The Everywhere Insiders 3: Ukraine’s Strategic Gains, U.S. Intelligence Failures

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/06/16

 Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she holds the position of Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. Tsukerman explores Ukraine’s devastating drone strikes on Russian bomber fleets and the geopolitical reverberations. The conversation examines the erosion of U.S. intelligence credibility, NATO’s dependency on American leadership, and China’s weaponization of rare earth exports. Tsukerman critiques Western complacency, the rise of asymmetric threats, and the failure to counter ideological warfare effectively. The Taliban’s normalization and its accusations against Israel are addressed, as is Trump’s geopolitical posturing. The interview emphasizes the urgent need for strategic foresight, ideological clarity, and independent European defence development amid escalating global instability. Interview conducted June 6, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Sources cited today include the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, AP News, and Reuters.

Russia has launched one of its most extensive aerial assaults on Ukraine in recent months, reportedly deploying approximately 407 Shahed-type drones and 44 missiles across six regions. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that a significant number of these were intercepted, but some managed to hit civilian and infrastructure targets. In Kyiv, three emergency service personnel were killed while responding to damage caused by the strikes. In response to the escalating violence, President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed a 30-day ceasefire ahead of the NATO summit. As of now, Russia has not accepted or formally responded to the proposal.

This Russian escalation appears to follow Ukraine’s recent successful strikes on a Russian airbase in southern Russia, which reportedly destroyed or severely damaged several Tu-22M3 bombers. According to satellite imagery and Western intelligence assessments, the Ukrainian strike—allegedly using drones—inflicted considerable losses on Russia’s long-range bomber fleet. These aircraft have been used extensively to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure.

Irina Tsukerman: The long-term implications of the attack are significant. Due to international sanctions and the loss of access to key components, Russia will face serious challenges in replacing these strategic bombers. This represents not just a tactical victory for Ukraine but a major strategic setback for Russia, particularly in its capacity to project air power over Ukrainian territory.

The most notable aspect of Ukraine’s operation was its apparent success in avoiding detection. Reports suggest that the operation may have been planned and coordinated near the FSB’s headquarters in Moscow. However, no Ukrainian operatives were apprehended, and the individuals involved in planning or executing the mission reportedly left the country undetected. This raises serious questions about the efficacy of Russian counterintelligence. The failure was so total that it may take years for Russia’s security apparatus to recover credibility.

Strikingly, there has been minimal discussion in Russian state media about the intelligence failure. This omission likely reflects the Kremlin’s effort to control the narrative and avoid internal scrutiny over the breach.

Russia’s subsequent large-scale attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets may be interpreted as an attempt to shift focus away from this military and intelligence failure. While such attacks are framed as acts of retaliation, they serve no clear strategic purpose and are widely seen as acts of desperation and intimidation.

Amid these events, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a controversial statement, suggesting that Russia had been provoked into action by attacks on its air assets. He implied that the Ukrainian strike on grounded aircraft constituted terrorism. However, under international law, a stationary military plane at an airbase is considered a legitimate military target during an armed conflict. Attempts to redefine these terms are seen mainly as political rhetoric that does not align with the laws of armed conflict.

Another critical dimension to this story is the revelation that U.S. intelligence was unaware of Ukraine’s plans to conduct such a long-range drone operation. The mission reportedly remained undisclosed to Western allies for over a year. President Trump was not briefed. This raises broader questions about the current dynamics of trust and coordination between Ukraine and its Western partners.

Tsukerman: First, there is an apparent lack of trust between Ukraine and not only the current U.S. administration but also the previous one. This includes President Biden and key members of his administration. Second, the United States lacks sufficient on-the-ground intelligence assets to gather crucial information about operations of this magnitude. That is deeply concerning, regardless of the state of diplomatic trust. The U.S. should possess at least basic operational awareness—especially regarding significant actions undertaken by either allied or adversarial nations. Given that the U.S. is deeply involved in this conflict through financial aid, military assistance, and geopolitical positioning, the absence of such capabilities raises serious questions about national security preparedness.

