The Everywhere Insiders 2: Complex Political Shifts Amid Ongoing War

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/06/04

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she holds the position of Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. This interview conducted May 23, 2025.Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So today, we’re here with American attorney Irina Tuskerman. Turning to Eastern Europe, the largest Russian–Ukrainian prisoner exchange since the full-scale invasion began took place on May 23-25, 2025, in which approximately 1,000 prisoners were released by each side, including 120 civilians each. Freed Ukrainian personnel arrived at an undisclosed site in northern Ukraine, where they reunited with families, while Russian POWs returned to Russia. Any thoughts?Irina Tsukerman: Yes. It was a highly complex and politically sensitive event. To put it mildly, it was a high-stakes humanitarian and symbolic maneuver. It carried immense risk but was carefully coordinated, blending humanitarian aims with strategic signaling, psychological dimensions, and diplomatic nuance.These figures are not merely battlefield commanders—they have become symbols of Ukrainian resilience and defiance. The Azov Regiment (now officially a brigade within the Ukrainian National Guard) has been the subject of intense international scrutiny and Russian disinformation campaigns.It is true that the Azov Battalion, founded in 2014, had connections to far-right figures in its early formation. However, those individuals have since departed, and the unit has been formally integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces. For years, it has trained with U.S. and NATO forces and now includes personnel of diverse ideological, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.While the term “nationalist” may still apply in the sense of patriotism and defense of national sovereignty, Azov today is no longer defined by extremist ideology. This evolution has often been ignored or distorted by Russian propaganda, which has attempted to label all Ukrainian resistance as far-right to justify aggression. These efforts intensified after Azov’s effective defense of Mariupol, which inflicted heavy Russian losses and garnered international admiration.Over time, even the U.S. Congress reversed earlier restrictions and permitted military assistance and cooperation with Azov, acknowledging its reformed status and rejecting disinformation narratives.Jacobsen: The Kremlin’s reach, as you mentioned, extends far beyond Ukraine. We have seen this pattern before—extrajudicial assassinations in Germany, Austria, Turkey, and even Spain. Russia has killed defectors, pilots, and Chechen dissidents across Europe in defiance of international norms.Tsukerman: Another intriguing and controversial figure in this context is Nadiya Savchenko. She is a former Ukrainian Air Force pilot and former Member of Parliament. Once celebrated as a national hero and former prisoner of war, her later trajectory included allegations of plotting against Ukraine’s government and even rumors of links to Russian intelligence, particularly the FSB.Her role in the prisoner swap negotiations is unclear. Whether she is a direct participant, a symbolic figure, or a bargaining chip, her name introduces a layer of political ambiguity. There are strong suggestions of backchannel diplomacy, hidden quid pro quos, and intelligence games operating in the background.Jacobsen: That raises important questions. To what extent has Savchenko been used as a pawn in larger intelligence and political games? What does her fluctuating reputation indicate about the rifts within Ukrainian politics and the shadow world of espionage that runs parallel to the open conflict?Tsukerman: Precisely. The asymmetrical nature of the prisoner list—some high-value individuals exchanged, others conspicuously withheld—reveals the conflicting interests and power imbalances that shape these negotiations. While the scale of the exchange appears to be a diplomatic success, it was far from a straightforward or balanced process. Political calculation was deeply embedded in every aspect of the swap.Jacobsen: For Russia, retaining Chechen fighters and other insurgents serves dual strategic objectives: preserving internal control over separatist regions and maintaining leverage over Ukraine in ongoing and future negotiations.Tsukerman: Absolutely. For Kyiv, regaining prominent Azov Brigade leaders is both tactically and symbolically significant. However, it also reveals an underlying vulnerability—hundreds of Ukrainian prisoners remain in Russian custody, many with little hope for swift release.While the repatriation of high-profile figures was met with public celebration, it masks a deeper humanitarian crisis. Numerous former detainees have reported psychological trauma, physical abuse, and severe deprivation during their captivity. These accounts paint a stark and troubling picture, sharply contrasting with the triumphant national rhetoric. The suffering endured behind bars is a grim reminder that prisoner swaps are not just political maneuvers—they are deeply human events with lasting consequences.Jacobsen: And that suffering does not end upon release.Tsukerman: Correct. The psychological scars and physical injuries many freed prisoners carry raise serious concerns about Ukraine’s capacity to effectively rehabilitate and reintegrate them. The infrastructure needed for such support—medical, psychological, and social—is overwhelmed and underfunded.Why? Because Western aid has prioritized lethal weaponry, battlefield emergency medical supplies, and basic logistics. Broader humanitarian programs, especially long-term rehabilitation, have often been treated as secondary. Some former prisoners have been transferred to the West for treatment, but these cases are exceptions.Recently, humanitarian aid has been deliberately downplayed in political discourse—especially in the United States—due to a growing narrative that such spending is wasteful or vulnerable to corruption. This viewpoint is driven not only by anti-war sentiment but also by pro-military advocates who paradoxically claim to oppose war while arguing that only military aid is justifiable.Jacobsen: That raises an ethical dilemma. Without long-term support, these soldiers could be sent back into combat before they fully recover—physically or mentally.Tsukerman: Precisely. This not only increases human suffering but also weakens Ukraine’s overall military effectiveness. Moreover, families of those still detained in Russian prisons are growing increasingly frustrated. Many accuse the Ukrainian government of lacking transparency, failing in advocacy, and prioritizing symbolic victories over sustained diplomatic efforts to free those left behind.Moscow’s selective release strategy fuels a propaganda narrative that portrays Ukraine as incapable of protecting its own citizens. This undermines domestic morale and diplomatic credibility, especially in the U.S. and several European states.Jacobsen: The swap seems to have ignited another debate—whether these exchanges are truly humanitarian acts or political instruments.Tsukerman: Indeed. Both Kyiv and Moscow appear to be using prisoner swaps as tools of strategic messaging and leverage, rather than as purely