, as he already has a base of support. If Trump were to say, “I want Ukraine to win next year” or “I want Ukraine to regain more of its territory,” and if he meant that and followed up by urging Congress to act, a package would likely move forward, providing additional economic or military support.

It might take the form of a loan. It might look different, but that could be the way forward. Public opinion is also critical here — for him, for Congress, and for how strong both sides appear. Currently, there is considerable messaging suggesting Russia is not as strong as it seems: its economy is under strain, its military is underperforming, and its territorial gains are slower than expected. That helps sustain support for Ukraine because it is one thing to back an underdog, but you do not want to back a lost cause. When it looks like Ukraine still has a real chance and Russia will not completely prevail, those are key factors.

Jacobsen: What are the demographics of those who do not support Ukraine?

Magid: It is mainly on the far right and far left — like the horseshoe of people not supporting. On the far left, they do not want more war. They call for peace, negotiations, the elimination of weapons, and an end to the fighting. On the far right, it might be “Ukraine is corrupt,” or “Ukraine will never win,” or “Russia has a point.” Some isolationists say, “We do not want anything to do with foreign conflicts, so why should we have anything to do with this one?” That is more on the fringes.

You also see a standard view that, fine, we want Ukraine to be okay, but it is not our problem, so we will not send more money. They are not actively supporting U.S. engagement. There are many misconceptions, too — both from Russian propaganda and simple misunderstanding — from people who say, “We do not want American boots on the ground in Ukraine.” That has never been proposed. Some people say they do not support it because they misunderstand what “support” means, which in this case has meant financial and military aid, not troop deployment.

Jacobsen: I appreciate that far-left and far-right framing—it suggests a divide between idealism and cynicism, yet both end up producing the same results. What specific tranche of aid or policy do you think could tangibly degrade Russia’s war-fighting capacity? Some observers point to a kind of parity in how each side frames its military strength. Still, Ukraine’s capabilities remain far more limited than Russia’s, especially across a frontline stretching more than 1,200 kilometers.

Magid: When you are asking about what specific tranche, do you mean U.S. support or international support for Ukraine?

Volodymyr Zelensky in 2022.

Jacobsen: International and U.S. support remain vital. Ukraine’s domestic capacity will continue to expand as long as the war endures, driven by the will to survive and defend the country. As one colleague told me early in my reporting, “Thank you, Canada, for the financial support — we do appreciate it. One footnote, however: money is not munitions. We need munitions.”

Magid: That is a double-edged sword because that was also earlier on. Canada has been great, but could do more, as could most countries. Financial support is needed currently in two ways. There is the financial bucket where Ukraine needs more money so it can produce more weapons and drones itself. There has been tremendous success in Ukraine’s drone innovation and warfare. However, they need more money; they could generate more revenue and complete the project faster than other countries.

It would also be beneficial for Russia to face greater financial restrictions. They are already weaker, but the existing sanctions are not being enforced effectively enough. They are not strong enough. The shadow fleet is a significant issue. There is more that can be done to hit that financial bucket and degrade Russia’s capacity. You see Ukraine right now using drones to hit Russia’s oil refineries, which they have called their own type of sanctions, because then Russia has less to sell. That has made an impact — there are gas shortages in Russia right now.

As for Western support, some urgently needed systems come from the United States, primarily for air defense. The considerable discussion this week is that President Zelensky is coming to Washington to meet with President Trump about defense in general. One aspect being discussed is the Tomahawk missile system, which has a long range and would allow Ukraine to strike deeper into Russia. Moreover, when I mention this, I always like to say that Ukraine is targeting logistics, supplies, and the bases that missiles are coming from in Russia — all military targets, not civilian — whereas Russia is targeting civilians in Ukraine.

Jacobsen: Is the deliberate targeting of civilians a sign that Putin lacks a coherent or winning strategy? After all, if you were truly winning, your focus would be on striking military—not civilian—assets.

Magid: There is something to that. However, part of Russia’s strategy is terrorism. They are trying to demoralize Ukrainian society and drive refugee waves, which would then put more pressure on Europe. As soon as the temperatures drop in Ukraine, Russia starts hitting energy infrastructure again, which can force people to leave and go into Europe. They have a history of committing war crimes, and even if they were winning on the battlefield — which they are not — they would continue to target civilians. They are targeting military sites as well, so I would not say they are only targeting civilians. However, they do launch massive attacks against entirely civilian areas and critical infrastructure, like water systems. You cannot call that a military target.

Jacobsen: Which third-country networks matter now?