If the U.S. intelligence community was unaware of this operation, what does that say about our ability to detect a significant act of sabotage—whether from Russia or another adversary? The war in Ukraine is arguably one of the most consequential global conflicts today and certainly one of the United States’ top geopolitical priorities. However, the fact remains: the U.S. had no apparent foreknowledge of a major Ukrainian operation.

It is hard to ignore the broader pattern of failure here. Of course, Trump’s publicly undermining U.S. intelligence agencies did not help the situation. However, these gaps predate his administration and persist into the current one. It suggests a systemic problem within U.S. intelligence in that region. Whether people support or criticize the intelligence community, the reality is that if you are entirely unaware of what is happening in a critical theatre of conflict, you become a target. You are not in control—you are being played. That is one of the underlying dimensions missing from broader discussions surrounding this major Ukrainian success.

For Ukraine, this is undeniably a moment of triumph. For anyone who opposes Russian imperialism, this is also something to celebrate. However, it raises uncomfortable questions: Where exactly does the West stand in all of this? Ukraine—a heavily embattled state under constant threat—has pulled off an incredibly sophisticated operation. Meanwhile, much of the West appears disjointed, uncoordinated, and lacking any coherent strategy regarding collective defence or the evolving security landscape.

Why have the most advanced and ostensibly stable countries grown so complacent? Is it an erosion of adaptive capacity? Have Western democracies, in their relative peace and prosperity, lost the moral and strategic resolve to face difficult situations with the determination that Ukraine has demonstrated?

Following the Ukrainian operation, the Pentagon reportedly instructed staff to begin exploring and developing weapons systems and operational strategies modelled on Ukraine’s battlefield innovations. However, is adopting new drone technologies and tactics enough? Morale and mindset matter just as much. Currently, Ukraine’s resilience and sense of purpose far exceed what we are seeing from the broader Western alliance. That is the central lesson that continues to go largely unacknowledged.

Jacobsen: Shifting slightly—China has been in the news recently for its strategic use of rare earth mineral exports. The implementation of a new export licensing system designed to give China more insight and control over global supply chains. This move is likely to impact how multinational companies conduct trade and manage their supply chains. It is another example of how economic instruments—particularly critical resources like rare earths—are being weaponized to gain strategic advantage, something the West also seems ill-prepared to counter effectively.

China’s recent move to reassert its so-called “national security interests” around rare earth mineral exports is gaining international attention. These minerals are critical for manufacturing advanced technologies, such as semiconductor chips. This decision is a response to U.S. restrictions on Chinese access to advanced chips and related technologies. What are your thoughts on China’s new export licensing system and the Chinese Communist Party’s intensified strategic use of rare earth elements?

Tsukerman: It is entirely expected that China would use whatever leverage it has to try to prevent the United States from gaining or maintaining a competitive edge—especially in strategic sectors. The U.S. has restricted China’s access to advanced semiconductors and imposed export controls under both the Trump and Biden administrations. Trump introduced even more restrictive measures beyond the CHIPS and Science Act and associated export bans.

So naturally, China is responding with its measures. What is disturbing is not that China acted but that the U.S. seemed unprepared for it. This was a predictable countermove. However, Washington did not appear to have secured alternative supplies or developed strategic reserves of rare earths before escalating export controls. The U.S. reaction has been reactive rather than proactive. It lacks anticipatory planning.

Jacobsen: So we are not leading—we are merely keeping pace or even falling behind?

Tsukerman: Precisely. This move by China affects not only the United States but also other countries. It also impacts potential alternative suppliers, such as India. While India possesses rare earth deposits, many of these have only been recently discovered and are not yet fully developed. It will take time—perhaps years—for India or others to reach production capacities that could challenge China’s dominance.

What we are seeing is the U.S. behaving in a very ossified manner on the global stage—slow to adapt, overly bureaucratic, and strategically sluggish. Such rigidity is particularly dangerous in a competitive and rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.

