The Everywhere Insiders 1: Syria, Vatican Diplomacy, and Global Power

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2025/05/31

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman discuss the U.S. decision to ease some Syria sanctions via the Caesar Act waiver, influenced by regional diplomacy and economic interests. European allies express frustration over being sidelined. Trump’s inconsistent foreign policy, including business ties with the UAE, is contrasted with Europe’s unified push for accountability. Broader analysis includes Thailand and Vietnam’s strategic balancing, the Vatican’s more assertive stance under Pope Leo XIV on Ukraine, and criticism of Human Rights Watch’s selective scrutiny. They conclude with updates on Congo and Sudan, where international coordination is lacking, and a ceasefire proposal in Ukraine dismissed by Russia, with Trump offering little pushback. This interview took place on May 16, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Today’s sources are Reuters, AP News, the United Nations, and Human Rights Watch, in no particular order. The United States has announced a plan to ease some sanctions on Syria. This decision involves using a waiver provision under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. The policy move is said to be influenced in part by regional diplomatic overtures, particularly from Saudi Arabia, and is aimed at facilitating post-war reconstruction and limited economic recovery in Syria. The U.S. Treasury Department is expected to issue general licenses for specific sectors essential to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Any comments?

Irina Tsukerman: While Saudi Arabia has reportedly encouraged regional reintegration of Syria, especially in the context of the Arab League, this particular U.S. policy does not appear to be directly driven by the Crown Prince himself. Instead, it reflects broader foreign policy calculations across multiple regional state actors. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy establishment has increasingly emphasized pragmatic diplomacy and regional de-escalation, with less focus on ideological or sectarian alignment.

Though the Crown Prince has hosted recent regional summits involving Syria, he does not appear to be an enthusiastic proponent of Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s regime. Photographic and diplomatic evidence suggests a cautious and calculated approach in such interactions.

The move to issue sanctions waivers will likely be controversial. The Caesar Act is a U.S. law passed with bipartisan congressional support and is designed to penalize the government and not just any particular figure, so the Ahmed Al-Sharaa regime for war crimes and human rights violations. Any easing of sanctions will require close coordination with multiple U.S. agencies, including the Department of Justice and the Department of State. While the Treasury Department may act more quickly, the State Department could face political headwinds—particularly from legislators like Senator Marco Rubio, who have strongly opposed any rapprochement with the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government.

Initial diplomatic talks are reportedly being considered between U.S. State Department officials and representatives connected to the Syrian government, possibly in a neutral location such as Turkey. These talks likely include specific U.S. conditions, including political reforms, humanitarian guarantees, and commitments to international law. Verifying any agreement would be a significant hurdle, and the integrity of such a process remains uncertain.

There have been some private business deals involving high-profile figures or promises related to rare earth mineral access—Al-Sharaa direcrly proposed the deals.

European allies have expressed frustration over the decision. They are concerned both about being sidelined and about the potential normalization of a government responsible for mass atrocities. Several EU member states have called for a coordinated international approach that includes robust security assessments, human rights protections, and accountability mechanisms.

There have been reports that, under international pressure, the Syrian government has agreed to specific monitoring proposals to protect vulnerable communities. However, these commitments remain vague, and enforcement mechanisms are limited. Furthermore, ongoing violence and the lack of territorial control in parts of the country continue to undermine security.

A credible and transparent multilateral oversight framework would be necessary for any sanctions relief to be responsibly implemented. However, it remains unclear whether the current U.S. administration prioritizes multilateral engagement. While Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have expressed interest in facilitating economic investment and humanitarian aid, enforcement and accountability remain unresolved.

Meanwhile, Turkey remains a key regional player with a complex role—hosting millions of Syrian refugees, backing opposition elements in northern Syria, and maintaining strained relations with both Ahmed Al-Sharaa and Israel. Its actions could significantly influence the outcome of any regional diplomatic framework.

The evolving U.S. approach to Syria sanctions is fraught with geopolitical complexity, legal constraints, and significant uncertainty regarding outcomes and intent. While many Syrians and observers across the region greeted Trump’s announcement with optimism, it is likely to be far more challenging to implement than he realizes. He is making the announcement primarily for publicity and to win favour with business partners in Middle Eastern countries. But making a public statement is one thing; figuring out how the plan will work is another.

The Caesar sanctions are complex. In addition to them, other U.S. and international sanctions are in place. There is no clear announcement about whether these sanctions will be lifted all at once, whether they will be phased out incrementally, or whether each sanction will be tied to specific benchmarks related to Syria’s conduct.