Magid: Some networks matter for both Ukraine and Russia. On Russia’s side, they are majorly supported in this war by North Korea, Iran, China, and Belarus — though Belarus is in a slightly different category. The drones that Russia uses are Iranian, and they got the technology from Iran. North Korea sends large amounts of ammunition and missiles, and has reportedly sent soldiers. China supports Russia economically. India is also buying large quantities of Russian gas and oil, which helps sustain Russia’s economy. There are also reports — I need to verify the numbers — that tens of thousands of Cuban fighters are preparing to fight for Russia, which would make them the most significant foreign contingent of fighters. So there is this “bad boy autocratic club” that supports Russia.

Jacobsen: There are also some reports of Indians and others being tricked or scammed into fighting.

Magid: There are unfortunate stories about people from many countries being tricked into going to Russia. The numbers are in the single digits or dozens, but they are being sent to work in factories or signing up under pretenses. Others are being scammed from North Africa, thinking they are getting work permits, and then they are brought through Belarus to be pushed over the border as part of weaponized migration. A lot of that is happening. However, in countries supporting on a larger scale, those are the key ones. As for third countries, you see the entire Western and international order — the G7, the EU, the U.S., the U.K. — but also many countries in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and, of course, Canada have all been supportive. It is interesting to see how these networks operate, and what they provide is, of course, different.

Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in August.

Jacobsen: What air defense and artillery production targets should the U.S. and Europe aim for in 2026?

Magid: I would say it is aspirational to speak about these targets in a quarterly fashion, because it takes so long to produce and finalize contracts. It has been an issue throughout the full-scale invasion — the slow pace of production from the U.S. and the EU. I know they are working on it, but the war still goes on. Air defense is the most urgent for Ukraine, as Russia is absolutely slamming them. The number of missiles and drones that Russia uses on a daily and nightly basis has increased drastically as it has scaled up production. Those supporting Ukraine also need to scale up their efforts.

One way to do that is to continue financial support for Ukraine. Ukraine has already scaled up domestic drone production and other sound systems. Co-production is also being explored — Denmark has been leading in this, and there is discussion about a potential U.S.–Ukraine drone deal. Other countries are looking to follow suit. This would involve sharing technology, investing more money, and maximizing production speed. I do not have specific expectations for a particular quarter in 2026, but I want to emphasize that there is a pressing need for all of this to happen quickly.

Jacobsen: How should guarantees, money, and capital be sequenced?

Magid: For a post-war Ukraine, it is a tricky question because the crux of it is what can happen now and what has to happen post-war. Demining is already happening in Ukraine, because there are different types. There is humanitarian demining — clearing civilian and agricultural areas that were mined — but then both Russians and Ukrainians have mined along the frontlines. You cannot demine that until the security situation is resolved. Areas that were occupied by Russia and have since been liberated — for instance, Kherson — still need to be demined now, and they are actively doing that. Just a couple of weeks ago, in Chernihiv Oblast, there was a humanitarian demining mission by an NGO that Russia attacked, killing some of the workers. This is a hazardous job, and Russia targets these responders.

For capital, Ukraine needs money now to keep its economy afloat. They need to pay government workers, first responders, teachers, and most importantly, soldiers. They need to buy food and weapons. Then there is also money for reconstruction. Some reconstruction is happening already. If your grandmother’s window is blown out, she needs it repaired this week; otherwise, she has to move. That can happen now. However, Mariupol, which is completely flattened and under Russian occupation, will need to be rebuilt once Ukraine regains control. That capital will not flow yet, and much of it will have to come from private companies.

Much of this is being discussed, but ultimately, post-war reconstruction cannot begin until stability is established. That is where the guarantees come in. Let us say there is a ceasefire — no one trusts Russia, nor should they. So just because there is a ceasefire without guarantees, capital is not going to flow in, and real reconstruction will not happen. People will not move back to Ukraine en masse until they feel it is stable and durable. It is all interconnected. However, the conversations are happening now because plans need to be in place. Different parts of the country are in various situations. You can work on the energy system in western Ukraine in ways you cannot in the east. Luckily, it is being looked at proactively.

Trump and Putin during the largely unproductive summit in Alaska.

Jacobsen: This brings to mind the difference between winning and simply not losing. A ceasefire and a peace deal aren’t the same thing—and a pause is something else entirely, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s behavior. What would a verifiable pause look like? Would it involve inspection regimes, limits on missile deployments, or clearly defined territorial arrangements?

Magid: It is interesting how the different terms play out. A pause could happen at any moment if Russia stopped firing at Ukraine. If they said, “We are going to have a pause,” that could lead to discussions on a ceasefire. Ukraine is not going to stop firing and defending itself until it knows that Russia is holding to the same standard. A pause could mean stopping missile strikes and halting fighting on the front lines.

Jacobsen: Which, to be clear, could be done at any time.

Magid: It could be done at any time.

Jacobsen: Because of one person saying so.