Given the long history of military and strategic thinking in the United States, it is surprising that such obvious countermeasures from China were not anticipated. You do not need to be a master strategist to foresee that if the U.S. makes Move A, China will likely respond with Move B. It is basic strategic logic. The fact that we were blindsided suggests systemic weaknesses.

That said, China’s predictability is not necessarily a testament to its sophistication. It simply means that China is responding within a limited range of available options—and doing so effectively because the U.S. has not closed off those vulnerabilities.

Jacobsen: So both nations are stuck in a kind of zero-sum logic based on finite resources?

Tsukerman: That is precisely it. The genuine concern is that both countries are still grounding their national security strategies in resource accumulation—rare earths, energy, and other tangible materials—rather than focusing on intellectual capital and innovation. Neither is truly advancing the conversation toward post-resource paradigms.

Despite its heavy investment in AI and technology education, China has yet to demonstrate creative or lateral approaches to circumvent its dependence on physical resources. Its strategies are still very linear and of an industrial age in nature. That makes them vulnerable to disruption by any actor that can think a step ahead.

Jacobsen: So the arms race is less about innovation and more about material accumulation at this stage?

Tsukerman: Correct. Moreover, that is not sustainable. These supply chains are fragile by nature—limited, contested, and vulnerable. If the U.S. wants to remain competitive, it should not focus solely on acquiring the most rare earths or metals. Instead, it should invest in alternatives that allow us to transcend our dependence on finite resources.

Innovation—true innovation—is about solving constraints. That means finding synthetic substitutes, developing circular economies, and maximizing human ingenuity. Otherwise, we are simply repeating the cycle that made the global economy so dependent on oil and gas. Moreover, rare earths could reach that point of critical instability even faster.

Jacobsen: That brings us to another area of intensifying conflict. On June 4, Israeli airstrikes on June 4 targeted areas in Beirut’s southern suburbs, specifically the Tahia region, reportedly in response to intelligence indicating underground drone production sites linked to Hezbollah. These strikes triggered widespread panic and mass evacuations.

One regional official condemned the attacks, claiming they violated the U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement from November 2024. In the aftermath, scenes of devastation emerged. According to accounts like that of Adel Hadda, Palestinians were seen praying amid the rubble, as most mosques in the area had been destroyed.

The death toll is staggering: approximately 2,000 Palestinians have been killed, with roughly 90% of the population displaced. In response, the United Nations Security Council is reportedly drafting a resolution calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza. The resolution would also demand the release of all hostages and the removal of barriers to humanitarian aid. As per Security Council procedures, it will require at least nine affirmative votes and no vetoes from any of the five permanent members to pass.

Thoughts?

Tsukerman: The United Nations has not been an especially constructive player in this theatre of war. It has not effectively pressured Hamas—or, more importantly, the state actors enabling Hamas’s continued operation. The fundamental problem is that Hamas has no incentive to disarm. Doing so would all but guarantee its collapse, and it is well aware of that.

In the meantime, Israel is reportedly exploring unconventional alternatives, such as arming local secular gangs or factions opposed to Hamas. I am skeptical of this approach. In my view, the core issue is not Hamas per se but the international network of support that sustains it. This includes state actors like Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, with supplementary backing from Russia and China.

Replacing Hamas with another group—especially one potentially as violent or ideologically unmoored—does not address the structural issue. Those same enabling countries could reroute their support to the next proxy. Whether the justification is religious or nationalist, the anti-Israel sentiment fueling the conflict will remain unchanged.

Jacobsen: So the framing of the conflict as a bilateral war—Israel versus Hamas or Israel versus Gaza—is fundamentally flawed?

Tsukerman: Precisely. There must be a broader strategic aim. First, the international community must hold those directly fueling the conflict accountable rather than reducing it to a localized fight. Second, any viable resolution must involve more than military operations. Without a robust political and humanitarian strategy, this war risks becoming another “forever war.”

Fighting a non-state actor like Hamas—a terrorist group with no real accountability to a civilian population—is profoundly asymmetrical. Israel, as a sovereign state, must answer to its citizens and international norms. Hamas, however, faces no such constraints. This imbalance ensures that civilians will continue to die in large numbers while Israeli soldiers are also lost in protracted, inconclusive battles.

