Kateryna Kyrychenko, Legal Rights Concerns for Ukraine for 2024

Author(s): Scott Douglas Jacobsen

Publication (Outlet/Website): The Good Men Project

Publication Date (yyyy/mm/dd): 2024/11/15

Kateryna Kyrychenko is a legal professional specializing in international law and human rights. She holds a Master of Laws in Human Rights and is pursuing a PhD degree in international law, currently serving as a Program Manager and Legal Officer at the Public International Law & Policy Group. Kateryna has actively supported efforts to document war crimes during the Russo-Ukrainian war. In 2024, human rights abuses during the Russo-Ukrainian war included widespread war crimes, such as mass deportations, sexual violence, and targeting civilian infrastructure. Russian cyberattacks and environmental destruction have been significant, while crimes against cultural heritage and illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia have raised allegations of genocide​.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: I want to focus primarily on 2024 and areas of human rights documentation and abuses. What have been the most significant areas of concern and reportage regarding human rights during the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Kateryna Kyrychenko: Thank you for the question. It is quite a complex issue because, as the Prosecutor General of Ukraine mentioned in one of his interviews with The Washington Post, “I would say that, practically, there is no any war crime in history that was not and is not committed by Russians on Ukrainian soil.“

That said, the number, scope, and scale of the crimes committed and documented are unprecedented, varying across different territories. In Ukraine, some areas have been occupied for nearly a decade. In contrast, others are not occupied but are subject to frequent missile and drone strikes. Depending on the situation in each area, we observe different human rights violations and war crimes, including crimes against humanity and alleged genocide. In addition to the more traditional war crimes, unfortunately, present in most conflicts, Ukraine is facing more sophisticated types of crimes, such as those related to cyberattacks.

This is a significant area that Ukrainian prosecutors focus on as they continue to build their capacities for prosecution. Ukrainian infrastructure and capabilities are under constant cyberattacks from Russia and its agents. Additionally, I want to highlight the area of crimes against cultural heritage, which is alarmingly frequent, particularly in the occupied areas. Ukrainian cultural heritage objects are being looted and illegally taken out of the country. A black market for these looted items has emerged, particularly in foreign countries, mostly Europe. Beyond these activities, cultural and historically significant objects are also being destroyed by missile strikes within mainland Ukraine. Again, the scale of this destruction is truly unprecedented.

For example, take the case of the Kherson Regional Art Museum. It was completely looted, with 90% of its stored objects taken out of Ukraine, and its whereabouts remain unknown. I emphasize this point because, in my opinion, these acts have the aspect of alleged cultural genocide. Beyond the physical removal or destruction of cultural objects, these actions deeply impact the population, culture, and future generations. Would you like me to expand on other crimes and human rights violations we have observed?

Jacobsen: Yes, please.

Kyrychenko: I work with the Public International Law & Policy Group, a global law firm, and we have been engaged in documentation efforts since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. We have helped Ukrainian NGOs build the capacities to interview victims of Russian war crimes on the ground. In particular, we have assisted the Ukrainian NGO OPORA, which relocated to Poland following the invasion, in establishing its war crimes documentation center. OPORA has since become the largest organization that has interviewed Ukrainians who have fled to Poland and collected their testimonies.

From the testimonies we have collected and from our documentation project with the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG), we have observed that people have been subjected to numerous violent crimes, including murder and rape. Additionally, there are many crimes with a material aspect, as occupying Russian forces have been looting and stealing virtually any objects of value, from small household items to larger possessions.

And I’m even talking about bottles of perfume or small pieces of kitchen equipment, for example, not to mention larger items. Besides that, what is especially concerning about the patterns of Russian crimes is the widespread use of sexual violence. I’m sorry; I’m trying to formulate this properly. People who have been subjected to these horrific crimes are not limited by gender or age.

It has been particularly shocking how rape is being used by Russian forces as a method of warfare. For instance, based on the reports from the UN Commission of Inquiry for Ukraine, their most recent findings have established a widespread pattern of using sexual violence against prisoners of war—Ukrainian soldiers—as a method of breaking morale. Beyond the obvious physical harm, the mental and psychological impact of these actions cannot be emphasized enough, whether on female victims, male victims, or their families. Moreover, there is the illegal detention not only of prisoners of war but also of civilians. The Office of the Prosecutor General regularly posts impressive numbers on its website, indicating the number of missing civilians.

Some of these civilians have been transferred to the Russian Federation, and some may have been killed. There is no clear information on many of these individuals. Another serious aspect is the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. The fate of these children is deeply concerning, as investigations by Ukrainian and international organizations have demonstrated. These deported children are being subjected to sophisticated reeducation programs designed to change their identity and essentially turn them into Russians.

There have already been cases where deported Ukrainian teenage boys have been conscripted into the Russian army to fight in Ukraine. This pattern is not just about physical acts. Still, it is linked to the alleged genocide aimed at erasing Ukrainian culture and identity for future generations.