Many people forget that the Caesar sanctions were designed to target specific types of behaviour, particularly war crimes and crimes against humanity, and not just individuals like Ahmed Al-Sharaa himself. While Al-Sharaa and his regime were the primary focus, the law is structured to pressure for systemic change.

Syria may be meeting some U.S. demands, but certainly not all of them. Reportedly, Trump has requested additional measures, including the expulsion of Palestinian militants and all other foreign fighters. That is a highly complicated demand because many of those fighters are personally connected to Ahmed Al-Sharaa and function as security guarantors for the regime. Some of those fighters did come under Assad, but other foreign fighters (not the Palestinian ones) were invited by Al-Sharaa, and that’s why it’s a problem for him to get rid of them. These are people he invited in, and in some cases, they have even been granted Syrian citizenship.

Once citizenship is granted, it is difficult to revoke it arbitrarily under international law. While Syria may prevent the entry of additional foreign fighters and attempt to increase border controls, with potential coordination from Iraq, removing those already present is another matter entirely. In practice, the expulsion of embedded foreign fighters is unlikely in the near term.

Trump may overlook some of these unresolved issues in exchange for the economic incentives the Gulf States and Syria proposed. That raises serious concerns, particularly given that the policy was announced before Syria demonstrated substantive compliance with international standards or U.S. demands.

This approach is reminiscent of awarding a “preemptive Nobel Prize,” which grants rewards for promises of future behaviour rather than measurable progress. Traditionally, significant and verifiable reforms precede any discussion of lifting sanctions.

Now that Trump has said he will proceed, bureaucratic infighting is expected to unfold among various departments and officials. However, Trump still has significant political influence. If he decides to override opposition—from figures like Senator Rubio or other institutional actors—he may do so through informal channels, incentives, or pressure tactics, potentially bypassing established legal procedures.

Jacobsen: Moving to the next topic, on the European front, the European Union is also considering easing sanctions on Syria. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently proposed relaxing certain sanctions, including those targeting the Commercial Bank of Syria, and allowing funding to flow to ministries tied to reconstruction and counterterrorism efforts.

Tsukerman: This is noteworthy because the European Union has long positioned itself as a guardian of human rights and democratic norms in Syria. It was among the strongest proponents of sanctions during the earlier phases of the conflict. While some Eastern European countries have taken a more pragmatic stance in recent years, others remained cautious—until recently.

It signalled a turning point when France welcomed Syrian representatives like Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad (not “Charam,” which appears to be a mistaken name). That initiative—seen as a form of quiet diplomacy—seems to have helped break the unified EU stance. France positioned itself as a mediator among the Gulf States, the EU, and the broader international community.

And the UK, despite its exit from the EU, was also unwilling to forgo the opportunity to reassert itself diplomatically in the region. In effect, many European leaders realized that if the United States was going to take aggressive steps toward re-engaging with Syria, they risked being sidelined unless they acted.

There are no reconstruction contracts, no ability to influence the situation, no counterterrorism input, and, most importantly, no opportunity to help resolve the refugee issue involving millions of displaced Syrians who may consider returning home if the situation stabilizes. That is the European Union’s strategic dilemma. As the United States moves forward, the EU follows suit, trying to secure its seat at the table.

Their motivations are clear: first, gaining investment opportunities and a chance to profit from reconstruction; second, playing a meaningful role in counterterrorism. European policymakers are concerned that if Syria is denied funding, even if Al-Sharaa cooperates within a counterterrorism framework, he may lack the resources to enforce it. In their view, the funding allows him to stabilize the region and manage jihadist networks.

The concern is that such support might result in Al-Sharaa “buying off” these networks, bribing them into temporary compliance. That is a deeply flawed and morally questionable approach, but one that some European actors may be willing to tolerate after years of ISIS-linked terrorist attacks across the continent.

This is where geopolitics meets brutal realism. It is not about endorsing Al-Sharaa but managing risks in a fragmented and dangerous landscape. From their standpoint, allowing Al-Sharaa access to reconstruction funds may be the lesser of several evils if it prevents a resurgence of violent extremism.

Jacobsen: Shifting to the U.S.–UAE economic agreements now—during President Trump’s latest Middle East tour, Gulf tour, which ironically diverged from his usual domestic golf outings on the public dime, he struck some significant business arrangements.

In particular, the United Arab Emirates agreed to purchase advanced AI semiconductors from American companies. Even more noteworthy, the UAE pledged to increase its investment in U.S. energy projects from $70 billion to $440 billion over the next decade. Do you have any thoughts?