Jacobsen: How do the religious dimensions factor into this dynamic?

Tsukerman: That is a crucial but under-discussed aspect. The destruction of mosques, while not a strategic aim for Israel, has become central to Hamas’s propaganda. Hamas deliberately embeds itself in civilian and religious infrastructure to provoke outrage and mobilize regional support. This tactic is a component of its broader information warfare strategy.

Even if Israel avoids deliberately targeting religious sites, the optics remain damaging. Hamas has successfully weaponized these visuals to galvanize support for what it brands as “resistance.” This is even though it bears primary responsibility for the destruction by militarizing those sacred sites.

Jacobsen: So even with military superiority, Israel could still lose in terms of narrative and perception?

Tsukerman: Exactly. Tactical victories are not the same as strategic success. Israel may be inflicting heavy damage on Hamas’s infrastructure and personnel, but it has not neutralized the ideological and emotional appeal Hamas cultivates. That appeal—rooted in religious symbolism, perceived victimhood, and anti-Israel sentiment—has grown more entrenched. Without countering that, Israel risks losing the broader conflict despite battlefield gains.

In most cases, the destruction of mosques is either incidental to airstrikes in densely populated areas or based on actionable intelligence indicating the presence of weapons or militants within those sites. Hamas has a long history of embedding fighters and munitions in civilian and religious infrastructure. This is not new.

Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have weaponized religious sites to incite broader regional conflict, including within Israel itself. For example, in the years leading up to the October 7 attacks, we saw repeated instances of stone-throwing, weapons smuggling, and other provocations near the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem—often timed around Ramadan. These actions were designed to escalate tensions and manipulate the religious significance of these locations.

By deliberately creating intolerable security conditions for Muslim worshippers, Hamas forces Israel into a no-win scenario: either Act to protect the public and face international backlash or stand down and risk civilian lives. The United Nations, knowingly or not, has been complicit in amplifying this strategy.

There are several reasons for this complicity: institutional corruption, the geopolitical makeup of the UN Security Council, and intense lobbying. Russia and China, both permanent members of the Security Council, are broadly aligned with Iran on strategic matters. They increasingly view the Israel–Hamas conflict as a front in a larger geopolitical struggle against the West. Because Israel is a close U.S. ally and the Middle East is now central to the strategic calculus of both Moscow and Beijing, these dynamics play directly into the broader global contest.

Jacobsen: And the U.S. appears to be playing a less visible, perhaps less effective, role in the Middle East.

Tsukerman: Yes. That shift is fundamental and concerning. Part of the issue lies with Israel’s diplomatic missteps—its inability to forge stronger partnerships with European countries, for instance. While it may be difficult, building that level of support is not impossible. However, the core point is this: the conflict is not about targeting religious sites or undermining Islamic holidays. It is about asymmetric warfare and the weaponization of sacred symbols to control perception.

Jacobsen: Let us move briefly to another topic. Former President Trump is reportedly reintroducing his travel ban—this time affecting around a dozen countries. From what I understand, the new version may be broader than the original 2017 iteration. Is this the same policy under a different name, or is it substantively different?

Tsukerman: The 2017 travel restrictions were not, strictly speaking, a “Muslim ban,” despite how Trump’s political messaging framed it. Countries like Venezuela and North Korea—neither Muslim-majority—were included. However, Trump deliberately emphasized the “Muslim ban” framing to appeal to specific segments of his base, which undermined his strategy and inflamed unnecessary tensions with Muslim communities worldwide.

It is also important to note that not all Muslim-majority countries were included in the original ban—and that is still the case. The new proposed travel restrictions target a combination of nations. Many are in Africa and the Middle East, but others are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. The current iteration appears to be framed less around religion and more around national security and immigration enforcement.

Jacobsen: What are the rationales driving this renewed ban?