Jacobsen: When it comes to sexual violence and rape as weapons of war, the Beijing Declaration and other key women’s rights documents have clearly stated that this is a consequence of any war. Are there any nuances in how sexual violence is being used as a weapon of war in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, or does it align with previous patterns without introducing new forms or methods of sexual violence?

Kyrychenko: That’s a good question. For the most part, it fits within the traditional understanding of sexual violence in conflict. However, what is particularly striking is the scale and the organized infrastructure behind these actions. In the recent report by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine that I mentioned earlier, they found evidence of an elaborate, well-coordinated system of detention centers, or so-called “torture camps,” in the Russian Federation. Illegally deported Ukrainians, both civilians and prisoners of war, are sent to these facilities, where they are subjected to horrendous treatment and crimes.

The same commission has also highlighted a clear hierarchy within this system, suggesting that these actions are coordinated from the top down. This indicates that such acts are not sporadic but are part of the Russian Federation’s broader policy and strategy in its approach to war.

Jacobsen: When reflecting on what you might expect for the rest of the year, considering that this interview might come out in early or mid-November, what are the areas of concern regarding human rights law for Ukrainians and potentially for Russians, too? For instance, there are dysfunctional nuclear facilities in the middle of a war, with multiple warnings from the IAEA about the importance of being extremely cautious with these facilities despite the ongoing conflict. Naturally, as you mentioned, it has been over two and a half years since the full-scale invasion began. We expect, based on prior documentation of wars, to see the continued use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, illegitimate deaths, forced conscription, destruction of administrative buildings, residential buildings, churches, cathedrals, UNESCO heritage sites, hospitals, and military facilities, as well as the indiscriminate killing of civilians, and the capture of prisoners of war for future exchanges.

All of this, including torture, is a grave concern. What concerns you most as we move toward the end of 2024?

Kyrychenko: Of course, it’s extremely difficult to identify one or a few things as more or less concerning, as all the things you mentioned are horrific and have a huge impact. There is a certain level of skepticism about ensuring accountability for these actions. But what I wanted to highlight specifically is the issue of nuclear blackmail and the intentional targeting of critical infrastructure. Energy infrastructure targeting is particularly concerning before the upcoming winter season. This has been a consistent Russian tactic aimed at breaking the morale of the Ukrainian people. It’s incredibly difficult to live in cities when the temperature drops below zero and there’s no water or electricity. It makes it hard for people to maintain their morale, keep fighting, working, and surviving such harsh conditions.

This has been the case for the past two winters, and concerns are rising about the upcoming winter. The Ukrainian government and energy companies are aware of this and are preparing accordingly. However, messages from the president and the government indicate that intelligence reports suggest more mass missile strikes on energy facilities are expected this winter. I’ve been here throughout all the winters, and it’s a drastically different situation depending on the season when you’re living in these conditions.

Jacobsen: I returned from Ukraine less than a month ago after an almost month-long trip. This was my second trip. My first trip was in November and December 2023. In my observation, the missile and drone strikes and warnings were fewer in November-December 2023 than during my last trip in 2024. Since the Kursk incursion, there has been an increase in the number of strikes. During two or three days of my time there, the air raid alarms were almost non-stop for 24-hour cycles. It felt noticeably different regarding the alerts on my phone and hearing the air raid sirens in the sky.

Naturally, there were air raid alarms every day in Ukraine. That’s just the reality. However, those two or three days were particularly intense, with the constant air raid alarms going off. Do you think the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the number of missile strikes has increased in the latter part of this year compared to 2023?

Kyrychenko: It’s difficult to say because it’s not the same every month. It depends on the developments at the frontline, especially with the beginning of the counteroffensive in Kursk, which has drawn some of Russia’s military capacities away. However, this year, the strikes have been heavily concentrated on energy facilities. While civilian objects are still being hit—much more frequently than military targets—it appears that Russia is focusing on energy infrastructure. This is essentially the easiest way to cripple the country’s economy and disrupt normal life. But there are, of course, periods where we are fortunate enough to experience fewer strikes.

For example, it was just this Monday when our armed forces reported the first night in 48 days without any drone strikes, which is surprising. So, yes, I wouldn’t be too optimistic. They may be regrouping, preparing for a wider, more intense strike. It’s not a time to be too hopeful, especially when considering the growing alliance with North Korea.

Jacobsen: Are there any legal precedents, either within Ukraine or the international community–where most agree that Russian Federation aggression was wrong, as per UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1–which condemned the invasion and the abuse within the international legal mechanisms? For example, could Russia’s partnership with North Korea be leveraged for further condemnation, especially as Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine? 

Kyrychenko: I haven’t seen any specific precedents at this time. Statements from several European bodies, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have been made. However, since this situation develops, we must remain mindful and observe how it unfolds.

One additional point to mention is that besides North Korea and Iran—which has been supplying weapons to Russia—another significant player supporting Russia’s aggression is Belarus. Sometimes, Belarus gets overlooked in the broader picture. Still, given the grave human rights violations occurring there, as well as its regime’s support for Russia, it should be noted.