Magid: The onus is entirely on Putin and the Russian side. Ukraine is defending itself. As for a ceasefire, that is what the Ukrainians are calling for. What President Trump has also been calling for is an unconditional ceasefire. The Ukrainians have agreed to this; they are ready to do it at any moment. The Russians have rejected it many times.

As for what a ceasefire would look like, you would need some monitoring because it cannot just be a “he said, she said” situation. Russia has a long history of violating ceasefires, and Ukraine has already been through that. There are ongoing discussions about various mechanisms and formats that could be effective. One critical aspect is the need for external ceasefire monitors and international security guarantees. Ukraine has already experienced failures, like the Minsk negotiations, where there were large buffer zones and unarmed monitors, and that did not stop Russian hostilities. A more robust model would be necessary, involving Ukrainian forces, NATO observers, or neutral peacekeepers.

They would have to monitor a vast swath of land, so there would need to be a technological component — drones or satellite imagery, for example — because it is simply too large an area to monitor entirely by people on the ground. There would also need to be deterrence mechanisms. So it would have to be an interesting combination of factors, and there would have to be some U.S. role — not boots on the ground, necessarily, but something like satellite monitoring to make Russia actually listen and be deterred.

Jacobsen: This next one is fascinating—it combines the two subjects people are warned never to discuss at the dinner table: religion and politics. The Russian Orthodox Church now operates largely at the Kremlin’s behest, reinforcing many of the regime’s narratives. In the occupied territories, which of these narratives are actually taking hold, and how deeply are they resonating?

Magid: That is an interesting question. It is hard to answer. One way they are sticking is by eliminating all competing narratives. They have outlawed and persecuted other religious organizations, gone after Catholic priests and other spiritual leaders, tortured and killed them. They control the information space in this manner, working hand in hand with Kremlin narratives. They are putting out constant messaging — adjusted over time — emphasizing “family values,” “defending Russian speakers,” and “God is on our side.”

Those narratives are probably sticking more in Russia itself than in the occupied territories because it is hard to believe such propaganda when your neighbor was held in a basement and tortured. At the same time, the Church’s networks are being used for intelligence gathering and other nefarious activities.

I did an event with the Free Russia Foundation a couple of weeks ago, and they released a report on the Russian Orthodox Church and its role in supporting the war in Ukraine. They even consulted Russian clergy who are now in exile because they spoke out against the war and had to flee Russia. It is fascinating and very complex in many ways, because it gets into areas of faith that many of us in the U.S., Canada, and the West are simply unfamiliar with.

The idea that you should not weaponize the Church to declare a holy war — to bless people to go murder children — I think anyone can understand that.

It is important to emphasize that the Russian Orthodox Church is tied to the state and controlled in coordination with the Kremlin. However, there are believers within that community who do not support it, and there have been internal splits. I know people who practice Russian Orthodoxy and do not believe in supporting the war. So it is essential to separate the political structures from the faith community.

Jacobsen: How can the different avenues you mentioned—documentation, third-party mediation, and targeted sanctions—actually help return abducted Ukrainian children home? I’m thinking of that Michelle Obama–style appeal to “bring them home.” Within a reasonable timeframe—say, six to twelve months, if not sooner—what combination of pressure and diplomacy could make that happen in practice?

Magid: I wish there were a better answer or better news. There has been incredible documentation from the Ukrainian side and from third parties — for instance, Yale University has a lab tracking this issue. They have documented around 20,000 kidnapped children, though the actual number is likely higher. Some cases have detailed records — names, families, locations — but others are harder to verify, especially when orphanages were moved. Some parents are still actively trying to get their children back.

These mediation efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Over the years, the Ukrainian government has appealed to various leaders for help — the Pope, some countries in the Middle East, and others. There are working groups, but ultimately, Russia must agree to return the children. It is a double-edged sword because Putin is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes related to the abductions. In a way, Russia fears that returning the children would confirm the charges. So despite the documentation and mediation efforts, they remain hesitant.

There have been a few recent cases — Melania Trump said she engaged with Putin and helped secure the return of some children. It is similar to what we discussed earlier about a pause: could these children be returned at any time? Yes. It is entirely up to Putin. Many of the children could be given back to Ukraine immediately if the Russian authorities decided to do so.

Some cases are more complicated because Russia has changed the children’s identities — legally altering names, arranging adoptions, and essentially erasing records. In some instances, open-source investigators have identified children in Russian schools whose relatives in Ukraine are still searching for them.

The issue is not one of time; it is one of power and political will. There is a Ukrainian NGO called Save Ukraine that’s done extraordinary work — something like an underground railroad system — to bring some children home. They have succeeded in dozens of cases, which is remarkable, but still only a drop in the ocean.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts or feelings based on the conversation today?

Magid: No, it has been a wide range of interesting questions — thank you.

Jacobsen: Thank you.

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