humanitarian actions. This instrumentalization raises serious ethical concerns. Are prisoners of war being respected under international humanitarian law, or are they being held as bargaining chips?Despite the challenges Ukraine faces—including war-related infrastructure damage and economic strain—the disparity in prisoner treatment between the two sides is notable. Reports overwhelmingly suggest that Ukrainian prisoners held in Russia suffer far more than Russian prisoners held in Ukraine. This disproportion underscores the need for international scrutiny of Russia’s detention practices.Jacobsen: One final issue—the Azov Brigade. The return of its commanders has again stirred international debate.Tsukerman: Yes, the presence of Azov commanders in this prisoner swap has reignited controversies over the brigade’s political legacy. Russia continues to portray Azov as a neo-Nazi militia, a key narrative used to justify its invasion. While, as we discussed, the brigade has undergone structural and ideological transformations and has long been incorporated into Ukraine’s National Guard, the optics remain sensitive.Kyiv must now navigate the delicate task of acknowledging Azov’s significant battlefield role while distancing itself from the extremist labels amplified by Russian propaganda. This is both a domestic and international communications challenge—one that Ukraine must manage carefully to maintain unity and legitimacy in the eyes of its allies.Jacobsen: It has not been a major issue recently, since much of the older narrative has been exposed as a Russian propaganda tactic, but we should not entirely discount its resurgence. Russia is known for recycling past disinformation successes and exploiting trends that shift in its favor.Tsukerman: Right now, the anti-Zelensky posture among some Trump-aligned figures in the United States plays to Moscow’s advantage. The current political climate may offer Russia a window of opportunity to reintroduce disinformation campaigns—particularly those targeting Azov or prisoner exchange narratives—with renewed traction.Looking ahead, several possible scenarios are worth considering.First, the prisoner swap may serve as the basis for incremental confidence-building measures—a rare cooperative act in an otherwise brutal and unpredictable conflict. It could mark a small but meaningful step toward future broader peace talks.However, the incomplete nature of the exchange, and Moscow’s continued detention of key prisoners, leaves room for a prolonged stalemate and the perpetuation of hostage diplomacy. This ambiguity allows Russia to maintain psychological and political pressure on Ukraine.More concerning is the possibility that Russia will exploit this leverage to fuel internal discord within Ukraine, a tactic it has used consistently. This is a topic deserving deeper discussion in its own right.Jacobsen: Could you draw a parallel with other regions?Tsukerman: Certainly. Russia has been training its allies and proxy groups, including Hamas, in the use of hostage diplomacy as a psychological and political weapon. Hamas operatives have reportedly traveled to Moscow for this very purpose—learning how to manage, manipulate, and prolong hostage situations to pressure governments and sway public opinion.This same strategy is now playing out in multiple conflicts across the globe. The commonality of tactics among these groups is not a coincidence—it reflects a shared playbook that originates in Moscow and has been disseminated to state and non-state actors alike.For Ukraine, this approach may result in deepened political tensions, weakening national unity at a critical moment in the war. The saga underscores how prisoner exchanges can function as part of hybrid warfare, blending humanitarianism with information warfare, intelligence operations, and geopolitical influence.The unresolved status of Chechen fighters Adam Osmayev and Amina Okuyeva further ties the conflict in Ukraine to Russia’s internal security fragility, particularly in the North Caucasus. These ripples go far beyond the immediate battlefield and touch on the deeper structural anxieties within the Russian Federation.Jacobsen: So what does this particular swap tell us, in the end?Tsukerman: The largest prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine to date encapsulates the multifaceted and often contradictory nature of this war. On one hand, it offered a rare humanizing moment, the joyful return of dozens of Ukrainians. But it was also marred by political exclusions, strategic calculation, disinformation campaigns, and the enduring uncertainty surrounding hundreds still detained.Ultimately, it reminds us that beneath the headlines of victory and relief, there are unresolved and pressing questions about justice, strategy, and the human cost of the war. These cannot be addressed through public spectacle alone.Jacobsen: Alright, mindful of the time, before we hand it back to the team, I’ll stay with the flow we discussed. We’ve touched on prisoner swaps and some Middle East escalation, particularly regarding similar tactics. Since this next topic falls squarely in your expertise, let’s jump briefly to Operation NK.Or—actually—would you prefer to start with the West Bank developments as of May 23? Just a quick overview, and then we’ll pivot to cybersecurity, where, frankly, the complexity tends to lose most people—but that’s where you thrive.Jacobsen: Please go ahead.Tsukerman: Certainly. In the West Bank, there has been a recent surge in violence accompanied by a deepening spiral of tension, trauma, and uncertainty. Any attempt to frame this conflict in simplistic terms is not only insufficient but, frankly, dangerously misleading.Recent headlines have highlighted stabbing attacks, settler reprisals, and Israeli military raids. But beneath these headlines lies a labyrinth of local power struggles, ideological battles, strategic manipulation, and disinformation campaigns that defy any clear-cut categorization.The latest wave of violence is often presented as either an eruption of settler violence or, conversely, as Palestinian terrorism. In truth, the situation is far more fractured and complex. It demands a nuanced examination.We must ask difficult questions:To what extent has sexual violence in the conflict been exaggerated or underreported for political purposes?How instrumental have Kahanist elements and ultranationalist factions within the Israeli government been in encouraging or legitimizing acts of aggression?And to what degree are Palestinian organizations reliable narrators of on-the-ground violence?These are crucial issues, especially as Israel is also engaged in ongoing conflict along the Gaza front. In the West Bank, there have been documented incidents of settler-perpetrated violence—ranging from physical assaults to property destruction and intimidation of Palestinian civilians. These acts are undeniable and have increased in frequency.However, the scale and systemic nature of this violence is often amplified by advocacy groups and media outlets, sometimes suggesting a centrally coordinated campaign. This narrative risks erasing the diversity within the settler community, which is far from monolithic.Some settlers are ideological hardliners, including young extremists influenced by religious nationalism. Others, however, are