Tsukerman: First, it is essential to note that the UAE is among the most pragmatic countries in the Gulf region—arguably the most. However, large numbers like $440 billion are aspirational. Signing such commitments during a favourable political climate is easy, but whether they materialize depends on future leadership.

If Trump leaves office in four years and the U.S. administration’s policies shift dramatically, the agreements may not be fully implemented. Technically, these deals are struck between nations and are meant to be upheld regardless of leadership changes. But in practice, continuity is not guaranteed. We have seen many trade and strategic agreements falter under new administrations—not just in the U.S. but globally.

Will the U.S. benefit from these agreements during Trump’s tenure? The answer is: only to the extent that the UAE perceives a direct, immediate benefit. For instance, the semiconductor deals will likely proceed. AI and advanced technology are top priorities for the UAE, and they are willing to spend heavily to secure their position as a regional tech leader.

For the U.S., this cooperation is a broader strategy for reducing the UAE’s technological reliance on China. Until recently, the UAE had maintained strong tech partnerships with Chinese firms, raising U.S. national security concerns. From the Biden administration to the Trump team, a surprisingly consistent push has been to curtail Chinese influence in sensitive technological sectors. Whether that pressure will continue to bear fruit remains to be seen.

The Trump and Biden administrations have stayed relatively on top of the AI chip issue. Not necessarily on top of everything else, but when it comes to advanced semiconductors, there has been a remarkable degree of consistency. Given their increasing importance to U.S. national security infrastructure, this emphasis is expected to continue regardless of who is in office.

Military and defence-related agreements are also likely to remain a high priority. However, there are already signs of congressional resistance—Senator Chris Murphy, for example, has signalled potential efforts to block certain deals. His concern is not solely about arms sales per se but rather the additional components tied to them, including investments by Emirati officials into Trump-linked cryptocurrency ventures. These ventures are widely seen as opaque, unregulated, and primarily designed to enrich Trump family members.

That kind of financial entanglement could slow the implementation of ongoing weapons sales. Other commercial investments are tied to UAE–U.S. cooperation, but much of their success will depend on follow-through. Many may remain on paper if the U.S. is not assertive in cultivating and enforcing the agreements. Some of the pledged funds may arrive eventually, but likely not quickly.

One troubling aspect of these deals is that they overwhelmingly favour a small group of top-tier U.S. companies. This concentration of benefits in the hands of a few well-connected players—many with close ties to Trump or his political allies—means the broader U.S. economy may see minimal impact. Small and medium-sized businesses, as well as innovative startups, are largely excluded from the windfall.

So, while these deals are not necessarily harmful, they are also not particularly helpful for the American public. They do not reflect the corruption seen in places like Qatar, but their structure and execution are likely to reinforce existing economic inequalities. The agreements could be seen as routine geopolitical arrangements—normal, understandable, and arguably beneficial in a narrow sense—but unlikely to deliver widespread domestic benefit.

In short, these are not transformative national agreements; they will make a few already powerful companies even wealthier, particularly those aligned with the Trump family’s business interests.

Jacobsen: Shifting focus slightly, let us talk about Vietnam and Thailand—regions we do not hear much about in the American press, particularly in places like the Pacific Northwest or the far Northeast. Yet they are quietly playing increasingly strategic roles.

Vietnam and Thailand have been enhancing their bilateral strategic partnership. Thailand has aligned more closely with Vietnam’s key international partners, namely the U.S., China, and Russia. This curious mix suggests an intentional strategy of playing all sides in a highly competitive geopolitical environment.

That partnership has grown in key sectors like defence, security cooperation, and politics, along with increased bilateral trade, which has now reached $25 billion. It is a delicate balancing act. Smaller economies like Thailand and Vietnam try to maximize leverage and independence by maintaining relationships with all major powers. Do you have any thoughts?

Tsukerman: The U.S., however, has not been particularly aggressive in engaging with these neutral or semi-aligned nations under any of the last three administrations—Trump, Biden, or Trump again. That leaves space for countries like China and Russia to build influence, especially when the U.S. does not offer a compelling alternative.

Even under President Obama, there was supposed to be a “pivot to Asia,” but that strategy never fully materialized. The Biden administration was more aggressive in engaging with the region, but it prioritized issues, such as climate change and energy transition, that were not always top concerns for countries like Thailand.

Thailand, in particular, focuses on pragmatic economic development and defence. China and Russia, by contrast, have never tried to impose those priorities. They have followed a simpler playbook: selling what they want, when they want.