Tsukerman: It is a mixture of factors. In some cases, the targeted countries are conflict zones that pose legitimate security concerns—such as Iran. In others, it is driven by domestic political considerations tied to immigration. For example, Venezuela and Haiti are both experiencing intense social and political turmoil. The U.S. has seen large waves of migrants from both countries—some fleeing political oppression, others escaping criminal violence.

Take Haiti, for example. The country is not inherently more dangerous than others. However, the volume of migration has become a political issue in the U.S. During the campaign, figures like Jake Evans made inflammatory and false claims—such as suggesting Haitian migrants “eat cats and dogs in the wild”—which reflects the level of xenophobia and misinformation at play. However, the core motivation behind the expanded ban appears to be a combination of anti-immigration sentiment and geopolitical anxiety.

A significant factor in all of this is that Trump has continued to demonstrate open sympathy toward Vladimir Putin. He appears willing to say or do almost anything to retain Putin’s favour—even after repeated instances of betrayal, disappointment, and public backlash. This was evident in the most recent phone call between the two, which reportedly lasted over an hour. Immediately afterward, Trump turned around and criticized President Zelensky, as if it were Zelensky’s fault for taking decisive action to defend his own country.

What national leader would not defend their country in the face of invasion? If a government were to take only half-hearted measures in such a situation, that would be tantamount to treason. Trump presents himself as a nationalist—so one might expect him to admire Ukraine’s stance. Trump claims to champion nationalism, but his admiration seems to be reserved for populist strongmen who are loyal to Putin—figures like Viktor Orbán, who I would argue are not true nationalists. If they genuinely prioritized national interests, their economies would be stronger, and they would not rely so heavily on external financial support.

Ukraine’s nationalism, by contrast, is much closer to American nationalism—fiercely independent, democratic, and rooted in the principle of sovereignty. Russia’s posture is imperialist. It does not elevate or respect its citizens, especially those outside Moscow’s elite circles, who are often treated like second-class citizens. That distinction is crucial.

Jacobsen: What are the implications for Zelensky and NATO?

Tsukerman: Zelensky cannot rely on NATO in any meaningful way after this. If NATO is still attempting to appease Trump, despite his repeated signals of hostility, it shows that the alliance is not prepared for independent strategic action outside of U.S. influence. That makes NATO, in its current form, an unreliable partner. It may offer strong rhetoric and pledges of military aid. However, when it comes to decisive action—particularly in the event of escalation involving other actors like China or a new Russian front—it cannot be counted on. That is not just a problem for Ukraine—it is a problem for NATO itself.

Jacobsen: Why?

Tsukerman: Because NATO’s dependence on the United States has become a liability. If Trump cannot be counted on to support Ukraine due to a personal vendetta against Zelensky, what would happen if a NATO member were attacked? There is no guarantee he would honour Article 5. His past rhetoric strongly suggests otherwise.

This means NATO should begin pursuing alternative strategies now. The fact that key European powers are still attempting to “salvage” the situation—rather than confront it head-on—is a sign they are not serious about building independent defence capacity. Admittedly, it is not easy. Decoupling from the U.S. militarily is a massive undertaking. Expert analyses suggest it could take many years—perhaps decades—and even then, complete independence may not be achievable. The U.S. remains a dominant global defence actor.

That said, European countries can increase their defence spending and capacity. They must because the nature of the threats they face is changing. For most NATO members, the primary risk is not large-scale conventional warfare; instead, it is the potential for hybrid warfare. Outside the Baltics, where the possibility of a direct Russian invasion cannot be ruled out, the majority of European countries face escalating asymmetric threats—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and hybrid warfare.

Jacobsen: In that scenario, is U.S. involvement even necessary?

Tsukerman: In many respects, no. The United States has already diminished its capabilities in the information warfare domain. Much of its intelligence work—particularly human intelligence—has been outsourced or heavily dependent on the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, U.S. cyber operations against Russia have been scaled back significantly, partly due to internal constraints and geopolitical considerations.