pragmatic families, farmers, and individuals whose primary concerns are personal safety and land rights—many of whom do not engage in or condone violence.Jacobsen: What role do political leaders play in this escalation?Tsukerman: A significant one. Take Itamar Ben-Gvir, for example. As a member of Israel’s war cabinet and a prominent figure in ultranationalist politics, he has promoted expansionist policies and has made inflammatory statements that often cross into racist or incitement rhetoric.While he may not directly call for violence, his dog-whistling and ambiguous language have emboldened certain factions. His presence in government sends a powerful signal that fosters settler self-assertiveness, both nonviolent and violent, toward Palestinians viewed as security threats or obstacles to land ambitions.Yet even within this context, the level of government sanction or encouragement for violence remains murky. The Israeli government has officially condemned sexual violence and certain forms of settler aggression. However, enforcement is weak. Investigations are often delayed or inconclusive, citing stretched resources due to broader security demands.This ambiguity feeds Palestinian perceptions of impunity and injustice, which in turn stokes resentment and retaliatory violence. These narratives are actively weaponized by local terrorist groups to justify further provocations, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.The blurred lines between official security policy, state-sanctioned operations, and settler activism make accountability extraordinarily difficult in the current environment.Jacobsen: What about the Palestinian factions in the West Bank?Tsukerman: That is another complicating factor. The Palestinian political and militant landscape in the West Bank is fragmented. Unlike Gaza, which is governed by Hamas, the West Bank is home to multiple factions—including Fatah, Hamas cells, and independent armed groups—often with competing objectives and strategies.This fragmentation complicates attribution and response. Acts of violence may be carried out by one group, condemned by another, and spun in divergent ways depending on the political goals at hand. These factions do not present a unified front and should not be treated as a monolith either.So, while many focus on Israeli settler aggression or military operations, the internal Palestinian dynamics, the presence of Hamas in the West Bank, and local power struggles all contribute to the cycle of violence and mistrust.Jacobsen: Could you expand on the internal divisions among Palestinian factions in the West Bank and how that affects the conflict?Tsukerman: Of course. The situation is deeply fragmented. In the West Bank, you have several major and minor actors vying for influence—often violently. Among them are Iran-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Shi’a-aligned militant group, and Fatah, the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority, which also operates the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.The Al-Aqsa Brigades have been involved in joint operations with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other factions—including reported participation in the October 7 attacks, though their involvement varies across regions and operational contexts.There are also smaller militias and local armed groups that compete for power, visibility, and legitimacy. They often issue contradictory or exaggerated claims of responsibility for attacks. For instance, following stabbing incidents or armed clashes, Palestinian groups sometimes claim credit only to have their statements later disputed by eyewitness accounts, journalistic investigations, or Israeli intelligence assessments.Jacobsen: So the propaganda war is just as chaotic as the ground situation.Tsukerman: Exactly. The information environment is highly contested, and verification becomes very difficult. Spontaneous or lone-wolf acts of violence are frequently co-opted by these groups to enhance their image, even if they had no direct involvement. This opportunistic behavior turns attribution into a political tool, rather than a factual accounting.These issues are further complicated by the inconsistent stance of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Under Mahmoud Abbas, the PA has officially condemned some acts of violence, but not all. Since October 7, there have been signs of both official and unofficial alignment between the PA and Hamas on certain fronts.The PA walks a very fine line: on one hand, it maintains security cooperation with Israel to preserve its limited autonomy and Western financial support. On the other hand, it does not want to appear irrelevant, especially when Hamas’ militant approach has rallied popular sentiment among Palestinians in some areas. This dynamic has led to ambiguous messaging and a lack of unified leadership, undermining effective responses.Jacobsen: What about the escalation of Israeli military operations?Tsukerman: That’s another flashpoint. Israel has increased operations in the West Bank, particularly in areas like Jeninand Nablus, which it frames as counter-terrorism measures aimed at disrupting weapons caches and apprehending active militants.From the Israeli perspective, these are targeted raids. But they often result in civilian casualties and significant property damage, which fuel local resentment and accusations of collective punishment. Palestinians portray many of these incursions as punitive in nature, especially when entire neighborhoods are affected.Interestingly, even Fatah-affiliated PA officials have, at times, requested Israeli intervention to clear out areas like Jenin, which had become strongholds for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Jenin is so volatile it has become, in some cases, a no-go zone for even moderate Palestinian factions.Jacobsen: And then there’s the broader geopolitical influence.Tsukerman: Absolutely. Iran plays a critical role by providing funding, weapons, and training to militant groups in both Gaza and the West Bank. Its support incentivizes continued violence that aligns with Tehran’s regional objectives, particularly the goal of undermining Israeli and U.S.-aligned regimes.Meanwhile, external actors like the Gulf States attempt to manage the conflict through economic aid and humanitarian diplomacy, trying to stabilize the region while asserting their own interests.Even former U.S. initiatives—such as the Trump-era Peace to Prosperity Plan and his recent comments about “taking over Gaza”—have escalated tensions, by signaling shifts in U.S. policy that embolden certain actors while alienating others.Jacobsen: What about the role of information warfare and public messaging?Tsukerman: That’s a key point. Both Palestinian factions and Israeli officials engage in aggressive media strategies, often through social media, to shape the global narrative. However, they tend to speak past each other—not to each other’s populations.For example, Palestinian organizations often communicate effectively with left-wing and activist circles in Israel and the West, but not with Netanyahu’s base. Conversely, Netanyahu’s coalition occasionally issues Arabic-language messages, but these are met with deep skepticism and limited penetration among Palestinian audiences.So