Russia is primarily a weapons and energy exporter. China, meanwhile, has invested heavily throughout Southeast Asia. While a significant portion of Chinese investment has gone to Malaysia, a substantial amount has also flowed into Thai startups and infrastructure. In comparison, the U.S. has been relatively slow and uncompetitive. Its trade volume and foreign direct investment in Thailand are modest by regional standards.

Thailand sees the U.S. market as desirable, but with the current tariff environment and lack of comprehensive trade agreements, it is uncertain whether Thai products will be welcomed in the U.S. as they might have been in more favourable trade conditions.

The broader issue is that Thailand is pursuing defence and trade agreements with nearly every major player—China, Russia, and the U.S.. That strategy is advantageous for Thailand but undermines any coherent U.S. effort to build an anti-China bloc in the Indo-Pacific.

The Trump administration undermined its long-term strategy by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without offering a viable replacement. That left a vacuum in regional economic leadership. If the U.S. is serious about countering China comprehensively—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—this is an opportunity to reevaluate whether isolationism serves national interests.

You cannot pursue a policy of economic nationalism while expecting other countries to align with your strategic vision. The inconsistency is exactly why Thailand can play all sides. The U.S. has not built the infrastructure necessary to contain or compete with Chinese investment drives across the region.

Jacobsen: This subsequent development is quite important. In religious news this week, Pope Leo XIV met with His Beatitude Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, at the Vatican. During the meeting, Shevchuk formally invited the Pope to visit Kyiv and presented him with a list of Ukrainian prisoners currently held by Russia. The Vatican continues to engage diplomatically, aiming to position itself as a neutral mediator in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Any general thoughts on the new Pope, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war?

Tsukerman: Pope Leo XIV has been notably active in the papacy’s spiritual and diplomatic dimensions. He has referenced the principles established under the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), including a renewed emphasis on peace-building, dialogue, and interfaith diplomacy. His approach blends theological continuity with geopolitical urgency, especially in addressing the suffering caused by war in Ukraine. He seems determined to use the moral authority of the Holy See to promote negotiations, though whether any party will accept Vatican mediation remains to be seen.

The new Pope, Leo XIV, has already spoken about theological pilgrimages to Turkey and has been highly engaged from the outset from a political and moral standpoint. His very first international phone call was to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Now, by meeting with His Beatitude Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, he is sending a clear message about the Vatican’s priorities, especially regarding the protection of communities suffering under Russian aggression, including Christians.

The Catholic Church in Russia, as well as in territories currently occupied or invaded by Russian forces, has faced discrimination and persecution for decades. Catholics have never been particularly welcome in Russia, despite the presence of a significant Catholic minority. Other Christian denominations are also facing extreme pressure, both within Russia and in Ukraine, as a direct result of Russian actions.

This new dynamic marks a departure from Pope Francis’s approach. While Pope Francis often spoke of peace, his stance sometimes suggested that Ukraine should compromise or give in to Russian demands. He rarely, if ever, offered strong support for Christians affected by the Russian invasion. In contrast, Pope Leo XIV appears to be positioning the Church as an advocate for justice and accountability. There is growing anticipation that Ukraine will be one of the first countries the new pope visits. That would send a strong signal—not only to Russia and its allies, but also to the Trump administration, which has yet to prioritize a visit to Ukraine.

This shift also has potential implications for Vatican policy in other regions. Under Pope Francis, the Vatican pursued a controversial agreement with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which many saw as a betrayal of Chinese Catholics who were forced into compliance with the state-controlled Church. It remains unclear whether Pope Leo XIV will continue this policy. His early actions suggest he may take a firmer stance on religious freedom.

He also appears committed to expanding interfaith dialogue, establishing deeper relationships with Jewish communities, and reinvigorating theological engagement. How this will evolve remains to be seen, but it is a promising start.

Jacobsen: Moving on—Human Rights Watch has released a report criticizing the British government for continuing to approve arms exports to Israel, despite ongoing concerns about potential violations of international law and the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The matter was brought before the UK High Court. Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: From a strictly pragmatic standpoint, this criticism is somewhat overblown. The volume of British arms exports to Israel is relatively small. The overwhelming majority of Israel’s weapons and defence systems come from the United States, not the United Kingdom. The British contribution is minimal, both financially and logistically.

So while Human Rights Watch may raise concerns about consistency in foreign policy or international legal standards, the actual scale of the UK’s involvement is marginal. The report does not reflect a substantive shift in the broader dynamics of arms flows to Israel. It may serve more as a symbolic critique than a report on a major humanitarian issue.