Jacobsen: Any final thoughts or conclusions based on today’s conversation that should be highlighted?

Kyrychenko: As the situation evolves, many potential changes could come to international law regarding Ukraine and Russia. For example, establishing a specialized tribunal for aggression, which might soon be created within the Council of Europe, could offer a model for holding Russian leadership accountable for their aggression. Additionally, the ICC arrest warrants issued against four Russian officials, including President Putin and other high-ranking generals, were processed relatively quickly compared to how these proceedings usually go. This war could bring about significant changes in international law and the global order, strengthening it and preventing regimes like Russia from launching unprovoked attacks without facing accountability.

One of the unique challenges in documenting war crimes in Ukraine, compared to other conflict zones, is the massive displacement of civilians. Millions of Ukrainians have fled the country since the full-scale invasion began, dispersing across the globe rather than being concentrated in specific refugee camps, as seen in other situations like with the Rohingya. This dispersal makes it significantly harder for investigators and documenters to access witnesses and victims. Within Ukraine, the situation is similarly complex. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are scattered across rented accommodations, the homes of friends and relatives, or temporary shelters, making them harder to locate and interview systematically. This scattered nature of the population not only complicates documentation efforts but also poses logistical challenges for gathering consistent and reliable testimony.

Another critical but less-discussed category of crimes being committed on Ukrainian soil are environmental war crimes, including ecocide. The scale of environmental destruction in Ukraine has been massive, and there is an increasing effort to frame this destruction within the legal concept of ecocide. Ukraine is actively working to build a strong legal case for ecocide, a relatively new and evolving concept in international law. If successful, this could set a groundbreaking precedent in holding perpetrators accountable for crimes against the environment on the international stage. Achieving recognition of ecocide in Ukraine could have far-reaching implications, not only for international justice but also for addressing the global issue of environmental destruction as a war crime.

Jacobsen: Excellent. Kateryna, thank you very much for your time today. I’ll start working on this transcript for you.

Kyrychenko: Thank you so much for your time and work on this. Take care.

Jacobsen: Goodbye.

Further Internal Resources (Chronological, yyyy/mm/dd):

Humanist

Humanists International, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United Nations (2024/01/08)

Personal

The Long Happenstance of Iceland and Copenhagen (2023/12/09)

Violence’s Imaginarium: Informal Follow-Up to ‘War Is Hell’ (2024/07/11)

Romanian

Remus Cernea on Independent War Correspondence in Ukraine (2023/08/25)

Zaporizhzhia Field Interview With Remus Cernea (2024/02/21)

War and Destruction With Remus Cernea (2024/02/22)

Remus Cornea on Ukraine in Early 2024 (2024/04/29)

Remus Cernea on Perpetual War and Perpetual Peace (2024/06/28)

Alex Craiu on Journalism During War (2024/09/24)

Ukrainian

Ms. Oleksandra Romantsova on Ukraine and Putin (2023/09/01)

Oleksandra Romantsova on Prigozhin and Amnesty International (2023/12/03)

Dr. Roman Nekoliak on International Human Rights and Ukraine (2023/12/23)

Sorina Kiev: Being a Restauranteur During Russo-Ukrainian War (2024/01/27)

World Wars, Human Rights & Humanitarian Law w/ Roman Nekoliak (2024/03/07)

Oleksandra Romantsova: Financing Regional Defense in War (2024/03/11)

Russo-Ukrainian War Updates, February to April: O. Romantsova (2024/05/13)

Dr. Kateryna Busol on Dehumanization in Russo-Ukrainian War (2024/06/20)

Oleksandra Romantsova on April to May in Ukraine (2024/06/27)

Oleksandra Romantsova on Political Events and Public Living (2024/09/19)

Book Release

On the Russo-Ukrainian War: August, 2023 to July, 2024 (2024/09/18)

Last updated May 3, 2025. These terms govern all In Sight Publishing content—past, present, and future—and supersede any prior notices. In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen is licensed under a Creative Commons BY‑NC‑ND 4.0; © In Sight Publishing by Scott Douglas Jacobsen 2012–Present. All trademarks, performances, databases & branding are owned by their rights holders; no use without permission. Unauthorized copying, modification, framing or public communication is prohibited. External links are not endorsed. Cookies & tracking require consent, and data processing complies with PIPEDA & GDPR; no data from children < 13 (COPPA). Content meets WCAG 2.1 AA under the Accessible Canada Act & is preserved in open archival formats with backups. Excerpts & links require full credit & hyperlink; limited quoting under fair-dealing & fair-use. All content is informational; no liability for errors or omissions: Feedback welcome, and verified errors corrected promptly. For permissions or DMCA notices, email: scott.jacobsen2025@gmail.com. Site use is governed by BC laws; content is “as‑is,” liability limited, users indemnify us; moral, performers’ & database sui generis rights reserved.