while both sides deploy messaging to support their goals, these efforts frequently reinforce internal narratives rather than fostering any mutual understanding or engagement. The end result is a highly polarized, insular communication loop, further entrenching division and mistrust.Western agencies’ countermeasures—often clandestine and aggressive—can provoke reciprocal actions, escalating tensions and setting the stage for a cyber arms race with unpredictable consequences. When Western governments assert that certain hackers are “private” actors who align ideologically with Russia or China, but remain technically independent, this framing often reflects the challenges of attribution in cyberspace. It is difficult to definitively link hackers to official state commands due to the covert nature of operations, use of proxies, and technical obfuscation. However, this ambiguity can also serve strategic purposes—such as avoiding escalation with nation-states and sidestepping direct retaliation or diplomatic fallout.To that end, the United States and its allies often target symbolic or critical cyber infrastructure and conduct operations against entities involved in command-and-control, reconnaissance, exploitation, and sabotage—often referred to as CACRES—while refraining from publicly declaring such operations acts of war. This restraint reflects both legal ambiguity and political calculation.One particularly controversial figure in this domain is Evgeny Harych Savchenko. While there is no publicly verified connection between him and Nadiya Savchenko, the former Ukrainian military pilot and politician, the similarity in names can cause confusion. Evgeny Harych Savchenko has been named in cybersecurity reports and investigative journalism as having possible links to Russian intelligence services, specifically the Federal Security Service (FSB). He is accused of involvement in cyber intrusions that have targeted Western political institutions, financial networks, and infrastructure. His potential capture or extradition remains speculative and serves as a case study in the complexities of international cyber law enforcement, particularly where state protection or plausible deniability is involved.This underscores a broader issue: state-affiliated hackers often operate under legal gray zones, shielded by jurisdictional boundaries and the principle of sovereign non-interference. Meanwhile, ethical challenges multiply. Cross-border cyber operations may violate international norms, infringe on national sovereignty, and raise concerns about due process, data privacy, and unintended collateral consequences. Although there are efforts to foster international law enforcement cooperation—such as through INTERPOL, Europol, and various bilateral frameworks—these efforts are not always effective. Some nations refuse cooperation outright or obstruct investigations, especially when their geopolitical interests are implicated.This leads to a persistent dilemma: should democratic states respect legal boundaries even when cooperation is denied, or should they take unilateral action to apprehend cybercriminals and neutralize threats? The use of malware or offensive cyber tools to disable adversary systems comes with high risks—including potential harm to civilian infrastructure, accidental data exposure, and questions around transparency, oversight, and accountability. Civilian protections are often afterthoughts in such operations, even though they are central to international humanitarian law discussions.Private sector cooperation is both essential and fraught. Technology firms and cybersecurity companies serve as frontline defenders and intelligence intermediaries, but they must navigate competing pressures—balancing user privacy, profitability, and government requests. For example, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit has partnered with global law enforcement to disrupt botnets and cybercrime networks. However, such collaborations raise ongoing debates about transparency, the protection of proprietary data, and operational security.Cybersecurity, once the purview of niche technical experts, has now become a central component of national and international security policy. It is increasingly tied to geopolitics, economic stability, and democratic resilience.Yes—if this were an advertisement for 21st-century geopolitical complexity, it would be a compelling one. And so, yes.What I was saying is that some of these companies, for profit, sell exploits. And they are often easily penetrated themselves because many cybersecurity professionals are so preoccupied with speaking engagements and public discussions that they are not necessarily conducting due diligence on active threat networks.But for the U.S., maintaining strong internal coordination as well as alliances with foreign countries is crucial. The capacity to penetrate and disrupt hostile cyber networks is a key factor in signaling resolve and technological superiority to China, Russia, and states aligned with them. We should be examining scenario forecasting related to the long-term impact of this digital separation.The most optimistic interpretation is that sustained disruption of cybercriminal and hostile nation-state networks could improve global cyber hygiene, reduce attacks on critical infrastructure, and foster greater international cooperation on cybersecurity norms, best practices, and law enforcement. Enhanced cyber resilience could stabilize financial markets, protect democratic elections, and safeguard essential services. That would be a good thing.But a more pessimistic—and in my opinion, far more realistic—outlook is that this could evolve into a cyber Cold War that spirals into kinetic conflict. Not necessarily direct military confrontation, but hybrid operations with retaliatory strikes targeting utilities, transportation, or military systems.And frankly, we are already seeing some of that unfold. Cyber actors are using anonymizing technologies and decentralized structures, as I mentioned earlier. This complicates both detection and response, enabling constant adaptation and evasion. The risk of false flag operations—particularly employed by Russia, and now increasingly by China—is also rising. These are attacks designed to appear as if they originate from a rival, thereby confusing attribution and heightening tensions.As cyber operations grow more sophisticated, so do the unintended consequences—data leaks, software vulnerabilities, and the spread of malware beyond intended targets. Escalation due to misinterpretation can lead to widespread disruptions. Striking a balance among deterrence, transparency, and escalation management is incredibly difficult. It is more of an art than a science.The outcome of the current operation—let’s call it an endgame in progress—remains unclear. It epitomizes the evolving nature of modern conflict, where the battlefield is digital, but the stakes are tangible. We do not yet know the full extent of the consequences: how much it actually undercut bad actors, weakened their capacities, disrupted their infrastructure, and set them back in meaningful ways.Alternatively, it may not have been as effective as hoped, because these actors could have been preparing for this—transitioning to resilient, flexible infrastructures that can bypass