So, in key areas of asymmetric defence, the U.S. is no longer the dominant player it once was. That creates space for Europe to step up and lead, either independently or in collaboration with like-minded allies outside of Washington’s sphere.

Tsukerman: NATO and its European members are failing to conduct a clear-eyed assessment of their actual threat landscape. They are conflating U.S. economic influence, U.S. defence presence, and the fundamental nature of threats they face. Instead, they need to disaggregate these issues, evaluate the concrete impact of potential U.S. absence, and make strategic decisions based on reliable data and rigorous analysis—not just fear and inertia.

If NATO members stand for anything strategically coherent, they should act accordingly. That means extending invitations to both Trump and Zelensky for future summits. Those who choose to participate will do so, and those who do not will make their position clear. The agenda should not be held hostage to personalities.

Jacobsen: Last two items, first, the Taliban. The UN and human rights organizations have again highlighted Afghanistan under Taliban rule as the most severe crisis for women globally—in terms of access to education, employment, freedom of movement, and fundamental rights. Second, Amnesty International has formally accused Israel of genocide in Gaza, citing what it claims are repeated acts causing irreparable harm to Palestinians and calling for international accountability. Your thoughts?

Tsukerman: On the first point, the more oppressive the Taliban becomes, the more normalized it seems to become internationally. Unfortunately, we may not be far off from seeing formal U.S. recognition of the Taliban, or at least tacit acceptance. World leaders who once distanced themselves from the group are now engaging openly with Taliban officials.

India’s leadership, for example, has historically sought to balance its regional interests by calibrating away from Pakistan’s Taliban ties. However, now, its engagement with Afghanistan is far more overt. Russia’s early recognition of the Taliban helped pave the way for others. Without a U.S. military presence, Afghanistan has gone from being a liability to a geopolitical asset—especially in the eyes of Russia, China, and now many Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern states.

Afghanistan is emerging as a crucial trade and transit hub for parts of the Global South, particularly as a gateway to Central Asia. Countries motivated by short-term strategic and economic interests are engaging in realpolitik—ignoring the long-term risks posed by Taliban-controlled territory.

This includes the risk of terrorist resurgence. Al-Qaeda training camps—supported or trained by Russian intelligence (GRU)—reportedly exist across Afghanistan. The Taliban once normalized and economically stabilized, could easily resume support for extremist networks, posing threats first to Southeast Asia and eventually to global security. However, this seems to be absent from most countries’ calculations. They either believe the Taliban can be contained, or they want short-term profit and will “deal with the consequences later.”

Whatever the rationale, it is clear that women’s rights are not a serious priority for any of these actors. Despite repeated international rhetoric about standing up for women, the concern is limited to domestic contexts. Abroad, women’s rights become secondary to trade routes, diplomacy, and power projection.

Jacobsen: And the genocide allegation from the Taliban?

Tsukerman: That accusation is pure propaganda. By any serious legal or demographic measure, what is happening in Gaza does not meet the definition of genocide. For example, data from sources like the CIA World Factbook indicate that Gaza’s population has grown throughout the conflict. That growth is fundamentally inconsistent with claims of systematic extermination.

Now, one can—and should—debate Israel’s military strategies and whether more should be done to reduce civilian casualties. However, that is not the same as the intentional and systematic destruction of a people based solely on identity. Some Israeli political figures have made deeply troubling statements, including comments about population transfers, and these must be addressed. However, even those fall short of meeting the legal threshold for genocide.

Meanwhile, Hamas and its affiliated propaganda networks have deliberately inflated or fabricated casualty figures to serve as powerful tools of information warfare. These figures are then cynically amplified by actors whose interest in Palestinian well-being is, at best, opportunistic and, at worst, entirely disingenuous.

Jacobsen: Final thoughts?

Tsukerman: Both the United States and the broader international community must reassess how they approach ideological threats. Tactical responses alone are not enough. Without a robust long-term strategy, whatever efforts are being made now—military, diplomatic, or humanitarian—are doomed to fail.

Jacobsen: Excellent. Irina, thank you very much. 

Tsukerman: Excellent—and get well soon.

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