It is an entirely political position in that regard. Furthermore, I noticed that Human Rights Watch had nothing to say about Trump’s arms deals with Qatar, a country that is a well-documented human rights violator, both within its borders and in its funding or support of various extremist organizations globally. This kind of selective scrutiny reveals a lack of consistency, making it difficult to take some Human Rights Watch’s reports at face value.

That is not to say there are no legitimate criticisms of Israeli policy. For instance, allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza but then failing to implement measures to ensure Hamas does not divert or confiscate it is a flawed policy. It helps no one—not civilians in Gaza, not Israel, and not the broader international community.

That type of critique is valid and shared by many people who nonetheless support Israel’s right to defend itself. However, what Human Rights Watch appears to be arguing here is that Israel should not confront or engage terrorist organizations because it has made implementation errors in certain areas. That is not a tenable or coherent position.

Jacobsen: Now shifting focus—Africa does not receive much sustained coverage in North American media, at least not within the primary information flow. Yet, there are significant developments that deserve attention.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in collaboration with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Congolese security forces, successfully escorted 1,359 disarmed soldiers, police officers, and their families from Goma—a city with rebel presence—to the capital, Kinshasa. The operation aims to reunite displaced personnel with their families and de-escalate regional tensions.

Any such step is welcome, and it represents incremental progress. But is it a groundbreaking achievement? 

Tsukerman: No. It is a tactical step that may help generate a more positive atmosphere but does not resolve the deeper, entrenched causes of conflict.

The underlying issues—ethnic tensions, resource disputes, political instability, and corruption—require long-term commitment and coordination. Right now, there does not appear to be sufficient political will, either domestically in the Congo or internationally, to pursue those long-term objectives seriously.

The U.S. has played a role in diffusing some high-level tensions between Rwanda and the DRC, but that does not address the core conflict dynamics. Addressing rebel movements requires a separate and sustained track involving diplomacy, intelligence-sharing, humanitarian investment, and economic development. That includes engagement not only with national governments but also with the communities most affected.

Given the corruption and governance issues in the DRC, especially in border regions, this will not be solved quickly. What is needed is a comprehensive, internationally coordinated framework of response. One that looks beyond reactive efforts and gets to the root causes: why armed groups continue to form, why people support them, and what systemic incentives allow violence to persist.

The focus should be on dismantling those root causes, not just reacting to the actors themselves. Without that, violence and instability will remain cyclical. Sudan is in an even more dire situation, yet it has received only a fraction of the global attention. The pattern of underreporting African crises while overemphasizing more politically charged conflicts elsewhere is all too familiar.

Jacobsen: We do not want this to get lost in the noise. The most significant development this week is the ceasefire proposal being ignored. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andriy Sybiha, stated that Russia has completely disregarded a 30-day ceasefire, backed by European powers, proposed by Ukraine. The truce was intended to begin on May 12. 

I am unsure what will come of this, but I hope the urgency catches on—there is a clear need for expedited action. Following this, European leaders, including those from France, Germany, Britain, and Poland, have urged the European Commission to draft a new package of massive sanctions, primarily targeting Russia’s energy and financial sectors. As with previous sanctions, the goal is to pressure Putin into agreeing to a ceasefire.

Any thoughts?

Tsukerman: Yes, it is unlikely to happen despite some rhetoric from various corners of the U.S. government about penalizing Russia if it fails to honour the ceasefire process. Trump has given Putin a pass for abandoning his proposals. Let us not forget: Putin initially suggested a top-level meeting in Istanbul. President Zelensky responded directly, saying he would meet him there. But instead, Putin downgraded the meeting to a lower-level delegation and then reportedly went to a restaurant. This was a provocation. This behaviour—last-minute reversals and low-level substitutes—is not just diplomatically unserious; it is performative. It is as if Putin is playing to an audience of one: Trump. He seems to care very little about the broader international community.

Trump’s response—that he would need to meet with Putin directly for Putin to agree to meet with Zelensky—is deeply concerning. It signals that the U.S. president is not serious about consequences for Russian violations. Any meaningful sanctions would have to come from Congress, and even then, it is unclear whether Trump would sign off on them.

After all the tough talk and grandstanding, it is becoming evident that the U.S. may not follow through. However, it is encouraging that Europe now seems united in its commitment to imposing long-overdue accountability measures. These sanctions should have been in place from the beginning. There was never a reason to give the Russian economy breathing room while it financed a brutal and unlawful war.

Jacobsen: All right, take care.

Tsukerman: You too. Have a good week.

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