arrests, asset freezes, and system takedowns. Navigating this terrain requires constant alertness, active engagement, a robust legal framework, increased international cooperation, and above all, sustained vigilance.Vigilance seems like the easiest task to maintain, but it is the one most often forgotten. After a major operation, medals are handed out, victories declared—but the work is far from over. A few bad actors may have been removed, but new ones are always ready to emerge.Particularly when it comes to nation-state actors, you might disrupt one network, but as long as the Kremlin exists, as long as Beijing exists, they will recruit and train new hackers—official or unofficial—to continue the mission. Just because someone got arrested or a server was taken offline does not mean the adversary is retreating. Quite the opposite. They adapt and return.So, measuring the ripple effects will take time. Understanding the consequences—both positive and negative—will also take time. And much of it may never be fully revealed to the public.Tsukerman: So we may hear snippets of information here and there, but ultimately, much of it will remain in the shadows—not fully known, even to some of the actors directly engaged in these efforts.Jacobsen: Alright. So these two are sufficiently separate… Well, is that sufficiently gloomy?Tsukerman: Well, the whole thing.Jacobsen: But as we learn more, we can make more precise analyses. It may also seem as though our default state is negativity anyway.Tsukerman: Yes, that is true. As we get more information, the outlook will likely continue to lean negative—but it will seem more legitimate because it will be more detailed, even though nothing may fundamentally change.Jacobsen: Alright. So, you have U.S. President Trump reigniting trade tensions by threatening tariffs on the European Union starting June 1, which will be after this is released. He’s also proposing a 25% levy on iPhones not manufactured in the United States. It shook certain parts of the gold market—primarily U.S. and European stock indexes dropped, the dollar weakened, and gold prices surged.Tsukerman: Trump claimed the tariffs would be lifted if European manufacturing moved stateside. In response, EU officials called for mutual respect and negotiations. Analysts are warning of higher consumer price indexes and supply chain disruptions.Jacobsen: What are your thoughts? Obviously, Apple has been moving—or planning to move—some production to India quite rapidly. How does this affect the whole equation?Tsukerman: Well, now Trump is saying he does not want Apple to move to India either. He’s threatening to impose tariffs if Apple moves to India. He wants them to move completely to the United States—with a 25% penalty if they do not comply. That would be a disaster. Brand-new iPhones could cost $3,000 to $5,000 apiece.Ironically, the skills and infrastructure for that kind of manufacturing exist in India and China—not in the United States. And he does not want to invite those skilled workers here, nor does he want to increase the number of people who can fill those roles.Jacobsen: That’s where someone like Chuck could play a constructive role as an ambassador of sorts, right?Tsukerman: Because he has lived in both worlds. That was actually why he went to India in the first place. But surprise—just as U.S. companies are moving to India and making major investments, Trump comes out and disrupts all of it with these new statements. There’s an inherent tension within his own policy. On the one hand, he wants to make massive deals with India and reduce reliance on China. On the other hand, his absolutist tariff regime and domestic production demands suggest he does not want to rely on foreign nations at all.Jacobsen: Without striking a balance, that’s impossible.Tsukerman: My theory is admittedly a bit cynical. I do not think this is truly about tariffs, or protectionism, or even about moving away from China. I believe it’s about bribes. It is about lobbying. The question is: which companies are ultimately going to offer the largest “contributions” in exchange for tariff relief?There’s a cyclical nature to these threats. Escalation happens, the markets drop, Trump walks it back, the markets rise again—and so on. What happens in between? Trump and his inner circle make money off the volatility. He said so himself, during the beginning of his second term, right before his first speech to Congress: he said he prefers volatility in both governance and markets.Also, lobbying has gone wild on K Street. Even Denmark, which rarely lobbies in Washington, is now participating for the first time in perhaps 50 years. I do not know what the future holds—but it is clear that much of this is about leverage, influence, and transactional politics more than coherent long-term policy.Denmark was never the kind of country that needed lobbying in Washington—until now. Sure, maybe a company like Novo Nordisk had some early lobbying related to Ozempic or other pharmaceutical launches, but beyond that, everyone knows Denmark is not a geopolitical hegemon trying to influence U.S. policy. They simply never needed lobbyists in the traditional sense.And yet, suddenly, even countries like Denmark are hiring lobbyists. So this is no longer about trade policy per se—it is about lobbying. That said, lobbying does have an impact on U.S. trade policy, which, up until the Trump administration, had been one of the engines of American economic strength. Now, it’s under increasing scrutiny for potentially destabilizing global financial systems.We have shifted from being the world’s economic stabilizer to something much more volatile—and that shift happened in a matter of months. The once-celebrated arsenal of carefully calibrated tariffs, export controls, and trade restrictions has become a double-edged sword. These instruments now appear to be unraveling fragile supply chains—supply chains that still have not fully recovered from the combined disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.On top of that, the rhetoric around trade has become increasingly geopolitical and less economic. Investor confidence is rattled. Because if no one knows what trade policy is going to look like tomorrow, why would they risk capital today?From what I am hearing, there are still business deals happening, but many of them are in real estate. That is because real estate is largely immune to these particular disruptions. There is always going to be demand, especially as hotels and tourist-dependent properties go bust. Someone will buy them—more likely than not, foreign investors—because domestic investors are losing capital due to the ripple effects of tariffs.So, yes, foreign interest will persist, but outside of real estate, the overall outlook is quite negative.Jacobsen: And that brings us back to the operation endgame, right? That digital background is just one piece of a much larger puzzle—where trade policy functions as both a weapon and a wedge in strategic maneuvering.Tsukerman: Exactly. That is why cybersecurity must go hand in hand with financial policy. You disrupt one, and it affects the other. Trade policy under Trump—what you could call an aggressive recalibration of global trade relations—began during his first term, continued under Biden, and has now escalated significantly.The imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods has never fully been rolled back. Meanwhile, export controls, particularly those targeting China and Russia, have been tightened under the Biden administration—especially with regard to advanced technologies like semiconductors and artificial intelligence.And there’s been a recalibration of trade relations not just with rivals, but with allies too. That aspect—recalibrating trade ties with allies—was more a hallmark of the Trump approach. Washington’s broader moves appear designed to assert dominance in critical sectors. But without a broader economic and diplomatic balance, the message becomes incoherent.Focusing on specific industries might make strategic sense in some contexts. But claiming you’re protecting critical sectors while indiscriminately tariffing nonessential imports—random, low-value goods from China, for instance—undermines your own argument.Rather than appearing as a strategic actor exercising control, the U.S. increasingly looks like a country thrashing about, seeking attention and trying different tactics until something lands. And this carries steep costs beyond optics.A major flashpoint is the tech sector. Export restrictions on China’s semiconductor and AI industries have disrupted established global supply chains worth billions. Companies like TSMC, Intel, and Nvidia are caught in the middle of this geopolitical-economic crossfire. They are being forced to navigate increasingly complex licensing requirements and investment restrictions.You may have heard that Nvidia is now exploring reentry into the Chinese market—despite pressure from the Biden administration to minimize such engagement. It reflects the impossible balancing act that firms are trying to perform under unpredictable, politically charged trade regimes.This not only impacts the bottom lines of major corporations, but also reverberates through global markets that rely on semiconductors—from smartphones to automotive manufacturing, and of course, defense tech, computing, and green technologies. All of these sectors depend on critical minerals that are essential to chip production, and those minerals are largely controlled by China and a few other nations. As a result, trade tensions are sparking retaliatory measures.Beijing’s food protection tariffs are undercutting both its own economy and the American economy. Selective restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports have been especially damaging for American farmers. Now Trump is talking about bailing them out starting in August, which could raise the federal deficit by billions—if not more.This is part of why there is a massive battle in Congress over the debt ceiling, which is now at $5 trillion. If that issue is not resolved by August, we may be facing a default. Exporters are already affected, and this has created political fissures in key swing states. Let’s be honest—China has strategically targeted tariffs at key U.S. industries closely aligned with Trump’s base. That includes specific companies and sectors based in the Rust Belt, agriculture-heavy regions, and what are sometimes called the “flyover states.”Meanwhile, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are expressing growing unease, confusion, frustration, and distrust. U.S. policy now increasingly prioritizes unilateral leverage—dictating terms rather than engaging in multilateral cooperation. This shift is straining, if not outright damaging, decades-old trade partnerships. I might even say “rupturing” would be a better word than “straining.”The risk is the fragmentation of the global trade architecture, which could usher in a new protectionist era. Not that the old system was perfect, but this would stifle innovation and slow economic growth. In Europe, that would be particularly damaging because innovation there is already constrained by excessive regulation—ranging from environmental and privacy standards to bureaucratic red tape and complex tax codes.Financial markets are reacting accordingly. Trump wanted volatility—well, he got it. Every major trade announcement is now followed by massive market swings. Investor anxiety over escalating trade wars is translating into currency fluctuations and capital flight.Jacobsen: So what does that mean for the U.S. dollar?Tsukerman: It means the dollar is no longer seen as reliably as it once was. When Americans travel abroad, everything becomes more expensive. And beyond tourism, Trump’s aggressive policies are actually helping to legitimize BRICS countries—especially China—in their efforts to push de-dollarization.I do not believe full de-dollarization is imminent, but Trump’s actions do encourage more international trade in non-dollar currencies. That undermines U.S. dollar dominance, which has long been a cornerstone of American economic power. Ironically, Trump favors a weak dollar because of his fixation on trade imbalances. He believes a weak dollar helps exports. But what he does not realize is that a strong dollar benefits everyone—including the United States.Credit rating agencies have not only voiced concern—they have downgraded the U.S. credit rating for the first time in over a century. That is a serious red flag. Historically, the U.S. raised its debt ceiling without consequence, and credit agencies looked the other way. Why? Because the economy was stable, trade was reliable, and downturns were seen as temporary.Now, none of that can be assumed. The economy is shrinking, despite early growth projections under Biden. It could have continued on a stable trajectory—even under Trump—if he had simply left well enough alone. But instead, we are staring down the barrel of a recession. Possibly something worse.So, a combination of rapidly growing debt and the threat of a recession means a potential for default—or at the very least, unreliable economic projections. That is precisely why the U.S. credit rating was downgraded. This, of course, undermines investor confidence, which means the influx of foreign capital into the U.S. is unlikely to continue at previous levels. That only exacerbates the problems I mentioned earlier.When investors are not only refraining from contributing but actively fleeing for greener pastures, it becomes far more difficult to raise the debt ceiling, pay off existing debt, or guarantee the bonds being sold to cover the deficit. That makes everything worse.Essentially, these credit rating agencies are asking a fundamental question: are current U.S. fiscal and trade policies even sustainable?They are warning that persistent trade deficits—self-inflicted, by the way—combined with rising geopolitical tensions could significantly undermine the U.S. dollar’s reserve currency status. That means the dollar could become so unreliable that other countries might no longer feel compelled to peg their currencies to it. That would be a disaster.Cryptocurrency is not a full answer. It might be a partial solution for certain individuals or sectors, but not on a global scale—not yet, and certainly not for everyone at the same time.This all feeds into a much broader concern: the potential for a financial domino effect. Trade disruptions could trigger capital retrenchment from emerging markets, destabilizing currencies, shaking debt markets, and reducing global opportunities for trade expansion and economic growth.If emerging markets contract, they are no longer emerging—they stagnate or fail before they even develop. In that scenario, there are fewer safe havens or growth opportunities for global investors. It becomes a vicious cycle.Behind the scenes, lobbying and political pressure are further complicating the picture. Lobbyists are making a fortune right now. Every day, I hear about a new firm opening a D.C. office. Powerful industry groups and multinational corporations are being pulled in contradictory directions.Some are lobbying for open markets and trade liberalization to maximize growth. Others are advocating, somewhat paradoxically, for protectionism to guard intellectual property and national security interests.It may seem like some industries benefit from this, especially those deemed “critical” to national interests. But in the long term, they will not benefit either. If the broader economy collapses, those sectors may receive bailouts—but not at the same cost as functioning in a healthy, competitive, privatized marketplace.Jacobsen: So politicians are essentially stuck balancing deeply conflicting interests.Tsukerman: Exactly. They’re trying to weigh economic growth, national security, public pressure, and long-term viability all at once. And that raises a critical set of questions.To what extent are these trade restrictions actually effective in curbing China’s technological rise? Arguably, not much. Despite the sanctions and export controls, China continues to make significant progress in developing domestic production of increasingly advanced AI chips and other technologies.So, the strategic effectiveness of these measures remains debatable.They are also effectively deterring the U.S. from being as competitive by dominating the global rare earth minerals market. On top of that, their proficiency in industrial espionage—there’s really no better term—allows them to acquire critical components and technological plans despite trade restrictions. So, in practice, they are circumventing many of these limitations while boosting their presence in alternative markets.They were prepared for this trade war, dating all the way back to Trump’s first term. Since then, China has significantly diversified its economy by investing in Asia-Pacific countries and reducing its dependency on Western markets.Jacobsen: But are the economic costs worth the geopolitical gains?Tsukerman: Gains? What gains? The U.S. is becoming increasingly isolated. Europe is turning inward, especially when it comes to defense systems. This whole approach is stifling innovation and disrupting global supply chains.Just look at the facts: several major companies—including two automotive giants—have moved operations out of the United States. That is clearly not beneficial to the American economy.Jacobsen: So how resilient are U.S. allies to the collateral damage of Washington’s trade realignment?Tsukerman: That really depends on the country. Take Vietnam, for instance. They’re not particularly resilient, so they’ve tried to curry favor with Trump—offering to adopt Starlink and reportedly granting a Trump Tower development opportunity in exchange for tariff relief. Whether that will be enough—or just the first of many demands—remains to be seen.Other countries are walking away from negotiations entirely because the demands from the U.S. side are vague or seem arbitrary. Japan is one such case. They couldn’t figure out what the U.S. negotiation team actually wanted in terms of tariff terms, so they exited the talks. It’s almost comical—if it weren’t so serious.Jacobsen: So is there a looming risk that these overzealous policies could trigger unintended consequences, similar to the 2008 financial crisis—but with more complex international dimensions?Tsukerman: Arguably, yes. We are already moving in that direction. Of course, there are a range of scenario forecasts, and much depends on whether Trump maintains a consistent tariff framework.In the best-case scenario, targeted trade measures would be paired with renewed diplomatic efforts. That could result in a more stable form of managed competition—addressing real security concerns while preserving global market stability. Ideally, multilateral institutions would adapt, becoming more resilient and helping to mitigate economic fragmentation.But the more pessimistic—and frankly, more likely—scenario involves spiraling trade conflicts morphing into full-scale economic decoupling. Even in that worst-case path, it will take time, but the consequences would be enormous: fractured global supply chains, inflationary shocks, and severe damage to the U.S. dollar’s standing as the world’s reserve currency. And these trends are not theoretical—they are already visible.The fallout will not be contained within national borders. It will ripple across emerging markets, especially those heavily reliant on U.S. trade and investment. What we are witnessing is a precarious intersection of economic strategy and geopolitical ambition.While pursuing technological and strategic supremacy is a legitimate goal, it carries immense risks. Those risks require careful and sustained management. Otherwise, we may end up undermining the very global stability we claim to protect.Unfortunately, Trump is acting like a bull in a China shop—completely ignoring the broader consequences. And in doing so, he is achieving the opposite of what his administration claims to want.He is not isolating China by collaborating with a network of allies to impose consistent, coordinated measures that could restrict China’s foothold in key industries. He is doing the exact opposite. He is waging a trade war against the entire world, while China has taken full advantage of Trump’s erratic market behavior. They’ve recalibrated back to their original standards and continue to benefit from more stable markets in the Asia-Pacific region.Jacobsen: So who’s winning here?Tsukerman: Certainly not the United States.Jacobsen: Final question. Fitch Ratings affirmed the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating for Ukraine at “restricted default.” This continues to reflect strain on the nation’s finances, primarily due to the prolonged conflict with the Russian Federation. While there have been efforts to secure international support and build the economy, Ukraine continues to face revenue shortfalls and rising debt servicing costs. Any thoughts?Tsukerman: Yes. There is no sugarcoating it—Ukraine is in a precarious financial position.Part of the issue is that Western donors have overwhelmingly prioritized military aid and a minimal amount of urgent medical assistance, while largely neglecting financial investment. It is understandably difficult to invest in reconstruction or long-term infrastructure when there is still an active war, when the domestic political situation is chaotic, and when large parts of the country remain occupied.Ukraine cannot easily access many of its natural resources or key economic sectors. All of these factors create a fundamentally unstable environment. And let’s be clear—this economic strain is not just the result of the last three years of full-scale invasion. It stems from nearly a decade of partial occupation and hybrid warfare, all of which has taken a major toll on the country’s finances.Even in liberated areas, reconstruction remains an enormous challenge. The “restricted default” classification is technically nuanced, but it carries real consequences: it affects borrowing costs, investor confidence, and overall economic resilience. Ukraine is walking a tightrope between survival and recovery.In practical terms, what the “restricted default” rating means is that Ukraine has either missed a debt payment or has restructured its debt under terms that do not meet standard expectations from creditors—but it has not entered full-scale default. This is similar to what happened with Argentina not too long ago.It reflects a complex negotiation process between Ukraine, bondholders, multilateral lenders, and domestic stakeholders. It is a compromise—Ukraine essentially fought to ensure it would not be viewed as a fully defaulting debtor. But the heavy debt burden—exacerbated by military spending and massive infrastructure destruction—has limited its fiscal flexibility and complicated access to international capital markets.Ironically, none of this is Ukraine’s fault. Yet, it is being punished through credit downgrades and restricted access to funding, making it even harder to pay off its debt.Jacobsen: So where can Ukraine turn for the funds it needs?Tsukerman: If it cannot access international capital markets, options are extremely limited. Its key creditors include Western governments, international institutions such as the IMF, and private investors holding Eurobonds. Ukraine’s debt restructuring has focused on extending maturities and lowering interest burdens, but responses have been mixed.You cannot entirely blame the creditors—they fear throwing money into a bottomless pit. Some bondholders are frustrated by delayed payments and worry that Ukraine’s economic model depends too heavily on continued donor support instead of sustainable internal reforms.And hovering over all of this is persistent geopolitical risk from Russia’s ongoing aggression. That risk affects every projection and every financial decision related to Ukraine’s recovery. It is what it is. This is a legitimate risk. The war is not only draining public resources, but also deterring investment, disrupting trade routes, and increasing inflationary pressures.Cities like Mariupol and Kharkiv—the city I’m from, by the way—have suffered massive infrastructure devastation. I was there. It was a great city. But now it’s wrecked. They’ve started reconstructing parts of it, only for them to be hit again. The repeated attacks make any rebuilding effort extremely costly—and incredibly fragile. Every time you build something up, it gets blown up again. The costs are cumulative and crushing.Domestically, the government’s reform agenda—including anti-corruption initiatives, judicial independence, and greater transparency—is facing delays and political resistance. Nobody who’s already entrenched in corruption wants to see that system dismantled, right? This resistance undermines credibility with international partners.These internal governance challenges compound the external financial risks, making Ukraine’s credit rating even more volatile. There are real concerns about the government’s ability to maintain fiscal discipline during wartime. How realistic are their economic growth projections?President Zelensky has made the most optimistic case possible—and understandably so. He needs continued funding. But strictly speaking, given the scale of the challenges, is the best-case scenario even remotely realistic? Can reforms be accelerated to meet lenders’ expectations? And what is the likelihood of donor fatigue, especially as Western countries face their own economic pressures?In Europe, those pressures are quite significant. In the U.S., they are largely self-inflicted—but now also mounting. The U.S. has shifted away from a comprehensive aid model, allowing Ukraine to purchase weapons but not contributing significantly on a governmental level beyond that.Jacobsen: And how much do political changes in the U.S. and EU affect future aid?Tsukerman: Quite a lot. In the U.S., we already know that congressional dynamics are shifting. Congress is expected to turn blue next year, but depending on the size of the majority, they may still be unable to override a Trump veto on future aid packages—even if authorized by Congress.In Europe, we’re seeing some positive trends: pro-Russian politicians are losing ground in many countries—except the UK. But it’s too early to celebrate. Hungary, for example, won’t face elections until next year, and in the meantime, it remains a spoiler on several key issues, including aid to Ukraine.There are possible paths forward. In the most optimistic scenario, Ukraine successfully implements key reforms, receives sustained Western financial and military support, and gradually stabilizes both economically and territorially. This would allow Ukraine to improve debt servicing and recover its credit ratings over time. Such a scenario would also require a diplomatic breakthrough—an end to hostilities—and secured reconstruction funding.As I said, that is the optimistic scenario. It is unlikely to happen in full, but perhaps elements of it can be realized.Conversely, the more grim scenario involves prolonged conflict, escalating destruction, and shrinking donor appetite. This would push Ukraine toward full default or financial collapse. Unfortunately, that seems far more likely at the moment.Yes, European countries are increasing their military and general aid. But it is still nowhere near enough to address Ukraine’s full financial needs. If the situation deteriorates further, we risk triggering contagion effects across other emerging markets and deepening instability across the region.In other words, the consequences of this crisis could spill over into nearby European countries—not just affect Ukraine directly. The most plausible middle-ground scenario between the best and worst outcomes might involve cyclical bursts of aid and incremental reform—just enough to keep Ukraine afloat, but still in a fragile state. This would be highly sensitive to shocks from military setbacks or political instability and would require constant recalibration of fiscal and diplomatic strategies.This scenario is likely—but only if everyone involved gets their act together. And by “everyone,” I mean the Western world—excluding the United States, which, at this point, cannot be reliably counted on.That will require a lot of hard work. I’m not entirely sure where Europe stands on this. The “coalition of the willing” has not yet fully solidified. There’s been plenty of talk about internal security, defense reform, and regional coordination. But when it comes to Ukraine specifically, I have not yet seen the level of financial commitment required to make this middle scenario sustainable. The resources are there—it is not a matter of capacity. It is a matter of political will.So, while this is technically an economic issue, it is also a reflection of the larger challenges of war governance and international diplomacy. Managing this deeply complex nexus of financial, political, and military demands requires sophisticated, multi-front balancing. Without it, the region plunges deeper into crisis. So far, Ukraine has managed. But the challenges are real.

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